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“The vey hardest part of economic development is getting the first foothold 
on the ladder. Households and countries at the very bottom of the world’s 
income distribution, in extreme poverty, tend to be stuk”.  
 
 Economist Jeffrey Sachs. 
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“The cotton industry is good business for the Zambian farmers,  
they just don’t know it yet“ 
 
 Interview August 2008 West Chita.  
Chairman of Zambian Cotton Development Trust  
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1. Introduction  
 
Expanding world trade and the growing integration of countries into the global market have 
increased the opportunity for substantial national economic growth and income growth for 
citizens throughout the world. The success stories1 have led many analysts to proclaim that 
trade-led growth should be the core of any poverty reduction strategy (Dollar & Kraay 
2002:219). Still trade and the gains from globalisation are unequally distributed between, as 
well as within, societies. This has led other analysts to argue that “Trickle-down economics, 
which holds that so long as the economy as a whole grows everyone benefits, has been 
repeatedly shown to be wrong” (Stiglitz 2006:23). Instead enhanced inequality and poverty 
have occurred contemporarily with national growth (ibid:23). Hence consideration on how to 
make trade more ‘pro-poor’2 is vital if we are to evict extreme poverty in our lifetime.  
 
Behind this report lies an assumption that trade-led growth is a powerful instrument that can 
alleviate poverty. Nevertheless, considering that the potential in the linkage between trade 
and poverty has not yet been fully exploited, the outlook is how developing countries should 
participate in global markets in order to alleviate poverty. Zambia proves this point as it, as 
many other developing countries, has been struggling with how best to integrate into the 
global economy to benefit the entire population (FNDP:262). For reasons outlined in the 
succeeding, I will from the perspective of Zambian farmers’ participation in cotton trade 
examine whether this is a conceivable poverty reduction strategy for Zambia. 
 
Making the most of globalization 
Considerations on how to spread the gains from globalization has among others been made 
by theoreticians 3  focusing on commodity chains. The focus has been on industrialized 
upgrading as a strategy for developing countries to meet the challenges of globalization. 
Focusing on industrial upgrading is based on the observation that prices of primary com-
modities, on which many developing countries fully rely on, have not followed the general 
price development, resulting in price reduction of primary commodities compared to manu-
                                                 
1  Western countries and the Asian tiger economies; Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea &Taiwan.   
2 ‘Pro-poor’ growth is growth that is good for the poor. It implies a reduction of inequality, where the income of 
the majority of the poor grows faster that the income of the non-poor (DFID 2004, Bigsten& Tengstam 2008:1). 
3 Gary Gereffi 1994, Immanual Wallerstein 1994, Peter Gibbon 2005, Raphael Kaplinsky 2001. 
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factured products (Kaplinsky & Morris 2001:21). This observation is described as ‘unequal 
terms of trade’, which originates from the structuralists: Raul Prebish and Hans Singer. They 
argue that the inequality, in ‘terms of trade’, derives from an unequal power relation between 
states, which give some countries advantages in protecting their own interests (Cypher & 
Dietz 2004:160ff). Hence developing countries that formerly had a primary commodity based 
economy have turned to industrialization, and some with great success4.  
 
Despite its efforts for diversification, Zambia is still highly dependent on the primary sector. 
Cobber and cobalt account for more than two-third of Zambia’s exports (Taylor 2007:58f, 
TPR 2002:6). This makes Zambia’s economy highly vulnerable to price fluctuations. Still 
real GDP grew 4,6 percent annually in average during 1999 to 2005, and from 2005 to 2008 
real GDP increased by six percent per year (PID 2008, CIA). One of the main reasons for this 
was an increase of more than 100 percent in copper prices on the world market5 (FNDP:22).  
 
Still, while GDP growth has accelerated, it has not trickled down to rural areas, nor ended the 
widespread poverty (FNDP:32). Approximately 64 percent of the population lives below one 
dollar a day (WB 2005), of which roughly 78 percent are living in rural areas (UM). The gini 
index of family income in 2004 was estimated at 50,8 indicating the significant inequality in 
the distribution of income between Zambians (CIA). Hence it seems that the economic 
growth is distributed in favour of the elite in urban centres and the mining industry, at the 
expense of the poor in rural areas. Considering this polarization, Fuentes Ricardo6 argues that 
due to the lack of linkage between economic growth and poverty “… more efforts are needed 
to promote productive sectors from which the poor obtain their income” (Ricardo 2005:15). 
. 
Agricultural-led development strategy 
How to end poverty has lately received a lot of attention. In 2000, the UNs member countries 
pledged to end extreme poverty in the world, by achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals by the year 2015 (un.org), and most donor agencies state poverty reduction as their 
general objective. Since most poor are occupied in the agricultural sector, the possibilities of 
                                                 
4 E.g. China has transformed its economy to be based on the secondary rather than the primary sector, and its 
GDP has risen ten percent annually over the last two decades, and more than 400 million of its citizens have 
moved above the poverty line. (Rodrik 2007:2, Kane & Serewicz 2001:1). 
5 Supported by a balanced economic policy, significant development aid and an increase in taxation (UM). 
6 Policy specialist from the Human Development Office at UNDP. 
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targeting this sector have become central in development debates. Still, during the last 
decades the agricultural sector has received little attention in the development debates. On 
the contrary industrialization has been pinpointed as the key catalyst for development and 
poverty alleviation due to the argumentation set forward in the ‘terms of trade’ consideration.  
 
Researchers have conversely discovered that promoting farmer’s income from agriculture by 
strengthening their linkages to the world market through private companies, has proved to 
process potential for rural development and poverty reduction (Shepherd 2007, Gibbon  
2001:60, Hazell 2007). They argue that by providing farmers with a reliable demand for their 
products, they can move out of being solely subsistence farmers7, and participate in income-
generating goods, which improve their chances of escaping poverty. Hence recognizing the 
agricultural sector as a development catalyst has recently gained more ground. This can be 
seen by the likes of the African Commission8, who highlight “agriculture as a cross cutting 
issue to achieve sustainable economic growth and job creation in Africa” (Bus-
trup9:3.12.08). Likewise, the International Food Policy Research Institute join in this view by 
arguing that “sustained growth in agriculture can reduce hunger and poverty” (Spiel-
an:3.12.08).  m
 
In the case of Zambia’s agricultural sector, the country is endowed with arable land of 42 
million hectares, of which only four percent is cultivated (PID 2008:1). The country’s 
800.000 small scale farmers account for around eighty percent of the area (CDT 2008:1). 
Currently, agriculture contributes to 18,6 percent of Zambia’s GDP, about ten percent of the 
country’s export earnings, and the sector provides employment to roughly seventy percent of 
the Zambian labour force (PID 2008:1). Hence there exists a considerable potential in 
abundant natural resources and cultivation (Rates 2003:5). Nonetheless, the difficulties of 
reaching these farmers effectively are considerable. This relates to poor infrastructure, lack of 
state fiscal capacity and good governance, education level and the informal sector which the 
                                                 
7 Forty percent of rural Zambian households are solely engaged in subsistence agriculture (OECD 2008:106). 
, and find solutions on how to best help Africans escape poverty (um.dk). 
8 The Danish government has founded the Commission. The objective is to generate international focus on 
Africa
9 Member of the African Commission, Chairman of the Danish Board for International Development Coopera-
tion. 
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farmers can be classified as being a part of10. Furthermore, Zambia’s landlocked position 
makes transport expenses above coast based countries and constrains Zambia from attracting 
reign investors that can provide the efficient linkage for rural farmers to the world market.  
, it is in essence the crop with 
e largest potential for farmers to escape poverty (ibid:1,39).  
le farmers in relation to whether it enables or constrains 
 from escaping poverty.  
                                                
fo
 
Zambia’s cotton success 
In spite of these constrains, the privatization in 1994 of the cotton industry in Zambia has 
been proclaimed by scientists to be a major success for Zambia’s development in rural areas: 
“Cotton is one unquestioned success of Zambia’s turn towards a market economy” 
(Tschirley & Zulu 2003:1). The success can be registered in the significantly increasing 
production that rose from 42.000 tons in 1994/95 to 227.000 tons in 2003/04, an increase of 
more than 500 percent (App:A). Moreover, exports of cotton during the period from 2002 to 
2005 were thirty percent higher than its nearest competitor: raw cane sugar, and while sugar 
is primarily produced by large farmers, cotton is essentially a smallholder crop (Kabwe & 
Tschirley 2007a:1). Hence the increased cotton production indicates a considerable influence 
on poverty in rural Zambia. Cotton constitutes an important crop for rural households, and 
since it is the only cash crop small scale farmers can cultivate
th
 
Researchers reach different verdicts on the cotton industry’s impact on rural livelihood. 
Some point out cotton as being the cause for unequal globalization and poverty, since 
industrialized countries subsidies their cotton, which diminish Africa’s possibility of getting 
full value of their cotton (Gray 2008:65). Others proclaim that since cotton is an income 
generating job for an extensive number of farmers, cotton work as a catalyst for economic 
growth in rural areas with a potential of alleviating poverty (Poulton et al 2004:45). Against 
the background of these contemplations, I will examine the strengths and limitations of the 
linkage to cotton trade for small sca
them
 
 
10 Whether these factors are causes or consequences of neglect in the agricultural sector can be questioned. 
While poor infrastructure hampers farmers’ access to the market, the farmers’ lack of competitiveness on the 
market hampers the financial incentives to improve the infrastructure. Hence often a vicious poverty circle 
exists in this situation, where poverty reinforces itself.  
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1.2 Research question 
How does the Zambian cotton industry influence the potential for reducing poverty among 
all scale farmers in Zambia? sm
 13
2. Method  
 
In the following chapter I explain how I will be answering the research question. I begin with 
a clarification of the core concepts that I apply and explain what purpose they serve in the 
report. My research focus is founded on my fieldwork in Zambia, which I will elaborate in 
terms of how I have conducted my fieldwork, and how it has contributed to answer the 
research question. Finally, considerations will be clarified on the level of validity of the 
collected information, as well as the application of the research of other scientists and the 
statistical data that supplement my fieldwork.  
 
2.1 Applications of key concepts  
 
In the following I will explain the key concepts for this report, and clarify what purpose they 
serve throughout the report in relation to each other.  
ents. These are variables that affect the farmers’ 
 of escaping poverty through cotton trade. The examination of the ‘institutional 
 Since 
 
‘organisational structure’ and ‘institutional arrangements’ composing the transaction between 
two actors.  
 
The linkage between farmers and companies 
The linkage between the private cotton companies and the small scale farmers is the centre of 
this report. How this linkage is ‘organisationally structured’ and ‘institutionally arranged’ 
will be examined thoroughly. The examination of the ‘organisational structure’ consists of 
how the cotton industry is organized e.g. the level of companies operating, which effect their 
price competition and level of investm
capability
arrangement’ consists of the contract between the companies and the farmers (App:H).
that Zambian cotton industry is based upon these contracts, analyzing the articles in the 
contract, e.g. how the rights and risk are distributed between the actors, provides an under-
standing on how the linkage between farmers and companies enables and/or constrain the
farmers’ capability of escaping poverty. The linkage between farmers and companies will 
essentially be analyzed with the assistance of the Principal-Agent theory11 that focuses on the 
                                                 
11 This theory will be explained in section 3.2 
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 The role of the state in creating the right business environment  
The linkage between the cotton companies and small scale farmers are affected by the level 
of involvement of the Zambian state. The Zambian state guide the business environment the 
ities and constraints that exist for the farmer’s involvement in the 
otton industry, I essentially focus on the domestic conditions which I believe are the main 
located in Zambia, are affiliated by large international enterprises which influence the 
companies operate within, by its extent of regulations, protection of property rights and 
creation of incitement for companies to invest (Moss 2007:234). This affects whether 
companies choose to operate in rural Zambia, and how they choose to operate12. Further, the 
Zambian states’ level of support to farmers, in this relation particularly through farmers’ 
associations; influences the farmer’s position in the linkage to companies. The role of the 
state is central in creating the right sustainable business environment for the companies as 
well as for the farmers. Since the Zambian state policy goal is to alleviate poverty (Dorward 
el al 2006:255, FNDP), the creation of a well-functioning cotton industry, should be meas-
ured against the yardstick of whether it reduces poverty. The possibilities and constrains of 
the state in creating a sustainable business will essentially be analyzed with the assistance of 
the Critical Globalist theory that focus on how to create a well-functioning market in an area 
where high transactions exist, as in rural Zambia13.  
 
To understand the possibil
c
reasons why small scale farmers have remained poor. Thereby, I concur with the view of 
“Studies that have tried to calculate the relative importance of global trade rules versus 
local problems have tended to conclude that it has been these local conditions that are more 
important” (Moos 2007:210).  
 
The global cotton market impact on Zambian farmers 
Still international variables, will be brought forward to investigate the terms by which the 
local and domestic level are affected. The agricultural policies of the industrialized countries 
are included, since they influence the potential for Zambia in participating in cotton produc-
tion, in terms of getting full value for their cotton. Moreover, some of the cotton companies, 
                                                 
12 Details on this will be brought forward in e.g. chapter 3. 
13 This will be elaborated in section 3.3. 
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Zambian cotton companies’ options and relation to the farmers14. The international condi-
tions will essentially be analyzed with the assistance of the Global Value Chain theory15, 
focusing on how international actors influence national and local options.  
.1.1 Application of the concepts of the cotton industry and cotton companies 
 companies. I use the contract which the cotton company Dunavant gives to 
e farmers, in order to generalize on the relations between the companies and their con-
2008 and uses a different business practice e.g. providing less pre-financing input (IW:Kitta). 
2
 
The Zambian cotton industry will be scrutinized thoroughly in this report. The industry 
consists of private companies, and has since privatization in 1994 moved from two to eleven 
companies. Some of these companies are linked with large international cotton companies, 
others operate at a smaller scale. As a result, the companies work under different conditions 
e.g. in economies of scale. The purpose of this report is not to outline the different individu-
ally business structures into specifics. Instead, it is the total of the companies; ‘the cotton 
industry’, that composes the relevance. The report set out to answer how the Zambian cotton 
industry is affecting the farmers’ capability to escape poverty. It is possible to look at the 
cotton industry in general, since the contract conducted by the different companies are 
similar, hence the relations are, to a large extent, similar between the farmers and the 
different cotton
th
tracted farmers (App:H).  
 
Only when it serves to explain the dynamics of the industry will some of the companies be 
mentioned by name. In these cases, it is the companies with contrasting business scale and 
practices that will be referred to, since these oppositions determine the dynamics of the 
industry the most. This means that the companies Dunavant and Cargill will be mentioned as 
the opposite of Yustina. Dunavant and Cargill uses by and large similar business practices 
e.g. their pre-financing input to farmers, are both operating at an international scale, and have 
both been operating in Zambia for a prolonged period of time and have taken the lead in 
developing the Zambian cotton industry (IW:Dettmer & Seabrook 16 ). Yustina, on the 
contrary, is a Malawian company operating at a smaller scale, starting operating in Zambia in 
                                                 
14 For further detail see chapter 3 and 4. 
15 This theory will be explained in chapter 3.1 
16 Names of people I have interviewed during my fieldwork in Zambia. 
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The outcome of these differences will be analyzed in later chapters. For further detail on the 
different cotton companies see appendix C and D.    
2.1.2 Measuring poverty  
 
In this report, poverty will be examined from the perspective of the cotton industry’s impact 
n farmers, to identify the possibilities and constrains for farmers to escape poverty when 
e. The report does not go further into the grassroots perspective of 
 since an increase in prices of cotton is worth nothing if 
 is a result of an equivalently or further increased input loan. And second of all, since I can 
m export cash crop production is widely recognized to be one of the best short-
rm measures to alleviate poverty” (Poulton et al 2004:59). This perception, concurs Jeffrey 
o
participating in cotton trad
the farmers’ general health situation or farmer’s other agro-commodity activities that can 
strengthen or threaten the farmers’ income and livelihood17. Instead, measuring poverty in 
this report relates to the payment farmers receive from selling their cotton production to a 
company, after subtracting the input loan they receive from the companies before planting. 
This is important to notify; first of all,
it
not rule out the possibility that some of the farmers are involved in other activities, hence 
receive an income from other activities as well, including e.g. food crops, police services or 
truck driving. 
 
It is recognized that estimating the farmers’ economic vulnerability is a vital poverty parame-
ter in the case of cotton, since decreased poverty enhance the farmers’ ability to bear risk. “In 
low income economies where the majority of the poor live in rural areas, an increase in 
income fro
te
Sachs who signifies the relationship between income level and escaping poverty, by pointing 
out that: “The key problem for the poorest […] is that poverty itself can be a trap. When 
poverty is very extreme, the poor do not have the ability – by themselves – to get out of the 
mess” (Sachs 2005:56). Since farmers use the little capital they have to survive by, it requires 
enhanced savings to improve their situation (ibid:56f). In relation to this argument, it can be 
derived that, since cotton is the only cash crop small scale farmers can cultivate, the income 
                                                 
17 Although it can easily be argued that there exists a connection between poverty and e.g. health. For instance, 
AIDS is an issue that influences the poverty trap of farmers. In Zambia 16,5 % of the adults in 2003 were 
affected by the disease (CIA). When the farmers do not have sufficient money to buy drugs to prevent HIV 
from transforming into AIDS, a household with a HIV infected person, easily lose him to AIDS, which is a 
direct yield loss in the field, resulting in lower income.   
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level from cotton essentially determines whether the farmers are able to save money and 
eventually their chances of escaping poverty. Behind this lies an assumption that if they are 
capable to save money and if the money is invested right, they can accumulate their income 
into poverty reduction. For example by buying tools and livestock they can improve their 
farm yield, which would accumulate their income.  
 
Economic vulnerability 
Following this path, economic vulnerability is applied in this report to clarify cotton farmers’ 
onditions e.g. cash constrains, weak cotton 
pressure caused by these ‘shocks’ (Krantz 2001:7). This creates a vicious poverty trap, where 
farmers harvesting next to poverty are constrained from climbing up the development ladder. 
Since poverty is a complex and multidimensional phenomena, a profound poverty reduction 
strategy would embrace many variables; illiteracy, health, social security net, etc. It is not 
possible to include all these poverty parameters in this report. Instead, I have chosen to focus 
on the cotton industry’s influences on one parameter: the farmers’ economic vulnerability, 
for reasons outlined in the following. 
 
The term economic vulnerability originates from the approach of Sustainable Livelihood. 
The approach pursues to understand the various factors that constrain or enhance farmers’ 
ability to escape poverty in a sustainable manner. The concept is defined as: “A livelihood is 
sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or en-
hance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base” (Krantz 
2001:1). In the approach sustainability becomes the key condition for escaping poverty, since 
poverty is understood as “… the lack of secure conditions in life …” (Foster & Norton 
2001:9).  
 
(1) capability to withstand constant ‘stress’ c
market services, poor infrastructure and weak farmers’ associations, and (2) their capability 
to withstand ‘shocks’ in the cotton industry, such as failed harvest or sudden lack of demand 
for cotton resulting in lower prices. The ‘stress’ makes the farmers vulnerable and hinder 
them from escaping poverty, but when they moreover face ‘shocks’, the outcome is likely 
increased poverty, since the farmers do not have the cash savings to withstand the extra 
Since poverty is a result of lack of secure conditions in life (Foster & Norton 2001:9), it 
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becomes interesting to measure the extent of farmers exposure to shocks when participating 
in cotton trade, and determine how to diminish farmers’ exposure to ‘shocks’ in the cotton 
industry. Thereby in this report, economic vulnerability is measured as the farmers’ extent of 
‘shocks’ when participating in cotton trade, including their level of job possibilities and job 
curity in the cotton industry, and the extent of unpredictability in cotton price fluctuation 
n terms of e.g. failed harvest.  
 
Examining economic vulnerability means that the research question is not simply answered 
by focusing on how the farmers can acquire the largest proportion possible of the cotton 
industry’s revenue. It is also important to study how to secure an investment climate for the 
cotton companies, in order for the industry to stay in Zambia in the long run, and create as 
m e for rural far the business climate is not attractive for the 
c  farmers jobless in terms of cotton, which likely 
l uld become subsistence farmers. Thus both 
rn to farmers and the best possible investment climate for 
anies need to be achieved to enable farmers to take advantage of the opportunities 
the cotton industry process to them and escape poverty. Thereby enabling farmers to partici-
pate in a s benefit from the cotton in stry. In the  where conf ting rests 
e  income in the sh term  gu ng nst ers’ exposure 
t tal is to re sustainab  in  cot indu , since 
poverty is a result of lack of secu d:20
 
2.1.3 Characteristics of small scale farmers  
                                                
se
and risks i
any jobs as possibl mers. If 
ompanies, they will leave Zambia, making
eave the farmers worse off since they wo
conditions: the best possible retu
the comp
s well a du  case lic  inte
xist between maximizing ort  and ardi agai farm
o shocks in the long term, the pivo secu ility the ton stry
re conditions in life (ibi 01:9).  
 
There are currently 280.000 farmers growing cotton in Zambia (IW:Nkole). Cotton is 
primarily produced by small scale farmers in the eastern, southern and central province of 
Zambia18 (Table:1). In the table below it is shown that the eastern province is clearly the 
largest of the lot, with over one-third of all households producing cotton. To illuminate the 
level and allocation of cotton cultivation in Zambia over the years, I have included detailed 
 
o 2005:9). Still, companies 
e cobberbelt and western province (App:C).  
18. In the remaining provinces, cotton is a less feasible option. This is related to low population density, poor 
infrastructure and soil conditions under which cotton can not grow (Balet & Port
have since 2002 build operations in th
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aspects on cotton cultivations in the case of the eastern province in table 219. It is important 
to clarify that when I use the term small scale farmers, it is understood as smallholders that 
re cotton farmers. Hence the term does not include smallholders in e.g. the northern part of a
Zambia, where the soil conditions prevent cotton from being cultivated. 
 
Table: 1 
Percentage of farmers growing cotton in 2002 
Eastern 39 
Central  20 
Southern  13 
Lusaka  8 
The rest of the province 0 
Source: Brambrilla & Porto 2006 World Bank Research 
Paper, calculations based on the Post Harvest Surveys 1997-
2002 
 
Table: 2 
Eastern province  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Farmers growing cotton in % 35 33 32 20 32 39 
Fraction of land allocated to cotton in % 12 13 12 7 12 15 
Cotton households also grow maize in % 100 98,4 98,7 99,7 99,5 100 
Source: Brambrilla & Porte 2006 World Bank Research Paper, calculations based on the Post Harvest Surveys 
1997-2002 
  
The characteristics for small scale farmers are that they are assessed poor and cash con-
strained. They cultivate between one and two hectare of land. Eventhough the farmers have 
lived on the land for generations, they do not own the land. The land is owned by a chief and 
is traditional land20, which constitutes more than half of Zambia (Vinther 2008). The chief 
determines who can cultivate his land and can take his processions back whenever he 
                                                 
19 Notice that the data for the tables are from 2002. This means that the tables do not show the increase of 
farmers participating in cotton since 2002. This can instead be seen in appendix A. 
20 Opposite of state owned land. 
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wishes21. Although the farmers disclaim the right to the land, most farmers are residents on 
traditional land, as they are not charged taxes for it (ibid.).  
 
These farmers depend on rainfall rather than irrigation, and cultivate around four types of 
crops. For example maize, groundnuts and sunflower consist of the food crops, and cotton is 
the only cash crop. By having different crops that are reacting differently to the weather, the 
farmer can almost be sure that the whole harvest will not fail, thereby they are minimizing 
the risk22. If bad weather occurs, farmers are most likely able to survive on some of the other 
crops, hence “spreading the risk between crops could mean the difference between starvation 
and surviving” (IW:Edwin). 
 
If the farmers were unable to produce cotton, most of them would solely be subsistence 
farmers, meaning that they are self-sufficient: Only producing food crops for own consump-
tion, without any significant surpluses to sell, or without any significant income from cash 
crops or non-farm related incomes (FNDP:31). Subsistence farming is currently still the most 
dominant form of production in Zambia (OECD 2008:105). Because subsistence farmers are 
cash constrained, they are economically vulnerable to shocks, and the chances of escaping 
poverty as subsistence farmer are minimal. “When farmers only are producing enough for 
them self, it is not development, it is survival” (IW:Muleba).  
 
There are disparities in the level of poverty in the group of small scale farmers worth 
mentioning. In average, there are six people in one household, but depending on e.g. how 
many wives’ one man has got, the number of members of a household can differ between 
two and twenty people 23  (IW:Muleba & Samuel). Considering that cotton is a labour-
intensive crop, the importance of the number of people and the level of oxen and ploughs 
equipment is decisive for the farmers’ yield24, and their capabilities to profit the most from 
cotton cultivation. In this report, I essentially treat the small scale farmers as one group 
                                                 
21 This only happens in rare cases. But simply the possibility of the chief taking the land back, effects the 
farmers incitement to improve the soil conditions, the choices of crop cultivation etc. (IW:Malambo) 
22 Cotton is drought resistant and maize is rain resistant.  
23 In Zambia, it is common to have between one or four wives, depending on your age and status (IW:Samuel).  
24 For a comprehensive study of this, read Stephen Kabwe and David Tschirley 2007a, where they categorize 
cotton farmers into four groups, determined by their level of assets, number in a household etc. In their report, 
they argue that the level of assets is vital in terms of the farmers’ ability to escape poverty, where the ones with 
most assets have a larger chance.  
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throughout the report, since it is their linkage as suppliers to the companies that will be 
 in terms of assets and households number will only 
 
investigated. The disparities in the group
be mentioned as one of the many variables that determine whether farmers are capable of
escaping poverty through their participation in cotton trade.  
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2
 
.2 The cotton commodity chain 
 figure below (figure 1), modity chain are illus-
-output’ structured map25. The figure serves to give an overview on 
 local level are linked with the international level.  
panies supply the farmers with inputs, then the farmers sow, 
weed and harvest the cotton seed26. Afterwards, the companies purchase the cotton seed in 
the farmer’s villages and process it into cotton lint at the ginnery27. Then the companies sell 
it on the world market tional cotton traders, primarily 28 . As 
illustrated  is linked, where flo ials go 
upward fro ocal to nal level, while flows of information on e.g. consum-
ers demand in quality go downward from inte  local level (Ka Morris 
2001:3).  
 
As mentioned earlier, the focus in this report will be on the linkage between farmers and the 
companies and, to a less extent, on the end-buyer: the spinners and the final consumers. This 
focus is highlighted in the figure by the activities within the stippled line.  
 
The figure shows a simplified version of the chain, given that the actors involved in the chain 
include hundreds of thousands  farmers, a number of companies and Zambia’s 
state level of regulation in the sector (Tschirley & Zulu anaging the global 
cotton commodity chain requires coordination and control, a central question in this report is 
to explore who a itiative to coordinate? Is it the Zambian state, or is it the 
private companie ening the relationship with the farm-
ers? And furthermore, what is the outcome of this distribution of roles between the state and 
the private companies in terms of the small scale farmers’ capability of escaping poverty?  
                                                
In the the major activities in the cotton com
trated through an ‘input
how the activities on the
 
In the cotton industry, the com
through interna to spinners
in the figure, the commodity chain
m the l
 two-way ws of mater
 the internatio
rnational to plinsky & 
 of small scale
2003:1). Since m
re taking the in
s, who are taking the lead in strength
 
25 The term originates from the Global Value Chain theory which will be detailed in the next chapter. 
26 Cotton seed is cotton from which the seed has not yet been removed. 
27 Ginning is a mechanical process where the cotton lint is separated from the seed. 
28 The textile commodity chain is small in Zambia, and cotton lint is primarily sold on the world market to 
traders from countries that process the textile value chain. 
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The global 
cotton 
market  
The Zambian state: 
- regulations 
- incentives 
- protection  of     
  property rights 
- macro economic   
  stability 
 
Flows of materiale 
 Flows of information on e.g. consumer orders
The linkage   
between  
farmers and  
companies,  
manifested in  
the contract  
Farmers
Companies
In
Seed, fertil
puts from company:  
izers & 
insecticides 
Inputs from farmers: 
Labor, livestock & 
land. 
 Purchasing 
& Grading  
Storage & 
marketing 
 Ginning:    
  Cotton 
  Lint   
Harvesting  
Weeding 
& spraying 
Seeding 
Distribution and marketing by international cotton 
Figure 1: The cotton commodity chain 
 
companies & consumed by spinneries on the world 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Fieldwork  
 
This report relies on in my fieldwork conducted from 14th of June to the 22nd of August 2008 
ght of m
uring the fieldwork will be supplemented by the contract of the cotton compa-
has written: “Quality Standard-Setting in the Global cotton Chain and Cotton Sector Reforms 
in Zambia. The purpose of my fieldwork was to get an inductive hands-on impression of 
what the key possibilities and barriers were for farmers to escape poverty through participat-
ing in cotton trade. I choose to do my fieldwork early in the research process, because I 
wanted to be in Zambia during the high season of the cotton sector, where harvesting and 
marketing were peaking29. Cotton is a season-determined industry, thus being in Zambia at a 
time where most people are occupied, contributed to get an insi any of the segments 
of the processing procedures. 
 
My fieldwork can be considered as the empirical background material for this report, which 
has determined my research question and my choice of theoretical approach. The interviews 
conducted d
nies, Zambian states documents, statistics as well as research conducted by scientists, who 
have worked on the research area over a longer period30. Thereby the findings from the 
fieldwork will not stand alone, but be brought in parallel with the findings of other research-
ers on the area.  
  
2.3.1 Fieldwork preparations 
 
Before leaving for Zambia, I planned to use the Global Value Chain theory31 to study the 
cotton-textile commodity chain. While preparing for the fieldwork I looked into the research 
field regarding the cotton-textile commodity chain in Africa, in particular research on 
Chinas’ increasing role in Zambia’s textile industry (Kragelund 2007, Kragelund & Bastholm 
2007, Alden 2007). I interviewed Marianne Nylandsted Larsen32, who amongst other papers, 
                                                 
29 Harvesting and buying of cotton start in May and lasts until September. The ginning procedure begins in 
June, and depending on how much cotton the company acquires, their main ginning procedure ends in 
researchers’ and their findings will be detailed in section 2.5. 
agen University. 
December.  
30 The 
31 For further information on this theory, see chapter 3.1. 
32 Assistant Professor at the Geography Institute, Copenh
 25
in Sub Saharan Africa” (Larsen 2003). One of the conclusions from this paper was that the 
privatization of the cotton industry in Zambia was highlighted as a success story due to its 
pressive growth rate.  
 
ognized that industrialization is a catalyst for development (Cypher 
be declining. The industry is currently in a crisis, which mainly has to due 
ith the fact that some of the companies that have entered the Zambian cotton market are 
is report, moving from 
e observation conducted on Zambia’s cotton industry, on the linkage between the compa-
im
As it has been widely rec
& Dietz 2004:248ff,280ff, Rodrik 2006:1), a natural question before arriving in Zambia thus 
was: Why isn’t there a larger textile industry, when there is such a well-functioning cotton 
industry? My idea was to look especially at multilateral and bilateral trade agreements that 
have influenced the cotton-textile commodity chain in Zambia33. In addition, I read that the 
Chinese textile company ZCMT was one of the only textile companies in Zambia still 
operating and controlling the whole cotton-textile GVC34 (Kragelund 2007:175). I planned to 
focus on this company. However, I was later informed by Peter Kragelund 35  that this 
company went into suspension of payment in 2007 (email:05.08), and considerations about 
focusing solely  on the cotton commodity started to take form. 
 
This proved to be a good decision. When I arrived in Zambia, the success of the cotton 
industry seemed to 
w
promoting side selling, resulting in farmers’ loan default towards their contracted compani-
es36. It therefore seemed outdated to examine why there is not a larger textile industry. After 
interviewing the cotton stakeholders, I contrarily realized that the microeconomic premises 
dealt with by the Principal-Agent theory37, including imperfect information and imperfect 
markets, are present in the relation between Zambian farmers and cotton companies. Hence it 
was helpful not to be too advanced in the writing process of the thesis, and be able to adjust 
to the new insight, and include it in my final research question and theoretical framework. 
From this it can be derived that I have used an inductive method for th
th
                                                 
33 Including the WTO MFA, the US AGOA initiative and the EU EBA initiatives (Gibbon 2003). 
34 ZCMT was one of the Chinese companies that started building assets in Africa to circumvent the export 
restrictions under the WTO MFA, and benefit from the African quotes to the EU and US market (Koyi 
2006:14). 
35 Professor at the Department of Society and Globalization, Roskilde University, and former researcher at 
DIIS. 
36 Details on the reason behind the current crisis will be brought up in the analysis, in particular chapter 7. 
37 For further information on this theory, see chapter 3. 
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nies and farmers to a general discussion on whether the privatized cotton industry can enable 
farmers to escape poverty.  
 
2.3.2 Interview method 
 
During my fieldwork, I was connected to Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke (MS), who helped me 
nformation. Many of MS’ partners in Zambia are farmer associa-
ons who additionally helped me in getting into contact to the farmers. When interviewing, I 
ews with individuals, but some of the farmers I met in groups of around three to ten 
ersons. Some of the respondents I met with once, while others I was have been in contact 
Denmark, I have been in regular contact by email 
uld help me get closer to the main focus of my report (Kvale 2000:104). 
xplorative interview is a method, placed between an open and a structured interview 
ured in a manner that the interviewer finds 
respondent gave me. In the beginning, my questions to the companies were centred on how 
with relevant contacts and i
ti
clarified to the respondents that I was a student, seeking to get their side of the story, thereby 
trying to offer them the right perception of my purpose. The fieldwork has mostly been based 
on intervi
p
with on a regular basis. Since returning to 
with the managing director of Dunavant: Nigel Seabrook, to be up-to-date with the changes 
in the industry. The respondents have been interviewed from half an hour to one hour. In 
general, many of the respondents were interested in my research, and wished to receive the 
report afterwards.  
 
For the interviews I used a tape-recorder in order to focus on the conversation while inter-
viewing, leaving the transcriptions for later. I used explorative interview as a method to get 
information that co
E
question method, where the interviews are struct
important, but at the same time keeps the questions open, so if the respondents wish to add 
other relevant aspects, they can do so (ibid:129). Further, getting the respondents’ own 
opinion well represented is more feasible when using open questions. 
 
As a result of this interview method my questions adjusted continually to the answers that the 
international trade agreements affected the Zambian cotton industry, whereas the respondents 
mainly were pointing at domestic factors that determined the development of the cotton 
industry. This made me modify the questions correspondingly. Whether their focus on the 
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domestic factors was due to the fact that they in their position could not do much about the 
international cotton market and therefore chose to focus on the things they could influence, is 
feasible. As a consequence how, and to which extent, the conditions within the global cotton 
market influence the industry will not be brought forward at the level that I first anticipated. 
Instead, the domestic cotton market will be the primary focus.  
 
2.3.3 List of interviewees 
 
I have met a variety of people, consisting of representatives from the whole domestic cotton 
chain and institutions surrounding the chain. In the following I have listed the key inter-
views38. 
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce 
I interviewed Richard Kamona, the deputy director of Agriculture of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture and Commerce (MACO). He has been participating in rewriting the Cotton Act, which is 
the Act within the regulation of the cotton industry takes place39 (App:I). My focus was to 
understand what governmental initiatives were accomplished in order to improve the cotton 
industry e.g. the prospect of implementing the revised Cotton Act, and how the state sup-
ported the cotton farmers’ linkage with the cotton companies. In spite of the fact that many of 
the cotton industries’ stakeholders are lobbying for the revised Cotton Act to be passed, it has 
not yet happened.  
 
Companies 
Since most of my questions to the companies were of a character that demanded respondents 
capable of informing on the overall situation of their company, it was people in key positions 
that I interviewed. I have met with the following six cotton companies: Cargill, Chipata 
Cotton Company, Continental, Dunavant, Mulungushi and Yustina. There exist, at present 
time, eleven companies in Zambia, whereas these six companies represent a wide range of 
                                                 
38 For further details, see in appendix E, where all the interviews are listed. The farmers requested to be 
anonymous in the report; hence the farmers have fictitious names in the interview list. 
39 CDT and other cotton stakeholders have developing a regulatory framework for the future development of the 
sector named the Cotton Act 2005 (Poulton et al 2008:144). The Act is a revised version of the 1914 Cotton Act 
ambia. For further discussion on the Act, see chapter 8.   
and focuses on improving credit repayment and product quality. The Act establishes a Cotton Board that has the 
authority to e.g. decide who can operate in Z
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the cotton companies in terms of different business strategies, level of market share, period of 
establishment in Zambia, that exist in the country (Map:2). I was interested in knowing how 
the cotton industry has changed in terms of the different com arket share and price 
competition, and how the companies have encountered these challenges. Further, I searched 
information on the number of farmers whose harvest had failed, and the number of those who 
had not paid their input-credit loan back for the comp interviewed the companies 
regarding their views on the prospect of their relation to farmers, the role of the government 
and which rules and regulations should be enforced, enabling them to operate as efficiently 
as possible. The companies were emphasizing the current crisis as a major challenge, and 
many  laid their trust in the implementation of the Cotton Act, to regulate and solve 
the c is. 
 
                                                
panies’ m
anies40. I 
 of them
auses of their cris
 
 The Zambian cotton industry is based on pre-financing, where the companies pay for the inputs, seed, 
secticides and fertilisers to farmers gets.  
40
in
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Map 2: The location of cotton ginneries in Zambia 
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Meeting with the managers of the companies proved valuable to achieve an insight into their 
overall business strategy and their organization. Still the respondents were reluctant to reveal 
information about certain areas of interest. For example, it would have been valuable to 
receive the company’s balance sheets, in terms of showing the fluctuation of prices to the 
farmers. It was not possible to get hands on these. Income data is often not available in most 
value chains, which makes it difficult to calculate the different actors’ share of the profit and 
moreover determine whether this is fair (Kaplinsky & Morris 2001:87). I have, to some 
extent, overcome this by obtaining insight into the prices during the interviews and applying 
other scientific information on the farmers’ income 41 . Furthermore, identifying the con-
straints and possibilities of the ‘institutional arrangements’ in the domestic cotton industry 
ether there is a unleashed potential for farmers to strengthen their income 
olders had too 
uch interest in promoting themselves as the ones who were playing fair. I overcome this 
coordinator of Cotton Association of Zambia (CAZ), the Zambian National Farmer Union 
helps to clarify wh
through cotton trade42. 
 
The respondent of the companies were quick to blame the other companies for unfairness. 
For example, the manager of the company Yustina was claiming that they were playing by 
the rules, but; “since the big Zambian cotton companies [read: Dunavant and Cargill] are 
afraid of our competitive prices to farmers, the big companies accuse us for steeling their 
cotton, and do everything in their power to get us out of business” (IW:Kitta). Whether these 
accusations could hold up in court differed, depending on whom I was talking to. Although I 
added critical questions to the answers the respondent gave me, it would have been unreliable 
to base my thesis solely on these company interviews. For that, the stakeh
m
problem by meeting with members of the farmers’ organizations who do not have the same 
business interest.  
 
Interest organizations 
I met with two district farmer associations in respectively Chipata and Nyimba, both located 
in the eastern province and both partners of MS. These associations proved very helpful in 
terms of arranging meetings with ginneries and farmers. In addition, I met with the national 
                                                 
41 Details on this can be found in section 2.5. 
42 This will be done with the assistance of the Principal-Agent theory. 
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(ZNFU)43, Farmer Organization Support Program (FOSUP) and the Cotton Development 
Trust (CDT). These organizations, who essentially work for the interest of the farmers, gave 
valuable information on how the cotton industry affect the farmers and in identifying the 
constraints and benefits farmers acquire from cotton trade. These constrains include the 
farmers’ isolation from larger markets, low prices and heavy labour requirements connected 
with cotton cultivation, in comparison to the farmers’ alternative crop cultivation. In addi-
tion, the organizations proved useful in terms of viewing the level of fairness of the different 
companies’ business strategy form the perspective of farmers. They additionally placed trust, 
hen it came to the current cotton industry’s crisis, in the implementation of the Cotton Act. 
 
any 
ver the years, other has shifted, and their households and livestock consisted of different 
w
Cotton farmers  
The eastern province is the region where most of the cotton is being produced. Currently, 
seven of the companies are operating in this province (Map:2). Hence it is in the eastern 
province that the impact on cotton cultivation is most visible. Therefore, I used most of the 
time in this province, and met with the majority of the roughly thirty cotton farmers I 
interviewed, in this province. As a group they varied. Some continue with the same comp
o
sizes. Some of them I met with in their villages Mbenjele and Chadiza, some of them at the 
storage of their cotton ginning company, and others at Chipata district farmer association 
(CDFA) office. Most of the farmers I interviewed with the assistance of an interpreter44 who 
was a representative of the district farmer association of Nyimba or Chipata.  
 
I interviewed them about which company they were cooperating with, whether they had 
changed company and if so why. I asked them what price they obtained from their harvest, 
whether this was what they had expected, or had there been any changes in the volume and 
quality of their harvest or in the price setting. I asked how their linkage to the companies was 
organized, and whether there had been any changes in organization structure, and whether 
this had worked to their advantage. Moreover, I asked them about the level of labor require-
ments, prices and market reliability in comparison with their alternative crops. Their informa-
                                                 
43 Chipata and Nyimba District Farmer Associations and CAZ are affiliated by ZNFU. 
44 In the eastern province they speak Bemba, and only a few farmers also speak English. In Zambia, 19,4 
percent of the adults in Zambia are illiterate (CIA). The national literacy rate of the age group 15-24 years old in 
2003 was 70 percent (FNDP:155). The country is multi-ethnic, including 73 ethnic, linguistic and racial groups 
:183). (Handley 2008:219, Adar 2002:244, FNDP
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tion gave me knowledge of (1) their economic vulnerability in terms of the unpredictability 
of the price fluctuation, and of the level of volume and quality of cotton, and (2) the con-
strains including their general low level of livestock’s and level of isolation from larger 
arkets45. The farmers were cooperating with different companies, and household’s right 
a result, 
ere could easily be five companies represented in one village. Considering the poor 
.3.4 Fieldwork applicability 
untrustworthy would be too quick a judgment, based on my 
rviews with thirty farmers, of which only two where selling to Yustina. These discrepan-
m
next to each other in the villages had signed contracts with different ginneries. As 
th
infrastructure, this seemed ineffective, but it also gave an idea of how much the companies 
are currently competing.  
 
2
 
The information that I have collected during my fieldwork is very useful for this report. It has 
given me valuable insight that otherwise would not have been available. Getting a first hand 
knowledge of the respondents’ different views on the cotton industry’s influence in rural 
Zambia, gave me an understanding of what the obstacles were in the cotton industry to 
improve farmers livelihood, and helped me come up with my final focus for this report.  
 
As already indicated, a problem emerged when collecting data involving the quantitative 
perceptions of informants on the cotton industries. The answers given by the respondents 
sometimes differed compared to the answers given by others, or from what I could extract 
from literature on the subject. This included what income the farmers received from cotton 
cultivation. Further, the views on the cotton industry of the farmers and the managers of the 
companies were not always similar. For example, I interviewed farmers who were cooperat-
ing with Yustina, who were pleased with cooperating with Yustina and the competitive prices 
the company offered. However, to conclude that the companies that were accusing Yustina 
for steeling their cotton were 
inte
cies made it difficult to distinguish which data was correct, and since the respondents quite 
often were not able to show me any statistics backing up their claims, this made it difficult to 
verify the collected data. I overcame this problem by supplementing the information acquired 
                                                 
45 This will be detailed in chapter 6 and 7. 
 33
through the interviews with data from other sources, which is mentioned in the succeeding 
section.  
 
2.4 The application of studies conducted by researchers on the area  
 
The documents used for this report includes the companies’ contract with farmers (App:H), 
the Cotton Act 2005 (App:I) and Zambia 5th National Development Plan 2006–2011 (FNDP). 
I combine this material with research done by other scientists, thereby seeking my own 
interpretations of the above documents, while applying other interpretation into it.  
 
Some of the most important empirical sources of my report are the research done by the 
research team from Zambian Food Security Research Program (FRSP). The FRSP is a 
collaboration between the Agricultural Consultative Forum, MACO and Michigan State 
University’s Department of Agricultural Economics (MSU), and is funded by the United 
tates Agency for International Development (FRSP.com). The FSRP researcher, whom I 
mainly refer to in this report, is Ballard Zulu and Stephen Kabwe, and from the MSU based 
avid Tschirley, John Fynn and Steven Haggblade. Since 
plishing reliable research on an area that includes getting access to rural areas and data 
 Zambian institutions with a recognized American University, 
able provides the work of FRSP with different outlooks. Whereas the FSRP provide 
These are all aspects that are relevant to probed in order to answer whether small scale 
S
researchers: Colin Poulton, D
accom
on farmers in an informal sector, is not an easy task, the FRSP being USAID funded, 
provides the data collection with the required resources. At the same time, the combination of 
combining researchers from
assum
the local knowledge and national context, the MSU based researchers provide the knowledge 
on smallholders and the role of agriculture in development in general. On the basis of this, I 
consider their research and use of statistical data as some of the most reliable work conducted 
in the area. 
 
FRSP has published a number of policy synthesis’s and reports on the issues of the cotton 
industry, covering the historical development of the cotton industry in Zambia, cotton quality 
provision, cotton country comparisons and the income returns to farmers etc. (FRSP.com). 
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farmers’ linkage to cotton companies enable farmers to escape poverty. I will apply their 
research on the Zambia’s cotton industry’s impact on farmers’ livelihood, from an outlook 
hich is determined by my choice of theoretical approach.  
 whether farmers can escape poverty through cotton trade, consider-
g the widespread perception of the potential agriculture contains in terms of reducing 
2.4.1 Statistics applicability  
 
I supplement the quantitative data from the interviews, with qualitative statistical data. By 
applying findings conducted through different methods of collecting data, the different 
information is verified.  
 
The statistics used for this report on Zambian cotton production are primarily based on 
material published by the CDT who has gathered data conducted by the Central Statistical 
Office (CSO) of Zambia on e.g. Post Harvest Surveys (Zamstate). In most of the data I use, it 
is not described how they have reached the particular figures. This makes it difficult to know 
how they have calculated the given statistics. But by using data conducted solely from one 
govern d are 
plausible. The CDT was formed in 1999 as an initiative of MACO and the private cotton 
w
 
To put it bluntly, the FSRP focus has primarily been on Zambia’s cotton industry as a 
country analysis, with the focus on the success in Zambia’s cotton industry growth perform-
ance in comparison to other African countries. In stead of focusing on comparing Zambia’s 
cotton industry with other countries in a national context, I examine the impact of the 
different geographical scale: global as well as domestic on poverty among Zambian farmers. 
This is done to question
in
poverty (Christiaensen & Demery 2007:13). For that reason, this report can be considered as 
a supplement to the work of FSRP on Zambia’s cotton industry, and as part of an ongoing 
research on the cotton commodity chain impact on rural livelihood and farmers’ capability of 
escaping poverty. 
 
ment agency the CSO, the chances of the data being systematically collecte
industry (CDT 2007:2). It is governed by an independent board of trustees, who aims at 
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contributing to a competitive cotton industry in Zambia through providing research and 
elopment (CDT 2008:4)46.  
Moreover, I have used statistics conducted by the company Cargill. When using statistics 
applied with extra care due to the obvious interest 
volved. However, the statistics assessed by Cargill is essentially similar to the material 
e
 
production dev
 
The research of FSRP refers additionally to the statistics published by CDT. This indicates 
that it is some of the most valid sources of information conducted on the area. On the basis of 
these statistics, I have conducted my own calculations, on aspects that the statistics did not 
include. This includes companies’ market share in percent, farmers’ yearly sale, cost and 
income of cotton in general, and farmers’ individual income. My own calculations are 
marked by blue shaded areas in the statistics appendix B and D, and are explained in the 
notes below the data.   
 
from a cotton company it should be 
in
obtained from CDT, where the disparities in e.g. Dunavant ginning capacity between th  
estimations given by Cargill and CDT are 5000 tons47 (App:D).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Farmers showing how they package the picked cotton seed from the field into large cotton sacks. 
                                                 
46 CDT targets 200.000-250.000 smallholder farmers in Zambia (CDT 2007:3). The task is to enhance the 
participation of smallholder cotton growers in the cotton industry and to reduce their vulnerability. The 
anisation to facilitate the improved association is mobilizing cotton growers and improving grass-root org
servicing and empowerment of seed cotton producers (CDT 2007:4). 
47 (120.000 - 115.000) 
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3. Theory 
 
As mentioned in chapter two, this report draws on my empirical collected data from my 
fieldwork and studies done essentially by researchers from FSRP. Nevertheless, to examine 
the research question more thoroughly, three theories that focus on different aspects of the 
examined area are included. The chapter will not stand out as a comprehensive explanation 
of the theories, but only introduce the main concepts that are relevant for this report. After-
ards, reflections on the combinations of the theories’ application in answering the research 
ter ends with a survey of the later chapters. 
t contains the Global Value Chain (GVC) theory, developed by Gary Gereffi  
994). There is an ongoing debate on whether the GVC approach is a theory or simply a 
hose producers who shift to a new commodity chain (Kaplinsky & 
orris 2001:38). 
                                                
w
question will be outlined. The chap
 
3.1 Global Value Chain theory 
 
The repor 48
(1
method. The approach provides a method to look at a particular commodity and from that 
derive general concepts, but over the years the approach has evolved key theoretical con-
cepts, and can thus be considered a theory (Gibbon & Ponte 2005:94, Bair 2005). The GVC 
theory offers an analytical framework to explore how linkages between production, distribu-
tion and final consumption of products are globally connected along global value chains, 
which embody a network of activities and actors, including households, enterprises and states 
(Gereffi et al 1994:2). Along the chain, different forms of upgrading occur. These include (1) 
‘process upgrading’, understood as the increase in efficiency of internal processes, (2) 
‘product upgrading’, where products are improved or new ones are introduced and (3) ‘chain 
upgrading’, refers to t
M
 
The approach has been used by many scientists, but under different terminologies49, each 
with a slightly different focus. Hence there is a considerable overlap between the concept of 
 
48 Professor at Center For International Development at Duke University. 
cken 2004:14ff, Gray & Moseley 2008:4). 
49  This terminology includes; value system, value stream, filiere analysis (meaning ‘thread’ analysis) and 
production chain system (Kaplinsky & Morris 2001:7, Di
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GVC and similar concepts which create some confusion that are important to account for. 
Formerly, Global Commodity Chain was the most common term being used. Terence 
Hopkins and Immanual Wallerstein50 define a global commodity chain as: “a network of 
labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity” (Gereffi et al 
1994:2). The term GVC is now used more commonly, due to the concepts emphasis on 
economic activity in which each chain adds value into each segment of the chain, and 
because it is considered to be the most inclusive of the widely-used alternatives (Gereffi et al 
2001:3).  
 
Global Value Chain dimensions 
Gereffi identifies four key dimensions of a GVC: 1. ‘Input-output structure’; 2. ‘Geographi-
cal coverage’; 3. ‘Form of governance’ and 4. ‘Institutional framework’ (Gereffi 1994:95, 
Gibbon & Ponte 2005:76). The first two dimensions are mainly descriptive and help to 
strengthen the analysis of the following two dimensions. I will here shortly elaborate on these 
st ones. 
 
s the “authority and power relationships that determine 
ow financial, material and human resources are allocated and flow within a chain” (Gereffi 
ore labour-intensive sectors and have low entry barriers in 
roduction (Gibbon & Ponte 2005:76). The global cotton chain belongs, as other agricultural 
                                                
la
‘Form of governance’ is defined a
h
et al 1994:97). The dimension is useful to identify power structures, characterized by 
regulations and coordination distributed between producer and buyers in a sector (Gibbon & 
Ponte 2005:78). Gereffi has conceptualized two ‘forms of governance’ structures, of which 
the differences reside in the location of their key barriers to entry (1) ‘producer-driven’, 
which is found in high capital and technology requirements commodities and (2) ‘buyer-
driven’, which is found in m
p
products, to the latter. 
 
The ‘institutional framework’ dimension has not been adopted by any scholars so far. Hence 
little research has been made on this particular dimension. Furthermore, Gary Gereffi 
“provided little indication of the exact meaning of this term” (Thomsen 2007:757). Peter 
 
50 Hopkins was former instructor to Associate Professor, Sociology, Columbia University, and Wallerstein is a 
Senior Research Scholar at Yale Sociology department.  
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Gibbon and Stefano Ponte51 have provided the following classification of the term which I 
lean to: “The institutional framework surrounding the chain was meant to delineate the 
onditions under which lead firms subordinate agents through their control of market access 
n 
hain from the perspective of how it effects the relation between farmers and companies. For 
ory with theories based on the NIE theory that treats the 
conomic theory, takes them for granted or 
onsider them irrelevant (Nielsen 2005:99). The NIE theory argues that the existence of a 
 
conomic premises on which the theory is based, is that the actors are ‘opportunists’, trying 
to pursue their own goals, at the expense of others, if they can get away with it (Nielsen 
                                                
c
and information, …” (Gibbon & Ponte 2005:76). In other words, the ‘institutional frame-
work’ identifies how institutional conditions shape the process at each stage of the chain, and 
provide the business climate the GVC operates within. The chain is embedded within an 
institutional context, at local, national as well as international level, and it is this context that 
facilitates ‘lead agents’ options and/or constrains them. Whereas the ‘institutional frame-
work’ is used solely from the perspective of ‘lead agent’, I want to look at the institutional 
linkage between companies and farmers. For this reason, I do not use the term ‘institutional 
framework’ in this report, but I do include the dimension of institutions that shape the cotto
c
this I have combined the GVC the
institutional linkages between actors. This theory will be described in the following. 
 
3.2 Principal-Agent theory  
 
The Principal-Agent (PA) theory is a part of the larger New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
theory. The NIE theory builds on the neoclassic economic theory, but has incorporated 
institutions into economics, where the neoclassic e
c
well-functioning market is based on institutions that minimise transactions cost and guaran-
tee property rights (ibid:106).  
 
The PA theory is based on the same economic premise as the NIE theory, but demarcates to 
solely address the problem of how to motivate one person to act on behalf of another. The PA 
theory focuses on the contract that is conducted between a Principal, in this particular case 
the cotton companies and an Agent, in this case the farmer (Hatch 2006:261). One of the
e
 
t the unit of trade and development at the DIIS. 51 Both are senior researchers a
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2005:104). As a result; when the Principal and Agents goals are not identical, the Agent will 
simply not do the job that the Principal has hired him to efficiently.  
 
To solve this motivation problem, the aim of the Principal is to formulate a contract in such a 
way that he achieves his own goal, but at the same time fulfils the interest of the Agent 
(Milgrom & Roberts 1992:170). This is done by founding the contract on economic incite-
ments that the Agent responds to. One way to do this is where the Principal rewards the 
Agent’s goal related performance, thereby giving the Agent an incitement to strive against 
lfilling the goal (Hatch 2006:261). Another strategy is by monitoring: The Principal checks 
Opportunist behaviour and the difficulties in specifying the sufficient criteria interfere with 
aximizing agreement. This ineffectiveness is related to 
m mmetric information’, meaning that one of the actor’s52 
 
fu
the Agents behaviour and if he catches him in not doing what is agreed upon according to the 
contract, he punishes the Agent through sanctions e.g. by lowering his salary or firing him.  
 
There are no ‘perfect’ contracts 
However, an assumption in this theory is that a perfect contract is rarely possible and often 
too costly (Milgrom & Roberts 1992:129). This has to do with the difficulties for the Princi-
pal to specify the sufficient criteria for the service the Agent should do, and determine the 
right economic means to obtain these objectives (ibid:167). A perfect contract would encom-
pass all feasible scenarios and external incidents, which is impossible (ibid:127). When the 
Principal cannot monitor the Agents behaviour, or specify the sufficient criteria for the 
accurate behaviour, the Principal cannot sanction or reward goal related behaviour effec-
tively, hence the contract becomes less effective.  
 
the possibility of reaching a value-m
another pre ise in the theory: ‘asy
processes more information than the other actor (Nielsen 2005:104). As a result, the involved 
actors’ process ‘bounded rationality’, meaning that the actors act in agreement with what 
they believe is rational, based on the information they are in procession of, and therefore not 
what might be most rational had they had full information (Milgrom & Roberts 1992:129f).  
                                                 
52 The Principal or the Agent. 
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If asymmetric information is present and actors choose to hide their information before the 
contract is made, it is called ‘adverse selection’, the ways to diminish this behaviour is 
through ‘signalling’ where e.g. the Agent try to prove that his behaviour will be in the 
terest of the Principal, or through ‘screening’, where the Principal attracts the desirable 
ey find pleasure in it, seek each others interest and trust 
ach other. Hence the theory’s outlook can be criticized for not showing the whole reality. 
ing market (Doward et al 2005:12, Rodrik 2007:51, Barrett 2007:307).  
biased towards a ‘one-size fits all’ growth model prescription of the Washington Consen-
sus 56 . “It presumes it is possible to determine a unique set of appropriate institutional 
in
portion of Agents by undertaking activities that separate those with the right behaviour from 
those who do not (ibid:149f,154ff). If hidden information occurs after the contract has been 
agreed upon, it is called ‘moral hazard’. The way to diminish this behaviour is through 
‘economic incitement’, ‘monitoring’ and ‘sanctions’ (ibid:166ff).  
 
The PA theory can be criticized for painting a rather critical picture of the nature of people, 
since the premise of opportunist behaviour, assumes that people seek their own benefits at 
the expense of others, if they can get away with it. In addition, the assumption that people 
only responds to economic incitement means that the theory demarcates from any belief that 
people work efficiently because th
e
Still the theory is relevant to apply in analyzing the case of this report, since considerations 
on how to uphold contract enforcement in poor rural areas is central due to the high cost and 
risks that are prevalent in rural developing countries (Kydd et al 2005:82). Poor infrastructure 
(physical & psychical), diminishes the lack of contact and information between with partners, 
which entails mistrust between the involved, which in worst cases distorts creating a well-
function
 
3.3 Critical Globalists theory 
 
Dani Rodrik53, Jeffery Sachs54 and Joseph E. Stiglitz55 are leading economists advocating 
against the type of institutional reforms promoted by the IFI institutions that are heavily 
                                                 
53 Professor in International Political Economy at Harvard University. 
54 Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University. 
55 Professor at Columbia University in New York. 
56 The term Washington Consensus was coined in 1989 to describe a set of specific economic policy remedies 
that essentially composed a standard reform package promoted for developing countries by among others donor 
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arrangement ex ante and views convergence towards those arrangements as inherently 
desirable” (Rodrik 2008:2). I compile the three economists under the term Critical Global-
ist57.  
z 2006:84). Instead policies should come from 
ithin the country, and the country should seek to tailor institutions that work in their local 
 
The Critical Globalist argue that since developing countries are different from industrialized 
countries in that they face greater challenges and more constraints, the policies that have 
worked in industrialised countries, would more than likely not have the same result for 
developing countries (Rodrik 2007:196, Stiglit
w
context, rather than seeking what in the eyes of industrialised countries would be considered 
‘perfect institutions’ (Rodrik 2008). They additionally argue that the Washington Consensus 
mindset is based on a theory that assumes perfect information, perfect competition, and a 
perfect market, in line with the neoclassic economic theory (Stiglitz 2006:28). These prem-
ises do not exist in the real world.  
 
Instead the three economists concur with the economic premises of the NIE theory, hence are 
strong believers in the importance of institutions in making the market work efficiently and 
for everyone (Stiglitz 2006:XIII). Whether we are talking property rights, rules of law, 
schools, health care and infrastructure, institutions in all it forms are the backbone of every 
society and it is these tailored and stabile institutions which eventually create growth (Bach 
2003).  
 
The Critical Globalist reject the two following premises, they believe has driven trade 
liberalization through out the world: “… that trade liberalization automatically leads to more 
trade and growth and that growth will automatically “trickle down” to benefit all” (Stiglitz 
2006:99f). While the Critical Globalists’ do stress that the bulk of successful developing 
countries have accomplished their success by trade and exports, and economic growth is the 
                                                                                                                                                       
countries, the IMF, WB and WTO (Wikipedia, Rodrik 2008:1f). These policies included fiscal discipline, 
rivatization, trade liberalization, deregulations etc. (Rodrik 2007:17). 
 Although the three economists often refer to each others research, they have to the best of my knowledge not 
been compiled as a theory before. I gather the economist as they are having similar approaches regarding 
solving the constraints developing countries are affected by. It is likely possible to find other economists with 
similar views.  
p
57
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most powerful instrument for reducing poverty (ibid:63, Sachs 2005:3, Rodrik 2007:2), they 
 trade and poverty. 
Obviously, these conditions restrain countries 
arket. “… markets are unlikely to work well in 
ce of a predictable and legitimate set of rules that support economic activity and 
m
alists, at other times I 
 
at the same time stress the complexity in creating a strong linkage between
 
Low equilibrium trap 
The Critical Globalist theory argues that the reason why some developing countries are not 
moving up the development ladder is that they are stocked in a ‘low equilibrium trap’ 
(ibid:64). They run a low production, since there is not much demand for their products. The 
low supply and demand reinforce each other.  
 
The ‘low equilibrium trap’ is a result of lack of strong institutions. When a country possesses 
weak institutions they have high transaction costs and risks, weak information flows, and 
lack of property rights protection. These imperfections hinder e.g. the enforcement of 
contract and the incentive to invest (ibid:46). 
and citizens effective linkage to the world m
the absen
dispense its fruit” (Rodrik 2008:1). Without the preconditions of appropriate state regula-
tions, basic infrastructure and human capital “…, markets can cruelly bypass large parts of 
the world, leaving them impoverished and suffering without respite” (Sachs 2005:3). The key 
task is to establish institutions that can support creating well-functioning markets. Following 
this argument the task is not to get ‘prices right’, but ‘institutions right’, the for er will 
follow when the right institutions are established. 
 
While the Critical Globalist focuses on the state, many of their points in the ‘low equilibrium 
trap’ are also valid in the case of rural areas and farmer’s livelihood. This means that while 
the economists might only argue from the perspective of the state, I will also use their points 
to illustrate the conditions by which rural areas and farmer’s livelihood are influenced. 
Moreover, in the analysis I will sometime refer to the Critical Glob
refer to the three economists individually. I hereby want to emphasize that although the
Critical Globalists have similarities, their argumentations on specific topics cannot necessar-
ily be generalized to include all of them.  
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3.4 The theories’ applicability and limitations in this report 
 
While the above sections essentially have been purely theoretical without much reference to 
how they will be applied in the report, this part explains the combination of the theories’ 
applicability in relation to the case of this report. The section clarifies how and for what 
purpose the combination of the theories will be applied throughout the report. Since the 
theories are concerned with different aspects of the research area, they will not be discussed 
against each other, but complement one another. All three theories are in one way or the 
other, engaged with the role of the market in development issues. I have chosen these 
market-oriented theories, because I wish to grasp the strength, as well as the limitations, in 
the potential for far
the GVC theory will b
mers to escape poverty by participating in the cotton trade. To begin with 
e elaborated, since it is this theory that has guided how I want to look 
ent for small scale 
e poverty. The GVC theory probes the terms taking place within the 
arket and the international 
                                              
at the case of this report. 
 
Thinking beyond a country analysis  
The GVC theory provides valuable insight to the dynamics behind changes in the interna-
tional division of labour in the global cotton chain. Moreover, it gives guidance to think 
beyond the conventional unit of a country analysis and include the local and international 
levels as well (Gereffi 1994:13). Since national boundaries no longer contain production 
processes, but are linked with activities below and above the national scale (Dicken 
2004:14), the GVCs theory understanding of the influence of these geographical scales helps 
to grasp the complexity for the state in creating a favourable environm
farmers’ ability to escap
power relation between farmers, companies and states, which is determining for farmers’ 
capability to exploit the potential in participating in global cotton trade in order to escape 
poverty. In this way, although the focus is on the domestic Zambian cotton industry, the 
application of the global oriented GVC theory has proven relevant.  
 
Scientists, among others Peter Gibbon and Stefano Ponte, have done research on different 
commodities in terms of ‘form of governance’ structure58. The focus has above all been on 
how the core industrialized countries have influenced the world m
   
58 Coffee (Ponto 2002), clothing (Gibbon 2002) and fish (Ponte 2008). 
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division of labour. The major conclusion from their research is that we are witnessing a 
power concentration in the industrialized countries e.g. through non-tariff barriers. This is 
worsening the developing countries’ position on the world market, due to the difficulties of 
fulfilling the quality standards requirements on the world market (Gibbon & Ponte 2005, 
Ponto 2002). Likewise, Marianne Nylandsted Larsen has contributed to the discussion on 
‘form of governance’, with focus on the cotton commodity chain. She argues that the cotton 
industry has not witnessed the same extent of power concentration, as other agricultural 
commodities have, lied under the GVC research (Larsen 2003). Their research on ‘form of 
governance’ in general, and in particular on the case of cotton is pertinent in identifying the 
possibilities and constraints that exist in the domestic cotton industry level and will be 
brought forward, in the analysis.  
 
While recognising that ‘lead agents’ in the sales and marketing segments play an important 
role in the domestic cotton industry, therefore can not be totally disregarded, it is my opinion 
that there has been a tendency for GVC scholars to utilize the GVC solely on the industrial-
ized countries’ division of labour. Thereby ignoring the importance of the first segments of 
the chain where farmers are positioned. In this report, I wish to move the focus away from a 
ore-periphery’ power relations discussion to a closer look on the impact on the first 
 the chain, in order to examine the possibility of improving farmers’ position in 
g countries in having access to the world 
arket. The theory signify that by being linked with international companies that have 
‘c
segments in
the cotton commodity chain to escape poverty. By providing a micro-level case study and 
connect it to a national and international context, it gives an understanding of the possibilities 
and constraints in which the farmers find themselves.  
 
The market 
The GVC theory identifies how the global market works from a vertical perspective, and 
shows the extent of potential benefits for developin
m
knowledge on world market demand, and have the fiscal capability to invest in rural areas; it 
has the potential to create growth in rural areas (Kaplinsky & Morris 2001:2). However it 
does not deal with the complexity in creating a business environment from the perspective of 
the state or its citizens. This is on the contrary dealt with by the Critical Globalist. 
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The PA and Critical Globalist theories, which essentially supplement each other, since both 
swear to the NIE theory, identify the imperfect market that the GVC is working within, in 
terms of e.g. the imperfect prices and imperfect contracts. Hence the NIE based theories 
mphasize the lack of benefits that the global value chain linkage creates, and offers an 
f the constraints of the market arrangement preventing poor states and their 
lthough the Critical globalist have faith in the power of trade and argues that privatisation 
be beneficial for national economic development and citizens, they in 
ddition  recognise its limitations, e.g. imperfect market information (Rodrik 2007:29). 
e centre of successful development, the 
e
explanation o
citizens to climb the development ladder. Furthermore, the NIE based theories helps to 
identify what institutional arrangement, including secure property rights and contract 
enforcement that is required for these countries and its citizens to engage in the global 
market, and enabling them to move out of the ‘low equilibrium trap’. Identifying these 
constrains are vital if the distribution of gains is to trickle down to farmers, and for them to 
escape poverty eventually. Since the Critical Globalist recognize the potential of markets and 
economic growth as powerful engines of development and poverty alleviation (Sachs 2005:3, 
Rodrik 2007:2), the issue is not whether world trade is good or bad but how to states should 
reshape it to make it work in the benefit of its citizens (Stiglitz 2006:188). In relation to this, 
the question in this report is therefore, what can be done to maximize the private cotton 
company’s contribution to rural Zambia, while at the same time diminish their potential harm 
(ibid:188).  
 
The state  
A
and open economy can 
a
Combining the GVC theory with the Critical Globalist gives an understanding of the Zam-
bian state’s constrains in relation to limited financial, human and political resources, and the 
state’s level of sovereignty to regulate the market in a way that improves farmers’ livelihood 
when linked with the global cotton chain (ibid:5).  
 
While the theories all recognize that markets as th
NIE theories emphasis the importance of the state to stimulate and sustain economic devel-
opment, by providing incentives for companies to invest. Thereby creating an investment 
climate that allows business’ to create jobs, while at the same time providing an efficient 
allocation of resources within the state, thereby ensuring that the gains acquired on the world 
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market are trickling down to farmers (ibid:94). While international variables, in particular 
larger companies, influence the domestic level, the Critical Globalist emphasises the impor-
nce of the state to solve the domestic development issues.   
1). Markets 
at produce below the attainable productivity level are those where institutions are inade-
). Hence establishing an efficient 
f the game’ in 
e cotton industry? And furthermore how does this affect the potential in alleviating poverty 
lly serve as a framework offering guidance in structuring the analysis.  
ctors  
chain, and how it affects the farmers in the first segments of the cotton chain in terms of 
ta
 
Institutions 
In this report I study the institutional arrangement in the Zambian cotton industry, in particu-
lar the contract between the company and farmers (App:H). In the NIE theory “…, institu-
tions are the prevailing rules of the game in society […]. High-quality institutions are those 
that induce socially desirable behaviour on the part of economic agents” (ibid:5
th
quate or missing, resulting in imperfect markets (ibid:58
market requires security of property rights, contracts enforcement, the rule of law, macroeco-
nomic stability and appropriate incentives in order to stimulate entrepreneurship and invest-
ment demands (Rodrik 2008:1, Rodrik & Subramanian 2008:14). If the institutions in the 
cotton market are not suitable, the required support between the transaction done between the 
farmers and companies does not exist. What is relevant to study in this report is what 
institutional arrangement that exist and who define and execute these ‘rules o
th
among small scale farmers?  
 
3.6 Project survey 
 
I will, in the following, outline how the coming analysis chapters are structured, which in the 
end enables me to answer the question of how the Zambian cotton industry influences the 
potential for reducing poverty among farmers. The theories focus on different geographical 
scales which essentia
 
Chapter 4: The global cotton market and a
The GVC theory will guide the chapter, with its reflections on how the international division 
of labour is governed, and how this is manifested in the global cotton chain. Through this 
focus, the chapter will identify the main international actors that affect the cotton commodity 
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poverty alleviation. The chapter will serve as a frame, by which the issues of the succeeding 
chapters are constrained. 
 
Chapter 5: A historic overview of the Zambian cotton industry 
ted in the subsequent chapters into a historical context.  
ambia’s cotton industry   
ter will answer the following question: What factors have contributed to the success 
ance, and how has this influenced small scale 
mer’s livelihood? The chapter will show the advantages of the institutional arrangement, 
of the cotton industry where the private companies has taken a lead role in solving some of 
the challenges that existed in the domestic cotton market. In addition I will mention some of 
the shortcomings in relation to alleviating poverty among small scale farmers. 
 
Chapter 7: The contract relation between companies and farmers  
In this chapter the relation between farmers and companies will be scrutinized. With the 
assistance of the PA theory, the contract and the dynamics of the relation will be investi-
gated. The chapter will provide an understanding of the shortcomings of the cotton indus-
tries’ impact on small scale farmers’ livelihood. This includes the price setting and the 
dependency on companies. Thereby explaining what is inadequate, in terms of utilizing the 
potential of farmers’ linkages to the cotton commodity chain in functioning as a poverty 
reduction strategy.  
 
Chapter 8: The role of the Zambian state 
In this chapter the role of the Zambian state in the cotton industry will be discussed. This will 
be done by clarifying how the policy of the Zambian state in relation to the cotton industry, 
has affected the cotton industry and farmers livelihood. This will enable me to discuss 
This chapter will give an overview of the reforms that have happened since Zambia’s 
independence and up to the liberalization. Afterwards, a brief overview of the changes in the 
Zambian cotton industry, from privatization and up to now, will be clarified. The chapter is 
precluded from theory and serves as an overview of the development of the cotton industry, 
entering the issues presen
 
Chapter 6: The ‘success’ of Z
This chap
of the cotton industry’s growth perform
far
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whether the implementation of the Cotton Act enables the cotton industry to utilize its full 
 
potential for farmers to escape poverty.  
 
Chapter 9: Conclusion  
Based on the argumentation laid forward in the previous chapters, I will answer the research 
question. Has the small scale farmers’ linkage to companies and world cotton trade enabled 
or constrained farmers from moving out of poverty. In addition, perspectives on aspects 
relevant in relation to the cotton industry will shortly be brought up, including alternative 
development strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Truck loaded with raw cotton from some villages on its way to Cargill ginnery.  
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4. The global cotton market and actors 
hat are coordinating the cotton commodity chain’s interna-
onal division of labour and (2) industrialized countries’ cotton subsidies determining the 
y linking firms together in 
 web of collaborative relations of sourcing and contracting arrangement, TNCs has the 
 
This chapter sets out to answer: What are the main international actors that affect the cotton 
commodity chain and how do they affect the actors in the first segments of the chain in terms 
of poverty alleviation among small scale farmers? The purpose of the chapter is to clarify the 
extent of influence the international actors have on farmers’ capability of escaping poverty 
through cotton trade. The chapter will identify that the main international actors are (1) large 
international trading companies t
ti
price fluctuations on the continuing declining cotton prices on the world market. 
 
4.1 Trans-national companies  
 
Concurrently with globalization, the market has undergone rapid transformation and become 
geographically and organisationally more complex. Products produced in one place of the 
world are linked with products produced far away. The complexity of the market requires 
advanced coordination in positioning logistically the different activities along the chain. An 
important component of global trade is conducted within TNCs. B
a
power to coordinate and control these complex operations in more than one country (Shep-
herd 2007:1, Dickens 2004:17). These companies, frequently with headquarters in industrial-
ized countries, have economies of scale in transport, marketing, storage and finance. An 
example of this is the international cotton companies Cargill and Dunavant both operating in 
Zambia, and in several other Anglo- and Francophone countries, while headquartered in 
United States59 (dunavant.com, cargill.com)  
 
                                                 
59 In the case of Cargill, economics of scale is even more pronounced, because it is operating in a number of 
agro commodities (cargill.com). 
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4.1.1 TNCs in developing countries  
 
The shifts in geographical location and organisational changes result from the search for 
lower wages and strive for flexibility. TNCs are able to take advantage of the possibilities 
globalization creates in terms of the low labour costs in developing countries, and at same 
time improve supply flexibility through networks with partners around the globe, while at the 
same time extending product differentiation, upgrading product quality and promoting brand 
reputation (Gereffi et al 1994:6). 
 
Developing countries are often the locations where TNCs can obtain the most gain of 
e functions to developing countries where 
ize such 
they strive at the same time to make their business environ-
In relation to this, the Critical Globalist argues that it is crucial that developing countries 
globalization. By outsourcing the labour intensiv
wages are lower, and maintain the high technology, design and marketing in the developed 
countries where it has core competence, the TNCs guide the international division of labour 
(ibid:12). Hence TNCs are able to take advantage of national differences in regulatory trade 
regimes and human capital conditions (Dicken 2004:20). While states seek to minim
‘regulatory arbitrage’ (ibid:20), 
ment attractive to foreign companies, in order to attract jobs to their citizens. This can be 
accomplished by the states securing a stable economy or, if that is infeasible or enough, by 
e.g. lowering the taxes to foreign companies (Rodrik 2007:119f). 
 
From this outline of the international division of labour, it can be derived that developing 
countries are not isolated in the globalization process. On the contrary “…, Africa is playing 
the integral role of the peripheral commodity producer. Peripheral in this instance does not 
imply an area outside the globalization process but rather a zone from which resources are 
being extracted” (Wallerstein 1979, cited in Gray & Moseley 2008:20). These global 
production linkages integrate developing countries and their citizens into the world market in 
manners which have profound implications for their development.  
 
navigate into these linkages by adapting it into their own context; only then can poor coun-
tries climb the development ladder (Rodrik 2007, Sachs 2006). However in addition, they 
argue that so far globalization has been managed in a way that diminishes the sovereignty of 
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the developing countries. This are constraining developing countries from making sound 
autonomy decisions in areas of utmost importance to the livelihood of their citizens (Stiglitz 
2006:9). An illustration of this is laid forward by Joseph Stiglitz: “A country may want to 
raise the minimum wage but discovers it can’t, because foreign companies operating there 
ill decide to move to a country with lower wages” (ibid:20). Hence developing countries 
rities for its citizens in the pursue of maintaining job-
f governance, and as a 
sult the buying segment is becoming increasingly dominant and concentrated in many 
              
w
might be hindered in taken the right prio
generating companies. In the next section, I will clarify how the role of TNCs is manifested 
in the cotton commodity chain.  
 
4.2 ‘Buyer-driven’ form of governance  
 
Managing global commodity chains effectively involve a degree o
re
chains (Kaplinsky & Morris 2001:60). In the case of the cotton commodity, the governance 
falls likewise into Gereffi´s categorization of the ‘buyer-driven’ form of governance. 
 
In the ‘buyer-driven’ form of governance certain characteristics and dynamics exist. The 
GVC theory states that suppliers in the ‘buyer-driven’ chain produce to buyers that operate as 
‘lead agents’, meaning companies that have the power to coordinate and control components 
throughout the chain (Gibbon & Ponte 2005:76ff, Larsen 2003:2). These ‘lead agents’ are 
often TNCs, due to the fiscal, marketing and technological strength it requires. In theory, it is 
stated that ‘lead agents’ often have strict conditions, e.g. specifications in standard settings 
and quality demand, the supplier has to adjust to (Gibbon & Ponte 2005:83,76). Adjusting to 
these terms can be expensive, but the alternative is often to be excluded from the GVC, due 
to similar suppliers’ willingness to take the position and overbid the former supplier 
(ibid:79). Thus while countries’ linkage with a ‘buyer-driven’ commodity chain gives 
possibilities in terms of job 60  creation, which is of major interest in Zambia where the 
unemployment rate is fifty percent (CIA)61; the opposite situation of being excluded is also 
                                   
 Although the term ‘job’ should in the case of the cotton industry be understood in its loosest sense. The 
farmers are only indirectly employed in cotton value chain, and the farmers continue to be in the informal 
h they do earn a living. 
60
agricultural sector.  
61 2000 estimation. Since many Zambian are occupied in the informal sector, they may not be included in this 
estimation, eventhoug
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present. Since cotton is produced in over seventy countries (App:G), and the level of cotton 
roduction worldwide is increasing (Figure:3), it can be assumed that if the Zambian cotton 
s.  
rces too cheap. 
his can be accomplished by establishing trade agreements that strengthen “good behaviour” 
p
industry did not live up the standards in quality, or did not have attractive low production 
cost, companies would not invest in the Zambian cotton industry. 
 
The concerns of ‘race to the bottom’ 
The situation with the possibility of being excluded and other countries’ willingness to take 
the position of the supplier can in the worst case scenario lead to a ‘race to the bottom’. The 
term refers to a path where countries are locked into continuously increasing competition, 
resulting in reducing incomes and lack of protection of the environment and workers’ health, 
due to the objective of staying competitive (Rodrik 2007:229, Kaplinsky & Morris 2001:22). 
In other words, the countries sell themselves too cheap, by sacrificing e.g. the environment 
and/or the workers’ health, in pursue of job creation for its citizen
 
This possibility is a concern also found at the Critical Globalist who argues that “Competition 
among developing countries to attract investment can result in a race to the bottom, as 
companies seek a home with the weakest labor and environmental laws” (Stiglitz 2006:196) 
While the ‘race to the bottom’ argument is a rather gloomy view of the globalization process, 
Raphael Kaplinsky62 and Mike Morris63 argue that there are observations that point towards 
this path: “there has been a lack of correspondence between the growing global spread of 
economic activities associated with meeting global needs and the incomes which arise from 
these activities“ (Kaplinsky & Morris 2001:41). From this it is clear that the expansion of 
trade, does not automatically increase sustainable development or contribute to poverty 
reduction (Gereffi 2006:40) From this is can be derived that countries’ capability of attract-
ing foreign companies does not automatically lead to sustainable improvement of the 
livelihoods of their citizens. The Critical Globalist argues that the key for the state is to 
balance between attracting companies, while not selling their countries’ resou
T
codes of conduct, where the environment and employers’ health are taken into account 
(Stiglitz 2006:159).  
                                                 
62 Professorial Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, University at Sussex. 
63 PhD at Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Centre for Social and Development Studies, 
University of Natal. 
 53
4.2.1 Companies flexible structure  
 
In the ‘buyer-driven’ governance, the business structure is flexible, enabling ‘lead agents’ to 
choose new suppliers without significant expenditures (Gereffi el al 1994:10). This is caused 
by the low barriers to entry, where companies in the ‘buyer driven’ governance are able to 
hoose new suppliers with relatively little investments required. As an example, if the 
from the smaller cotton company Yustina points out: “The 
international cotton companies will go in and out of Zambia, but the farmers will be here 
eir whole life, and generations after that. The farmers can’t go anywhere else. This is 
e the farmers and the compa-
ies are differently territorially embedded in the location, it affects their relationship. The 
 since more companies have entered the Zambian market compared to the 
                                                
c
investment climate in Zambia becomes too disadvantaged for the companies, such as 
hindering the return of their investments, the company relocates to another country, where 
the investment climate is better. This flexibility is likewise manifested in the cotton compa-
nies’ contract with the farmers, where it is written that: “The parties agree that either party 
may terminate the Agreement by giving one-month written notice to the other party of its 
intention to terminate” (App:H§8). In other words, if the companies wish to move their 
operation out of Zambia, they can do so within a month’s notice. 
 
The flexible structure clearly illustrates the weak position in which the farmers find them-
selves, when linked with TNCs. While the TNCs are mobile, the farmers are not. As the 
managing director Jesse Kitta 
th
where they live and where their families are” (IW:Kitta). Sinc
n
companies’ imminent opportunity to move out of the country sets the farmers and the 
Zambian state in a forced position to meet the companies’ requirement, in order for the 
company to stay in Zambia to create jobs64. Further, in relation to the former ‘race to the 
bottom’ argument; Zambia is likely to be stuck with the bill if a company leaves, in terms of 
e.g. farmers that have transformed their farming to meet the requirements of cotton no longer 
requested, hence the farmers have difficulties in providing for their families.  
 
In the case of Zambia’s cotton industry, companies have moved out of Zambia, leading to 
market unrest. But since other cotton companies have taken over the assets of those who have 
relocated, and
 
64 Elaboration of this will be broadened in chapter 7. 
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number that have left, the level of unstableness created by the cotton companies’ flexible 
mply not safe for these farmers, there are too 
any risks involved” (IW: Malambo, Muleba). If the cotton companies were committed to 
trong linkage to the farmers e.g. by being obliged to provide some compensation if 
they chose to move out, or were obliged to provide a longer time limit, it is feasible that 
farmers would consider specializing more in cotton. This would make farmers more competi-
tive on the world cotton market, likely resulting in the farmers receiving a premium of their 
improved volume and quality.  
 
4.3 Drivenness in International trading companies 
 
Marianne Nylandsted Larsen argues that the level of ‘drivenness’65 in the ‘buyer-driven’ 
chain differs depending on who the buyers and end-markets are. She argues that ‘drivenness’ 
is more expressed when retailers lead the GVC compared to international traders (Larsen 
2003:8). From this it can be derived that since the coordination across geographical scales in 
the cotton chain essentially is  performed by International trading companies (ITCs),  less 
‘drivenness’ exists in the global cotton chain than could be expected in commodities con-
nected to retailers. Marianne Larsen’s argumentation is based 
industry in African Anglophone countries, which will be brought in here, in terms of how the 
structure has not been as severe, as one could have feared. Still the imminent opportunity for 
the companies to move out is critical in terms of the impact this has on the farmers’ sustain-
able livelihood, when companies “…may terminate the Agreement by giving one-month 
written notice …” (App:H§8).  
 
The risks of companies moving out make the farmers insecure of their job security in the 
cotton business. As a result, each farmer cultivates around four crops, to minimize the risks 
of cotton companies eventually deciding to abandon their relationship with Zambian farmers. 
The farmer associations are encouraging the farmers to diversify their production, and spread 
their risk: “Specialising in one or two crops is si
m
sustain a s
on her research on the cotton 
less ‘drivenness’ from ITCs influences the position of Zambian cotton farmers in the global 
cotton chain.  
                                                 
65 Another word for ‘drivenness’ would be the level of control and coordination from ‘lead agents’. 
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 r roughly one-third of world cotton production, the subsequently 49 accounts for 
ss than twenty percent (Poulton el al 2004:6). 
 
The cotton production has increased three times more in Africa compared to the rest of the 
world (Gray & Moseley 2008:10). Still the market for cotton distinguishes itself from most 
other agricultural commodities in terms of spatiality, as both the productions and consump-
tions are global in coverage. Since there are more than seventy cotton producing and export-
ing countries, the cotton companies have many and dispersed suppliers and end-users 
(Poulton et al 2004:5, App:G, Gibbon & Ponte 2005:99). Survey conducted by the Interna-
tional Cotton Advisory Committee66 (ICAC), points to the fact that no less than 475 compa-
nies are engaged in international cotton trade; whereas the nineteen largest companies 
accounts fo
le
Figure 2 
 
 
Source: Poulton et al 2004:78 
                                                 
66 The ICAC is an association of 44 cotton producing, -consuming, and –trading countries formed in 1939. It 
supervises the world regulations of international cotton trade and cotton production (ICAC.org). ICAC provides 
the world stocks, the movement of labour. ICAC gives every week the position of the world; the demand and 
supply of cotton in the world, which countries have increased their production, or quality etc.  (IW:Nkole). 
 to greater engagement and knowledge within the 
irley 2007a:41). 
Zambia joined the ICAC in 2006, potentially contributing
sector regarding the world market in which it operates (Kabwe & Tsch
 56
 The reason behind why the geographical coverage and high level of suppliers are being 
upheld, is that there are still demands for the large number of different cotton qualities 
produced: “…, spinners tend to favour blends of different national origins and qualities in 
order to obtain the right blend demanded by variations in yarn quality” (Larsen 2003:10). 
ue to these variations in quality demand, it is too costly for spinners to supply their own 
needs by managing the entire market; hence the work is done by ITCs instead (Poulton et al 
t witnessed the geographical production concentration, 
ncy in other commodities67 ; the market has stayed global and 
oreover, Marianne Larsen argues that since ‘drivenness’ is less pronounced in cotton, ITCs 
ve become more 
volved in cotton supplying countries in order to ensure a constant supply to spinners from a 
involvement in the first segments of the cotton chain procedure, has strengthened the 
D
2004:6). Since the cotton chain has no
which has been the tende
dispersed. 
 
4.3.1 ITC moving into procurement 
 
M
have been able to move into direct procurement: “Several of the large and largest interna-
tional trading companies have initiated […] input credit schemes to assure sufficient volumes 
of a particular national origin” (Larsen 2003:9). These changes in ITCs activities relates to 
the fact that developing countries began to liberalize their markets in the 1990s. As a result, 
ITCs filled out the position of the former parastatal cotton companies. This entailed that ITCs 
expanded their operations in a number of countries, from which they purchased cotton68.  
 
These findings on the enhanced involvement of ITCs in cotton producing countries are 
pertinent, in terms of the role that ITCs have in the first segments of the cotton chain, and its 
impact on small scale farmers’ position in the global cotton chain. ITCs ha
in
variety of origins and of the requested volume. Hence the ITCs are supporting their suppliers 
in e.g. Zambia in reaching the demand of international standards, providing the farmers with 
the necessary inputs in credit through their ginnery in Zambia, while at the same time 
continuing to provide cotton lint to spinners. From this it can be deduced that ITCs’ greater 
                                                 
67 Coffee, Cacao, fish (Gibbon & Ponto 2005, Ponto 2008) 
68 This will be explained in detail in the case of Zambia in chapter 5. 
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farmers’ linkage to the world market. By enabling farmers to participate in large scale 
production and compete on terms required on the world market, this has opened new export 
opportunities for Zambian farmers (Barrett 2007:300). This argument will be discussed into 
greater length in chapter 6, where the question of whether this new opportunity advantage 
has been transformed into poverty reduction among small scale farmers will be scrutinized. 
 
4.4 The risky cotton business  
 
The flexible structure in the ‘buyer-driven’ chain makes ITCs carefully consider before 
locating, which countries they would get the highest returns from. They investigate what the 
cost and incentives are for doing business in a country compared to others. Obviously, the 
companies are unlikely to invest in countries with political uncertainties and economic 
instability, since their returns of investment will be connected to higher risks.  
 
Zambia is a relatively stable democracy, and has not experienced any major political unrest 
since independence in 1964. Moreover, the economy is relatively stable with an inflation rate 
below ten percent (UM). Still, Zambia is a landlocked country making transport cost higher 
than countries with coastlines. Its geographical location distances the country from export 
markets, which obviouslly is a disadvantage, especially in relation to attracting companies 
that operate in a sector, where prices are low compared to volume, which clearly is the case 
in the cotton industry69 (CDT 2007:2). Additionally, the general poor infrastructure in rural 
Zambia makes it difficult to get access to areas where farmers are resident, which is required 
to deliver inputs and purchase cotton at the right time. This enhances the transportation costs 
and makes the Zambian cotton industry less effective and less competitive.  
bination of all these constraints classifies rural Zambia, as what the Critical Global-
                                                
 
The com
ist refers to, as a ‘low equilibrium’ area. The underdeveloped market in rural Zambia is 
fraught with high risk, and it is therefore difficult to get anyone to invest in these areas. This 
is a typical situation for rural poor, who simply do not provide enough of a market incentive 
 
69 In relation to this, Jeffrey Sachs puts special emphasis on these geographical factors as an overriding factor 
ked countries’ best chances in trade is to export 
 Zambia, this would mean focusing on cobber and mining. 
for a landlocked countries poverty (Sachs 2005:105). Landloc
commodities with a high value per unit weight, only those commodities can successfully overcome the high 
transport cost (ibid:104).In the case of
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for private companies to invest in (Hazell 2007:10, Sachs 2005:72). The ‘low equilibrium 
trap’ prevents small scale farmers from accessing larger markets while at the same time 
prevent companies from accessing these potential suppliers. Since companies have little 
ach these remote areas, it reinforces farmers in sustaining 
arket exchanges. This leads to thin and volatile 
e companies needed to be willing to take high risks, which not all 
el al 2006:245). For this reason, it is not at 
l that it was only large cotton ITCs that started operating in Zambia when 
privatized (ibid:250). In relation to this, Steven Haggblade71 and John Fynn point out that 
Zambia has an advantage in terms of climate compared to other countries, including abun-
dant natural resource endowments in fertile land and water available for irrigation 
(Haggblade & Fynn 2006:3). Following this view it means that while high investment costs 
existed when establishing the cotton industry, there are reasons to believe that staying in 
Zambia will work in the companies’ advantage, thereby indicating that their investments 
would be profitable in the long run.  
 
Considering that in contrast to ITCs driven cotton chains, commodity chains where retailers 
operate as the ‘lead agent’, more ‘drivenness’ exists and farmers would be expected, with or 
without the help from governmental institutions by e.g. bank loa
emselves. Since small scale farmers in Zambia are cash constrained and can not get a bank 
                                                
incentive to incur large costs to re
in subsistence low production for local m
markets, thereby limiting households’ incentives to increase productivity (Barrett 2007:314). 
As a result, the conditions for successful linkages between rural farmers and the world 
market often tend to work against the remote poorest, which results in a ‘low equilibrium 
trap’ that reinforces itself (Sachs 2005:70, Kydd et al 2005:81).  
 
Against the background of these considerations the companies that did choose to enter the 
cotton market have thus high risks and transactions costs when seeking to provide a effective 
linkage to the many and dispersed farmers, spread over large geographical areas70 . The 
cotton industry is a risky business for the companies, especially for those companies that 
went into Zambia, at the time when the industry was transformed from a nationalized to a 
privatized industry. Th
companies are willing or able to do (Dorward 
coincidenta
ns, to manage the procedure 
th
 
70 Elaboration of this will be done in the succeeding chapters. 
71  Professor at International Development in the Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State 
University, senior advisor for FSRP. 
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loan due to lack of collaterals72, being linked with retailers would have proven an impossible 
task.  
4.5 Declining cotton prices 
 
World cotton prices have declined persistently since 1995, by as much as fifty percent (Gray 
& Moseley 2008:22, Figure 3). This means that farmers will have to produce more and more 
just to receive the status quo income. There are overall two ways for farmers to increase their 
cotton volume. The one requires investment in research to develop a cotton crop that requires 
less labour and less soil, while sustain the same amount of farm labour. The other possibility 
for the farmers is to increase the allocation of land for cotton cultivation, thereby making 
farmers work more in the cotton field.  It is likely that none of these solutions are feasible, 
since the first one is expensive and since the cotton industry already is too labour-intensive 
and the extra work would happen at the expense of the farmers other crops. Therefore 
Zambian farmers at their current position will not be able to produce significantly more, and 
as a result their income from cotton will eventually decline.  
 
Figure 3 
 
source: Poulton et al 2004:9 
 
                                                 
72 The small scale farmers do not have a deed on the land on which they live (Vinther 2008). 
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The trend in declining cotton prices clearly influence the level of potential that exists for 
small scale farmers involved in cotton cultivation. An illustration of this is an estimation 
ased on cotton farmers in Benin: “When world cotton prices declined by 40 percent during 
ral po erty in cotton growing regions of Benin increased by 8 percent” (Gray & 
oseley 2008:13). While the elasticity between decline in cotton price and farmers income is 
not equal for all countries, since countries process different cotton qualities, which have 
different prices on the world market, and since domestic variables, including the share the 
intermediate takes of the prices, it is nonetheless plausible that the relation between the 
decline on world cotton prices has likewise a negative effect on poverty in Zambia. 
 
The four main reasons behind the decline in price are (1) the result of competition in reduc-
ing cotton production cost, by e.g. improved technology and pest management techniques 
(Poulton et al 2008:124), and (2) an international trend away from cotton towards synthetic 
materials. Synthetic fibres have increased from 48 percent in 1995 to 55 percent in 1999 on 
e textile fibre market (Larsen 2003:6). This makes the demand for cotton less, leading to 
reduction in price. (3) Further, the cotton production in Asia has increased. The world cotton 
market prices are influenced by unpredictable fluctuations in import-export production from 
particular India, Pakistan and China. All three countries are major cotton producers, but also 
major cotton consumers; hence their cotton is only exported when the cotton harvest is larger 
than their domestic demand. China, in particular, is the main ‘swing’ factor in world cotton 
trade and therefore has a strong impact on cotton prices (ibid:5), and (4) cotton subsidies in 
industrialized countries, particular US, EU and China depress world market prices on cotton 
(Gray & Moseley 2008:22). This later issue will be further discussed in the succeeding, since 
it is often claimed that farm support in industrialized countries hinder African farmers from 
is a labour intensive crop; one would assume that the production would be located in devel-
b
2001/2, ru v
M
th
escaping poverty (Rodrik 2007:222).  
 
4.5.1 Cotton subsidies 
 
Bearing in mind the former explanation of the international division of labour and that cotton 
oping countries, where labour costs are lower. However this is not the case. The figures 
above (figure 4) signify that United States is the second-largest cotton producer and by far 
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the largest exporter of cotton73. This can be explained by the heavy subsidizing of cotton 
farmers in the US.  
 
Figure 4   
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                                                                                          Source: App:F 
   
 
The US farm policy assures that American cotton growers are compensated for their high 
production costs no matter what the market prices are, by giving them a minimum price 
above market prices and at the same time giving them a payment that brings them a target 
                                                 
73 US are followed by the African Francophone countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire and Mali (Larsen 
nt out that since the fluctuations in import-export cotton production in China, India 2003:4). It is relevant to poi
and Pakistan, the data from 2005 would plausibly look very different for these countries had I showed another 
year.  
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price (Bassett 2008:37). One estimate points to that small scale farmers in West Africa can 
produce high-quality cotton at a fifty percent lower cost than farmers in the US (Gray & 
Moseley 2008:24). Another estimate assesses that American cotton farmers have received up 
to 73 percent above world market price (ibid:23). Additionally, the ICAC calculates that if 
e US alone removed subsidies from cotton, the global cotton price would raise between 12 
at the 
ambian state otherwise could get from cotton export77.  
th
and 26 percent (Stiglitz 2006:306), and world prices would, in the short term, increase 
between six and eleven cents per pound on the world market74 (Gray 2008:65). However it is 
important to signify that the cotton quality variations worldwide mean that a price increase 
would not be equally distributed across all exporters, and that domestic variables would 
influence the level of price increase that would trickle down to farmers. 
 
The ICAC assesses that subsidies on cotton are 20 percent in China, 50 percent in the US and 
over 100 percent in the EU75 (Poulton et al 2008:154). Eventhough the US does not have the 
highest level of subsidies, the country is the largest cotton exporter; hence it is reasonable to 
belief that the US does the most damage in terms of distorting the cotton market. By dump-
ing price-depressing surpluses on the world market, these countries depress would cotton 
marked artificially. Among others, they restrict Zambia’s comparative advantages 76  in 
cotton, and prevent Zambian farmers from getting full value of their cotton (Hazell 2007:6). 
The industrialized countries’ subsidies deny the extent of foreign exchange earnings th
Z
 
According to an estimate conducted by Oxfam in 2003, Africa is losing 300 million US$ a 
year due to industrialized countries’ exports subsidies (Larsen 2003:5). In relation to this, 
Colin Poulton argues that “Higher world prices as a result of subsidy removal would […] 
translate into both higher production and higher incomes for smallholder producers” 
(Poulton et al 2004:59). If Zambia cannot get full value for its cotton production in which it 
has a comparative advantage, the chances of world trade benefitting Zambians becomes 
smaller. On the contrary, it is feasible that it will leave small scale farmers in rural Zambia 
                                                 
74 Equivalent to between 9,3 US$ and 17 US$ (2009 estimates). 
75 The EU intervenes in cotton production by providing support to Spanish and Greek cotton producers, under 
the Common Agricultural Policy (Balet & Porto 2005:7) In 2001, Spain and Greece accounted combined for 6 
counted for 16 percent of world cotton subsidies (Poulton et al 2004:17). percent of world exports, and ac
76 The lower labour cost. 
77 Domestic variables also play a role in whether a potential reduction of subsidies would trickle down to 
farmers.  
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further isolated from reaping the benefits of globalization and world trade (Stiglitz 
2006:87,135). In relation to this, David Tschirley and Ballard Zulu78 argue that “Elimination 
of cotton subsidies in the U.S. and EU could do more for cotton sectors in SSA in the short- 
to medium-run than any other single action” (Tschirley & Zulu 2003:5). 
tion is to what extent, and would it be enough 
r farmers to escape poverty. In this relation, Dani Rodik argues that the reality is that the 
ers. 
herefore, to the extent that an increase in the world cotton prices is transmitted to farmers, 
                                 
 
While this assumption might be true, the ques
fo
global impact of agricultural liberalization in industrialised countries would be relatively 
small and highly uneven (Rodrik 2007:222). Thereby indicating that its impact on Zambian 
poverty would be very modest. How much, in real terms, the removing of subsidies would 
mean for Zambians farmers is unclear, as domestic variables effect whether the gains 
acquired on the world market would trickle down to cotton farmers, including the institu-
tional arrangement, share to intermediates and corruption. Todd Moos79 have the following 
remark to this “While it is true that global trade rules are often tilted against African 
producers, most of the barriers they face are homegrown” (Moos 2007:210). But unlike the 
US, where large cooperate farmers dominate the production; small scale farmers grow cotton 
in Zambia, hence even a small change in price would mean a lot for Zambian farm
T
they will have a significant effect on rural income and poverty (Poulton et al 2004:62). 
 
Since no other sector is as distorted globally by trade policy than the agricultural sector, and 
no sector is as important to Africa, it is worth recalling that from a neoclassic economical 
theory perspective, the ideal of perfect competition is where the market is determined by 
demand and supply’s own equivalence, and where actors conform to this equilibrium 
(Nielsen 2005:99). However, as indicated above, and as Colin Poulton amongst others 
emphasis the fault in this premise is that all distractions80 other than price are removed and 
actors do not accept the market equivalence unconditionally (Poulton et al 2003:521). 
Instead, states change equivalence through domestic interventionist policy, by conducting 
regulations and laws that bend the market forces and change the conditions of competition 
                
ways include. 
78 Fellow researchers at FSRP  
79 Research Fellow, Center for Global Development. Washington 
80 E.g. products are not always homogenous and there exists externalities e.g. environmental damage that prices 
do not al
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e.g. by subsidising. The interactions between world market and these policies change 
equivalence artificially, which Zambia has to conform into, if it wishes to participate in world 
trade. 
 
4.5.2 The collapse of the Doha negotiations 
 reduced. 
his signifies the fundamental inequity of agricultural policies in industrialized and develop-
 
As argued, states change the market equivalence through domestic policy, but also by 
bilateral preferential trade agreements81 and through international trade institutions, includ-
ing the WTO 82 . I will here briefly mention the latest WTO negotiations: the Doha-
negotiations, which were arranged to secure a global trade agreement with focus on poverty 
reduction including reducing industrialized countries agricultural subsidies. At the end of the 
meeting in Doha 2001, the North committed themselves “to correct and prevent restrictions 
and distortions in world agricultural markets… with a view to phasing out, all forms of 
export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade distorting support” (WTO 2001 quoted 
in Basssett 2008:36). However the countries’ subsidies continued, and the Doha-negotiations 
broke down in the end of July 2008 (Woden & Siaens 2008:160, Poulton et al 2004:21).  
 
From the failure in the Doha trade negotiations, it can be deduced that the possibilities in 
improving global agricultural trade conditions for developing countries have been
T
ing countries. Zambia can currently not count on WTO’s assistance in terms of increasing 
their position in world cotton trade, instead the continuation of status quo in the livelihoods 
of cotton farmers is putting them at further risk83. In relation to this, the Critical Globalist 
argues that “As a global society, we should ensure that the international rules of the game in 
economic management do not advertently or inadvertently set snares along the lower rungs 
                                                 
81 Developing countries have received preferential export quotes to industrialized countries, for a selection of 
products. E.g. the EU´s preferential trade agreements with the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries, and the 
 developed countries under the Everything but Arms agreement, and the US Africa Growth and Opportu-
ity Act. However many of the countries do not have viable industries to take advantage of these arrangements 
SADC. 
Least
n
(Anderson & Martin 2007:64).  
82 E.g. support of agricultural goods by export subsidies are still tolerated within the WTO (Anderson & Martin 
2007:66).  
83 The breakdown of the Doha negotiations and lack of solving the agricultural issues shows that Zambia and its 
counterpart countries are too weak in lobbying for a free and fair trade. This aspect could easily be further 
scrutinized in terms of strengthening the African cotton association and the regional blocks of COMESA and 
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of the ladder in the form of inadequate development assistance, protectionist trade barriers 
[…] and the like, that prevent the low-income world from climbing up the rungs of develop-
ment” (Sachs 2005:24f).  
 
4.6 Summary 
 
From this chapter there are variables, which point toward different conclusions of the 
consequences of international actors’ influence on small scale cotton farmers in Zambia in 
terms of poverty alleviation. First of all, Zambia being linked with large international cotton 
companies provides the country with much needed jobs for its rural citizens. This point is 
ssential, since rural areas in Zambia in many ways are isolated from the larger market, 
hile the farmers’ engagement with the world markets presents them with new opportuni-
s, risks are also present. These risks connected to cultivating cotton are, from an interna-
tional perspective, a result of the differences in territorial embeddedness between the farmers 
and cotton companies. This, in essence, means that farmers can be cultivating cotton and than 
experience that there are no demands for their product. This condition points towards 
farmers’ increased exposure to risks when linked into cotton trade. These enhanced risks can 
threaten their livelihood into further economic vulnerability.  
 
Further it can be concluded that the global cotton market is worsening Zambia’s competi-
tiveness on the world market. The general decline in world cotton prices and industrialized 
states’ interventionist policies benefitting their own cotton farmers, keeps the prices artifi-
e
constraining them in a ‘low equilibrium trap’. By creating a linkage through the cotton 
commodity chain between rural areas and the international market, small scale farmers are 
able to move from being solely subsistence farmers and sell cotton on a much larger market. 
Considering the large unemployment rate in Zambia, the companies’ interest in investing in 
rural area is an advantage for Zambia. Few companies are able to invest in a land-locked 
development country, where the return of their investment takes a longer time to return. 
Moreover, the direct involvement of international companies in providing input on credit to 
farmers enables them to better attain the quality and demand of the world market.  
 
W
tie
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cially low. This hinders the Zambian farmers in fully gaining from the benefits world cotton 
 poverty. From this 
erspective, the chances of reaching the full potential in the Zambian cotton industry and 
gainst the background of the conclusions done on this chapter, the big task is to strengthen 
mbia, while diminishing the 
ariables that put the farmers at further risk. Only then can small scale farmer escape poverty 
trade otherwise could bring them in terms of possibility of escaping
p
thereby enabling farmers to escape poverty are, to some extent, in the hands of the actions 
conducted by global powers: Whether China will export or import cotton, the level of 
subsidies to cotton farmers in industrialized countries, and whether final consumers prefer 
synthetics rather than cotton lint in a given year essentially determines the price given for 
Zambian cotton. There is not much that can be done in the first segments of the cotton chain, 
to circumvent these international arrangements. From this vies, it seems ironic that Zambian 
small scale farmers are essentially isolated form seizing the gains of globalization, while they 
are not isolated from seizing the down side of globalization. 
 
A
the advantages international cotton companies bring to Za
v
through cotton trade. In spite of declining cotton prices on the world market, and the fact that 
the international trade regime is working against the Zambian cotton industry to reach the 
potential in alleviating poverty in rural Zambia, the cotton industry in Zambia has been 
highlighted as a success. It is in this light that I in the next chapters will scrutinize the 
domestic cotton industry, and looks further into the possibilities and constrains for farmers to 
escape poverty through participating in cotton trade.  
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5. A historic overview of Zambian cotton industry  
 
This chapter is the first part of the domestic analysis and will in a chronological order treat 
the changes in the organisational structure that have happened in Zambia. The chapter sets 
out to answer: What are the different domestic institutional arrangements that have influ-
enced the Zambian cotton industry over the last two decades, and how has it influenced the 
cotton industry and farmers’ livelihood? By giving a historic overview of the dynamics 
behind the Zambian cotton industry performance, its shows what has enabled the Zambian 
otton industries strong growth performance. In the next chapters, the strength and weak-
inimized, and by guaranteeing high 
argins to producers, the ISI strategy created considerable incentive for domestic 
c
nesses of the current institutional situation will be scrutinised in terms of its impact on 
poverty among small scale farmers.  
 
5.1 Import Substitution Industrialization strategy 
 
Since the independence in 1964 84  and throughout the 1980s, Zambia used the Import 
Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) strategy 85 , at that time commonly used in developing 
countries, to boost the industry (Taylor 2007:58). This was accomplished under the United 
National Independence Party with the leadership of Kenneth Kaunda 86 . Through major 
governmental investments, foreign competition was m
profit m
companies to produce manufactured products, including textile. During this period, Zambia 
focused on developing the mining sector and used the copper revenues to finance the state-
led industrialization. This focus happened at some level at the expense of Zambians involved 
in the agricultural sector in rural areas (Thurlow & Wobst 2006:604). During this period, the 
cotton production was integrated domestically into linkages with the textile industry.   
 
                                                 
84 Zambia formerly named Northern Rhodesian was colonized by Britain at the end of the 19th century.  
85 The ISI strategy is a inward looking industrial development strategy, characterized by laying incentive on 
domestic industrialization to decrease the dependency of products produced in industrialized countries. The 
ns of the strategy (Cypher & Dietz 2004:299). 
Zambia in 1964, a position he held until 1991 (Taylor 
strategy is developed on the basis of the unequal ‘terms of trade’ considerations. There have been many 
versio
86 Kaunda became the first president of the Republic of 
2007:57). 
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From 1977 to 1994, the cotton industry was heavily regulated. The industry was based on the 
parastatal cotton company Lintco (Poulton et al 2008:131, Brambilla & Porto 2006:4). The 
state provided fixed price guarantees, and provision of transport appealed to the potential 
cotton farmers (Taylor 2007:60). In relation to this, the executive director Mike Muleba from 
FOSUP argues, that “the ISI period was beneficial for the cotton farmers, because they were 
paid a relatively good share of the final price and they were paid the same price independ-
ently of the quality they were selling” (IW:Muleba). Hence the fixed prices made the farmers 
know how much benefit they could expect from cultivating cotton, compared to the amount 
of labour spent on other crops.  
 
However since this procedure of fixed prices gave no incentive for the farmers to improve or 
aintain the quality, the reputation of Zambian cotton quality on the world market deterio-
ame additionally lower. In continuation of this Andrew Shepherd87 
rgues that “Where subsidies are applied, ownership of an activity by farmers is generally 
ollowing conclusion “… the benefits to peasant and small-
ale farmers were, at best, modest” (Taylor 2007:60).  
                                                
m
rated and the price bec
a
weak as subsidies tend to reduce responsibility and reward failure” (Shepherd 2007:21). 
From this it can be derived that eventhough the cotton farmers received a good proportion of 
the final cotton price, a low final price due to the discount attached to the bad quality hurt the 
farmers’ income. In addition, as one farmer explains “before privatization we could easily 
wait months between the cotton harvest and payment” (IW:Chanda). This statement indicates 
the lack of efficiency of the Zambian cotton industry.  
 
Moreover, considering that Zambian cotton farmers are cash constrained, the uncertainty of 
the time frame of their payment makes them further economic vulnerable. They can not 
calculate their payment on a regular basis into the livelihood costs. On the other hand, the 
fixed prices, independent of the quality they provide, make farmers know the exact payment 
they will receive, which make them less vulnerable in terms of variables88 they have control 
over that affect the quality. In relation to the pros and cons of this arrangement in the ISI 
period, Scott Taylor89 make the f
sc
 
n University. 
87 Researcher at Agricultural Marketing and Rural Finance Service at the Food and Agriculture organization of 
UN. 
88 Including the level of sun and rain hours (IW:Kenan) 
89 Associate Professor, Department of Foreign Service at Georgetow
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Due to the widespread corruption and lack of competitiveness in export in the ISI period, the 
returns of the Zambian state investments were slow to arrive (IW:Krough-Poulsen). More-
over, the global recession in the early 1980´s did not help to spur the benefits of the ISI 
strategy. When copper prices failed to recover in the 1980s, the country’s economy stagnated 
and the balance of payment worsened. GDP per capita declined in this period to three percent 
per year (Taylor 2007:59)90. In the believe that the decline in copper prices was only tempo-
rary, the Zambian state lent capital abroad, which resulted in an enormous dept burden by the 
end of 1980s (Thurlow & Wobst 2006:605). Hence all things considered, the ISI strategy was 
too expensive for the Zambian state (Koyi 2006:6, Handley 2008:219). Thus by 1990 Zambia 
was in a state of political and economic crisis, and calls for reforms were mandatory.  
 
5.2 Liberalization 
91
and a partner in national development (Handley 2008:235). Having resigned to the 
ationalized economy for years, Zambia’s private sector was naturally a leading supporter of 
                                                
 
In 1991 the MMD  came to power, under the leadership of Frederick Chiluba (Handley 
2008:223,239). The MMD promised greater access for the private sector and interest groups 
to the policy-making process. In the MMD manifesto it is stated that: “MMD believes that 
economics prosperity for all can best be created by free men and women through free 
enterprise … with the Government only creating an enabling environment whereby economic 
growth must follow” (MMD manifesto cited in Handley 2008:223). Faced with a profound 
recession, MMD implemented macroeconomic stabilization reforms, reduced the state 
budget significantly and privatized the agricultural sector including the cotton industry 
(Brambilla & Porto 2006:4, Dorward el al 2006:243). Hence under Chiluba, economic 
liberalization was enforced, and the role of the private sector was emphasized as a wealth 
creator 
n
the MMD and looked forward to seizing the opportunity they believed a liberalized economy 
would present (Taylor 2007:56). 
 
 
90 With the decline in copper prices Zambia witnessed a radical decline in per capita incomes from US $752 in 
1965 to US$440 in 2004 (PID 2008:1). The cobber price has later increased, which was explained in chapter 1.  
evel of multi party democracy.  
91 MMD stands for Movement for Multiparty Democracy. However the opposition’s parties are weak and 
disorganised, which questions the l
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These economically wide reforms were motivated by the IFI, where liberalization and 
privatization during the early 1990s was on the top of the agenda for creating economic 
growth in developing countries. “It was during this period that Zambia earned its reputation 
as a star pupil of the World Bank” (Handley 2008:224). In order to open the market to 
foreign investments, and ensure the necessary investment flows that could boost Zambia’s 
economy to become more integrated in the world economy, Zambia adopted the Structural 
Adjustments Programs (SAP 92 ) recommended by the IFI (Taylor 2007:62). Hence the 
Zambian economy was reoriented to the global, market-based economic system. In relation 
 the previous chapter, the irony of these reforms is that while Zambia, along with other 
African countries, liberalized their production, it has happened without the reciprocation of 
As a result the e.g. textile industry declined, leaving many without a job. “These events had 
the cumulative effect of turning Zambian businesses into primarily retailers and distributors 
rather than producers” (Taylor 2007:69). The remaining textile companies still running in 
                                 
to
the industrialized countries.  
 
5.2.1 The decline of the textile industry 
 
It is widely recognized that the benefits of the recommended polices of the IFI were not 
realized as the “Zambian businesses were, like many of their counterparts throughout sub-
Saharan Africa, ill-prepared for liberalization, ...” (ibid:56). When the market was opened 
up to internationally highly competitive products, no national protection or support of 
domestic production was conducted, hence disabling potential viable firms to become 
competitive. Domestic firms were squeezed out by cheaper products even on the home 
market (Traub-Marz 2006:32). Zambia is still affected by the of any significant positive 
results of these economic reforms (TPR 2002:10) The Critical Globalist utters this situation 
of developing countries transforming their economy into the IFI recommended policies, as 
‘the check is in the mail’, meaning that the benefits of the reforms’ prescription are yet to 
occur.  
 
                
valuation.  
92 SAP was designed to address: poor governance, excessive government intervention in the markets, balances 
the budget, currency de
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Zambia have made a career of the local niches markets93, including the traditional Katanga’s 
oyi 
.2.2. Privatizing agriculture   
As a result of the government’s reduced role in agriculture when liberalized, the private 
sector has taken over and has been spearheading the growth in agricultural exports and 
diversification (FNDP:63). From 1995 to 2004, the growth of agricultural exports was in 
average 22,4 percent, mainly led by cotton, vegetable and horticulture exports (PID 2006:2). 
Moreover CDT assesses that between 1990 to 2000, agricultural GDP grew 3,9 percent per 
annum at an average rate. Currently agriculture contributes to 18,6 percent of GDP. The rise 
in GDP in agriculture per year has been faster than the population growth of 2,9 percent 
(CDT 2007:1). While this indicates a positive growth rate per capita, the high gini-index of 
50,8 in Zambia indicates that the GDP increase has not trickled down to farmers to a satisfy-
ing extent. Peter Hazell95  has the following observation to how liberalization in African 
countries in general influence farmers livelihood: “The removal of subsidies has also made 
some key inputs […] prohibitively expensive for many farms, and the removal of price 
stabilization programs has exposed farmers to much more downside risk in farm gate prices. 
These problems are especially difficult for small farms living in more remote regions with 
poor infrastructure and market access” (Hazell 2007:5). 
                                              
and official uniforms, where they are still able to compete on service and delivery (K
2006:9f). Today, most of Zambia’s demand for textiles comes from foreign countries, most 
of it as second hand clothing94, known locally as Salaula (Hansen 2000). The import of 
second hand clothes destroys whatever initiative there is to start a textile company (Rates 
2003:27). As a result, in the 2007/08 season cotton lint consumption by domestic spinners 
amounted to less than 20.000 tons, equivalent to five percent of cotton lint production. The 
remaining cotton lint was exported (CDT 2008:6).  
 
5
 
   
 These products can not be found on the second hand market.   
 Second hand clothing is used clothe as well as clothes that are out of season, factory seconds etc. (Koyi 
006:16). 
 Professor at Centre for Development, Environment and Policies at School of Oriental and African studies, 
niversity of London. 
93
94
2
95
U
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.3 Changes in the Zambian cotton industry’s organizational structure  
In the following, a short presentation of the development in the Zambian cotton industry’s 
organizational structure and production from the period when it was privatized to the current 
situation, will be outlined. I will here only brush upon how the cotton industry has influenced 
the cotton farmers. In the next, details of the dynamics behind the changes of the industry and 
clarification of chapters the weaknesses and strengths of the cotton industry’s influence on 
small scale farmers in terms of reducing poverty, will be examined. Hence this section works 
as an overview, to which the later chapter refers. 
 
Figure 5 
Seed Cotton Production in Zambia, 1991-2008
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1994-1997: The privatization of the cotton industry 
 
The liberalization began with the privatization of the parastatal company Lintco, which was 
ld in two parts to international buyers: Lonrho96 and Clack Cotton97 in 1994. To begin 
aphical monopoly 
eant that in spite of privatization, competition between the two companies on the domestic 
 (Taylor 2007:82).  
 the business environment began to change and 
veral challenges came to the fore: The farmers began to change their behaviour toward 
the world price of cotton from its peak in 1995 and onward making the 
rice to farmers less (Balat & Porto 2005:5). In 1999, Lonrho pulled out, and other firms cut 
back on the number of farmers they had supported (Poulton et al 2008:142). Among its 
so
with, the companies operated in separate provinces98. The partly geogr
m
market hardly existed.  Instead, the companies found interest in cooperating to encounter the 
challenges that existed in the industry at the time. As a result, the Zambian cotton industry 
improved and the cotton production rose 2,5 times, with an increase from 42.000 tons in 
1994/95 season to 104.000 tons in 1997/98 (App:A).  
 
1998-2000: The first credit default crises  
 
As a result of the improvements in the Zambian cotton industry since 1995, it became more 
profitable to invest in Zambian cotton, and around 1997 it attracted new cotton companies. 
These companies were e.g. Continental, Mulungushi, and Mukuba who began to compete. 
The Zambian government was committed to a liberalized economic policy and made no 
attempt to limit the competition
 
As the number of companies expanded,
se
their contracted companies and began to side sell their cotton to companies that were offering 
higher prices than their contracted company. Lonrho and Clack Cotton found that the farmers 
they had supplied inputs to were selling the resultant crop to others, leading to lower cotton 
supplies to the companies and significant loan default. Lonrho asses that credit repayment 
dropped from around 86 percent in 1996 to 65 percent in 1999 (Kabwe & Tschirley 2007a:4). 
This caused the first major credit default crisis. The crisis was further exacerbated by a 
continual decline on 
p
                                                 
96 In 2001 Lonrho was bought by Dunavant, the world largest cotton trader (Poulton et al 2003:526).  
97 A company from South Africa. In 2003 Clack Cotton sold all its access in Zambia to Cargill. 
98 Clack Cotton in the eastern province and Lonrho in the southern province.  
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reasons for departing, Lonrho cited US$2 million per year in unpaid loans. (ibid:142) As a 
result, the production dropped back from 104.000 tons in 1997/98 to 75.000 tons in 1999/00 
(App:A).  
 
2001-2005: Moving from a ‘concentrated’ to a ‘competitive’ structure 
 
Clack Cotton and Lonrho’s successor Dunavant overcame the first credit crisis by strengthen-
ing their input credit supply to the farmers, thereby strengthening the farmers’ loyal behav-
iour towards them (Kabwe & Tschirley 2007b:6)99. From this it can be derived that the first 
cotton crisis lead to an improvement of the farmers’ position, since the companies became 
interested in strengthening the linkage to farmers’ and give them yield training and improve 
eir cotton of cotton. During this period, the farmers’ yield was improved from 600 to 750 
current crisis, that 
the sector overcame the first crisis in spite of the lack of state interventions, and solely by 
private innovative initiatives.  
 
2006-2008: Second credit default crisis 
 
Since 2005, there have been substantial changes in the structure of the sector. Several new 
smaller companies have entered the market including: Alliance (2006), Bircland (2006), 
Chipata Cotton Company (2005), Great Lakes (2006), Olam (2004) and Yustina (2008) 
(Kabwe & Tschirley 2007a:13), and companies already in Zambia have expanded their 
ginning capacity. Today, the Zambian cotton industry has been fully liberalized, with a 
highly ‘competitive’ structure. At present, eleven companies are operating in Zambia and are 
fiercely competing.  
 
                                                
th
kg/Ha, and the area for cotton cultivation was expanded from 125.000 to 300.000 Ha 
(App:A). Moreover, credit repayment rose from 65 percent to over 90 percent (Poulton et al 
2008:143). As a result, the industry once more took of, and reached 227.000 tons in the 
2003/04 season (App:A). It is relevant to pinpoint here, in the light of the 
 
99  The companies used different distribution systems. Cargill has improved its staff to monitor farmers. 
Dunavant on the other hand use a system of limilted number of independent ‘distributors’ who are responsible 
for supplying inputs and obtaining the cotton. This system diminishes the amount of information that Dunavant 
requires to ensure adequate credit recovery, and creates incentives for distributor to recover as mush credit for 
a & Porto 2006:5) the company as possible (Poulton et al 2008:143, Brambill
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The ‘competitive’ structure has changed the investment climate within Zambia, where some 
f the companies’ are promoting side selling by offering farmers, who they have not con-
tracted, with better prices. This has resulted in the second credit default crisis in 2006. This 
s the appreciation of the Zambian currency, the 
Kwacha10 xper n over the 
last three seasons from 2006 to 2008. The cotton production in 2006/07 dropped to almost 
one third compared to the 2003/
nies opera low pro ity has 
grown to about 288.000 tons in the 2007/08 season, the cotton production has only been at 
139.000 tons (App:D). Hence, there is not e feed the ginneries and the 
ng potential, :D).  
 
The changes in the structure of the sector over e past three years have put the sector under 
great pressure and m question is, whether the former 
hands-off approach that the Zam plied under the first default crisis, and the 
in e , can
                                                
o
crisis ha  been even move severe due to 
0. As a result, the industry has e ienced a slump in cotton productio
04 season (App:A). The   consequence of the many compa-
duction, is that while the ginning capac
nough cotton to 
ting in Zambia as well as the 
production is well below the ginni with 48 percent not being utilized (App
th
ay have pushed it to a turning point. The 
bian state ap
solely from the private companiesitiativ  still overcome the crisis.  
 
100 Argumentation of this will be brought up in chapter 8. 
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Table 3. Chronology of Key Events in Zambia’s Cotton Sector 
Year Actions Taken Comments 
 
1997-94 Parastatal phase: State-owned Lintco runs single channel cotton system.  
Production trends downward from the mid-1980s 
in spite of rising world cotton prices.  
1994 Lintco sells its assets to the private companies: Lonrho and Clack Cotton. 
Operating in separate provinces, not much 
competition. Production takes off.  
1997 
Three new companies enter the 
market. Government does not 
intervene. 
The market share decreases from 80 to 90 percent 
for the two ‘old’ companies, but they still 
dominate the market. The new entrants provide 
few, if any, inputs to farmers. Competition for 
cotton increases.  
1998-00 First credit default crisis. Credit recovery falls to below 60 %, and productions fall. 
1999 Lonrho leaves Zambia due to credit losses.  
2001 Dunavant takes over Lonrho.  
2001 
Dunavant and Clack Cotton begin to 
strengthen their relation to farmers, Credit recovery improves to 90 %. The industry 
more. through input packages and extension 
service. 
takes off once 
2002 Heavy drought in southern province. Low production and credit recovery decreases in this province. 
2002 Government launches the Cotton Outgrower Credit Fund. 
The first direct government involvement in the 
sector since liberalization in 1994, to incentive 
that all companies provide farmers with input.  
2003/04 Proposal of the Cotton Act.  An Act to regulate the cotton industry through a Cotton Board. 
2005 
The cotton industry is moving from a 
concentrated to a competitive 
structure. 
 
2005 Kwacha begins rapid appreciation. The bad exchange rate is laid on farmwitnessing a price reduction in 2006 a
ers, who are 
nd 2007. 
2006 More companies enter the market.  Widespread side buying. The second credit crisis takes off. 
2006 CDT with others begins to develop a new proposal for a Cotton Act.  
2008 Heavy competition between compa-nies on price.  The farmers benefit from the price competition.  
                                                                                                               (Inspired by Kabwe & Tschirley 2007a:5) 
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6. The ‘success’ of Zambia’s cotton industry  
 
In this chapter, I go into details with how the Zambian cotton industry influences small scale 
farmers’ capability of escaping poverty. This will be done by examining which measure-
ents the Zambian cotton industry has taken in order to improve the quality and volume of 
environment, where the 
turn of their investments was relatively well secured. Further, the companies found an 
lve the common obstacles that existed in the 
on production since privatization has increased from 42.000 tons in 
e 1994/95 season to 227.000 tons in the 2003/04 season (App:A). This is primarily a result 
ipating in larger market, the 
read of the cotton cultivation that includes world market sale creates new opportunities for 
m
small scale farmers’ cotton, and mention the shortfalls of these variables. These variables are 
important since they determine the farmers’ income, hence their possibilities of alleviating 
poverty. One conclusion in this chapter is that when it comes to upgrading the quality and 
volume of cotton the organizational structure with only a few companies has been fortunate 
for the cotton industry. The companies had a favourable business 
re
incitement in cooperating with each other, to so
cotton industry at the time. As a result, the Zambia cotton industry has increased, reaching an 
enhanced number of former subsistence farmers in rural Zambia.  
 
6.1 Zambia’s ‘concentrated’ structure  
 
In contrast to the effect liberalization had on the domestically more advanced industry, as we 
saw in chapter 5, the privatization in 1994 of the cotton industry has been proclaimed by 
researchers to be a major success for Zambia’s development (Kabwe & Tschirley 2007d, 
Tschirley & Zulu 2003). The clearest success parameter is to be found in the growth per-
formance, where the cott
th
of an increased number of farmers participating in the cotton production, which has increased 
from around 50.000 before privatization to 250.000 in the 2004/05 season (ibid).  
 
The geographical spread of the cotton industry to include an enhanced number of small scale 
farmers has led David Tschirley and Ballard Zulu, among others, to proclaim that “Its 
potential role in poverty alleviation and food security is thus very large” (Tschirley & Zulu 
2003:1). Since small scale farmers are often isolated from partic
sp
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farmers to escape poverty through cotton trade. The move from solely being subsistence food 
ing obstacles, need to be addressed to establish a reliable cotton industry. First of 
ll, cotton production requires substantial use of an input market, including seed, insecticides 
ing crop, the 
otton industry all over Africa is based on pre-financing (Shepherd 2007:10). By ending this 
rocedure, African farmers would likely stop producing cotton. 
  
crop producer to also cultivating cotton that has more value is ‘chain’ upgrading for the 
farmers (Gibbon 2000:3). Where there formerly were a tendency to rely on local markets to 
absorb whatever the farmers produced, there is now a possibility through cotton to meet the 
requirements of buyers on world market (Shepherd 2007:1).  
 
In relation to this, the organizational structure behind the Zambian cotton industry growth 
performance success is relevant to study, to identify how it has influenced the cotton farmers’ 
conditions. In the preceding, the organizational structure and institutional arrangement will 
be identified, and additionally the shortfalls in the arrangement that curtail the possibility of 
utilizing the full potential for small scale farmers to escape poverty. 
 
Obstacles in the cotton production in Africa 
In order to understand Zambia’s cotton production success, one has to understand the 
obstacles that exist in the cotton industry all over Africa, as well as when the cotton industry 
in Zambia were privatized. There are a number of obstacles in the cotton industry, of which 
the follow
a
and fertilizers, which is often weak in rural Africa, and secondly cotton farmers are cash 
constrained, and rural credit markets are often non-existing in the agricultural sector of 
Africa (Kabwe & Tschirley 2007b). If these obstacles are solved, it is the first step towards 
creating a well-functioning cotton industry, and will make the cotton production an attractive 
alternative for farmers.  
 
Therefore, in order to take advantage of the export opportunities the cotton production 
contains for small scale farmers, in terms of job creation, larger market and increase in 
income, a number of initiatives have to be enforced by the government or/and by the private 
sector. This includes providing a coordinated market that creates reliable access to inputs for 
farmers. Since farmers are cash constrained, and cotton is a very input-demand
c
p
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Country comparison of the organizational structure  
frican cotton producing countries have used different strategies to address these common 
n terms of establishing a 
ell-functioning cotton industry: “the concentrated sectors have generally performed best in 
ariables affect Zambian farmers’ participation in cotton trade, to an extent where 
ey can escape poverty, will be discussed into greater length in the succeeding. For now, it 
eir cotton harvest: “…, while Zambia’s concentrated structure 
reates the potential for high returns to farmers […], little of this potential has yet been 
 
A
coordination obstacles. Some have used state monopolies, while others have used private 
markets with duopoly or a fully liberalized system. The different paths of organizational 
structure have resulted in different performance results in terms of quality, yield and price to 
farmers (Tschirley & Zulu 2003:2). In comparison with other countries, Zambia has been 
emphasized as a country that has used a successful strategy. Based on an evaluation of six 
cotton producing countries101, the conclusion was that the ‘concentrated’ structure, which 
only Zambia and Zimbabwe have applied, was the most effective i
w
the areas of quality control, input credit and research and extension support, while perform-
ing no worse than the sectors with multiple small players in the area of seed-cotton pricing” 
(Poulton et al 2004:40) David Tschirley & Kelly Valerie among others concur this by 
stressing that “The concentrated market-based systems (Zambia and Zimbabwe) show the 
best overall picture: best performance in lint quality, macroeconomic impact, and value 
added, acceptable on several other indicators, and poorest on none” (Tschirley & Valerie 
2008:4).  
 
How these v
th
is relevant to notify that there are strengths and weaknesses among all the different organiza-
tional structures that have been practised. Therefore, the comparison of Zambia’s ‘concen-
trated’ structure with other structures as the ‘best’, does not necessarily mean that there is not 
room for improvement e.g. farmers’ income from cotton. The FSRP researchers Stephen 
Kabwe and David Tschirley argue that there is still room for improvement when it comes to 
the return to farmers of th
c
realized” (Kabwe & Tschirley 2007c:4). In the subsequent, details on the institutional 
arrangement, composed by the Zambia’s cotton companies, will be identified.  
 
                                                 
101 Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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6.2 Improved quality procedures 
 
Beside the ‘concentrated’ structure, Zambia differed from other countries in that the Zambian 
government applied a hands-off approach in the cotton industry 102 : “Zambia is unique 
among the countries analyzed in the almost complete absence of government in production, 
marketing, regulation, or direct financial contribution to the sector” (Tschirley & Zulu 
003:3). This meant that the private companies have played the determining role in the 
development of Zambia’s cotton industry since privatization, and that the position of farmers 
 in essence in the hands of the private cotton companies.  
which will be outlined in the sections below. These upgrade arrangement in the cotton 
commodity chain improved the reputation of Zambian cotton quality on the world market, 
2
in the cotton industry is
 
The turn-over, for the Zambian cotton industry, was that the two leading private companies: 
Lonrho, later Dunavant, and Clack Cotton, later Cargill, at the time when privatized strength-
ened the linkage between farmers and the world cotton market. The closer linkage consisted 
of investments in providing the farmers with enhanced input-credit packages103 and guaran-
teed a market for their cotton production (Kabwe & Tschirley 2007b:6). These arrangements 
made the cotton crop an attractive crop for farmers. An advantage of the input-credit pack-
ages is that an increased number of farmers can participate in cotton, and that the farmers can 
diminish failed cotton harvest and improve the quality, with the use of insecticides and 
fertilisers.  
 
Without the companies’ willingness to provide these services, farmers’ participation in the 
cotton industry would have been unaffordable. The companies’ improvements in input 
scheme helped the farmers to reach a position, which enabled them to supply the cotton 
market in terms of the quality required. The linkages with ITCs provide the Zambian com-
pany with knowledge of changes in world demand and new technology; facilitating the work 
of the farmers in Zambia.  
 
Moreover, the lead cotton companies conducted other arrangements in quality involvement, 
                                                 
102 The lack of governmental interference was partly a result of lack of governmental resources and partly a 
deliberate neglect in terms of the focus on liberalization and privatization at the time (Taylor 2007:82). 
103 Including cotton seed, insecticides and fertilizers.  
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and additionally the price the Zambian for Zambian cotton obtained on the world market 
(Tschirley & Valerie 2008:3). The upgrading of cotton on the world market is important 
nce it determines the quality premiums attached to the countries’ exported cotton lint: “As 
f differentiation (and barriers to entry) in end-markets, preserva-
on of quality upstream in the chain to farm level is a prerequisite for the longer-term 
 installed cleaning stations at the gins, and employed women to take 
ut all the contamination at these stations paying them according to the volume of contami-
 only to Zimbabwe in the premium its cotton lint receives” 
(Kabwe & Tschirley 2007a:31). Whether this increase has trickled down to Zambian farmers 
is unclear. But in relation to this, Dani Rodrik argues that “… the most direct beneficiaries of 
si
quality is the main source o
ti
development of cotton sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa” (Larsen 2003:32).  
 
6.2.1 Contamination 
 
The quality of cotton is highly jeopardized by the level of contamination, especially from 
plastic strings104 that enter the cotton seed during harvest, due to farmers placing handpicked 
cotton in polypropylene sacks (IW:Seabrook). When privatized, the companies abandoned 
these sacks and provided the farmers with ‘cotton friendly’ sacks. Furthermore, they imple-
mented effective quality control procedures throughout the cotton supply chain. An example 
of this is Dunavant who
o
nation they got out of the cotton seed (IW:Seabrook). From a PA theoretical perspective, this 
arrangement with a strong connection between the Principal wish and the Agents’ incitement 
to follow the Principal order is effective to diminish contamination.  
 
The result of these arrangements is that the problem of plastic fibres contained in cotton has 
almost vanished (Larsen 2003:22). This has improved the quality of Zambian cotton, and 
increased the premium for Zambian top cotton grades received on the international market 
from 0,01 US$/lb of lint when privatized to 0,06 US$/lb105  in the 2006/07 season (Kabwe & 
Tschirley 2007a:31). “This is the largest revealed improvement in quality in SSA during this 
time and places Zambia second
                                                 
104 Contamination also includes leaves, feathers, etc. But plastic strings are the major culprit in the discount 
 
 to 0,02 US$/kg, and the 0,06 US$/lb is equivalent to 0,133 US$/kg 
connected to contaminated cotton, due to the risk that spinneries take. Plastic in a shirt melts and makes a hole 
in the fabric when ironed.
105 The 0,01 US$/lb is equivalent
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increases in border prices tend to be traders and intermediates, rather then farmers” (Rodrik 
007:235).  
farmer cultivating 750 kg108 cotton 
ed, he would receive a price difference between 6,75 US$ in whether his cotton was 
                                              
2
 
6.2.2 Grading procedure  
 
Apart from controlling the problem of contaminated cotton, the companies have installed a 
detailed grading system. When the farmers sell their cotton to the company, they pay by the 
grade of the cotton. The companies pick up the cotton from the farmers’ house and categorize 
it by A, B, C and D grades106. A grade is the highest quality of cotton and fetches a price 
premium in comparison to B grade and so forth on the world market. In this season, 
Dunavant paid 1310 kwacha per kg for ‘A’ grade for farmers, 1280 kwacha for ‘B’ grade and 
1260 kwacha for ‘C’ grade107 (IW:Kenan). The price differences between A and C grade is 
equivalent to 0,009 US$. This would mean that for a 
se
categorized as A or C grade cotton. 
 
Through the small price differences between the grades, the farmers have a small economical 
incitement to aim for producing the highest quality of cotton as possible. This stands in 
contrast to the fixed price arrangement under the parastatal period, that led to a decline in 
cotton quality (sec:5.1). The incitement in the ‘price per grading’ can, from a PA theoretical 
view, be seen as the companies’ attempt to motivate the farmers to work harder in the cotton 
field, by rewarding the farmers with the outcome that are the most desirable for the compa-
nies (Milgrom & Roberts 1992:179). However, since the price differences are low, the farmer 
does not have a strong incitement to strive after the best quality, furthermore there are 
variables that determine the quality of cotton that are beyond the farmers’ control. This will 
be discussed in the following.   
   
107 1320 Kwacha equivalent to 0,246 US$, 1280 Kwacha equivalent to 0,241 US$, and 1260 Kwacha equivalent 
to 0,237 US$ (2009 est). 
106 ‘A’ grade is bright white, relatively dry and contains little plant depris, the fibres are long and soft, resulting 
in a finer yarn and a silky quality of cloth. The worst cotton is ‘D’ graded which is grey or yellow, humid and 
includes stems and leaves. Fibre quality distinguishes from each other in length, strength, colour, maturity, level 
of impurities and the country of origin (Larsen 2003:10). 
108 Amount taken from App:A.  
 83
6.2.3 Disadvantages in the price arrangement 
 
The variables that influence the quality of cotton, beyond the farmers’ control, include the 
number of sun hours compared to rain and the attack of insects (IW:Kenan). From this it can 
be deduced that the grade level not solely can be seen as the result of the farmers’ efforts in 
the field. A farmer may have worked hard, but because of bad weather his work will not be 
rewarded. When there exist externalities109, beyond the farmers’ control, the price premium 
for a certain grade is not righteous. According to the PA theory, this makes the ‘price per 
grading’ an imperfect criteria (Milgrom & Roberts 1992:130ff). From the perspective of the 
companies’ price setting, the farmers’ linkage to the cotton companies set the farmers at 
further exposure to externalities they have no control over. This result in insecurity for the 
ture income of the farmers, and increased risk connected to cotton cultivation. The increase 
ssibility according to the 
ontract (App:H§7). This creates a dept spiral whereas indebted farmers lose their productive 
                                                
fu
risk points towards a poverty increase among farmers.   
 
Moreover, it is written into the contract that the farmers bare all the risk of the production 
(App:H§3). Thereby, the farmers can have done everything in their power right; correct 
seeding, weeding and harvesting and still risk becoming indebted, due to externalities like 
chronicle drought or pest epidemic, that are not rare in cotton cultivation. The result of failed 
harvest means that in the worst cases, the farmers do not receive any payment for their work. 
Since farmers are cash constrained they will likely not be able to pay back the loan for their 
cotton inputs they have received from the company. As a result, farmers become indebted to 
the companies (Gray 2007:73). It is not uncommon for farmers who are able to pay bank in 
cash to pay back in assets instead, such as oxen which is also a po
c
assets. An ox less in cotton cultivations means that farmers can not produce as much cotton 
as they normally do, hence their yield the next year becomes less, resulting in lower income. 
From this perspective, the farmers’ participation in cotton instead of being an income-
generating activity becomes a way to pay off dept (Gray 2008:74).  
 
Working under the conditions of the unpredictability of weather is the terms that farmers 
world wide are forced to live with. Still, in the relation of small scale farmers in Zambia that 
 
109 Variables beside what the price is being set after.  
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have no social safety net, considerations on how to prevent farmers linked to the cotton 
industry from becoming indebted, are crucial if farmers are to escape poverty: “Strategies 
re needed to cope with unexpected events that otherwise could undermine the contractual 
otable way, this solution is currently inconceivable. Another 
ossibility is to take other variables taken into account to determine the companies’ price 
ume. This should include companies providing 
d 
ften prove an impossible task. It requires that the companies monitor the farmers on a 
regular basis, including in the rainy seasons where roads is over-flooded and prevent anyone 
to reach the rural areas where farmers are living. When there is no cost-effective way for the 
company to check whether the farmer is doing his best to produce a good quality of cotton, 
the ‘price per grading’ and volume becomes the only criteria by which the farmers’ work is 
measured. This situation is in the PA theory referred to as the ‘minimum cost implementation 
a
relationship and jeopardize the livelihoods of the contracting parties” (Shepherd 2007:27). 
One solution could be risk management conducted by the Zambian state by providing safety 
net (Hazell 2007:11). But since the Zambian State does not interfere in the cotton industry 
nor support the farmers in any n
p
setting, beside ‘price per grading’ and vol
some extent of security to farmers when exposed to unexpected events, like pest epidemic, by 
taking soil conditions and the risk of the unpredictability into account. 
 
Based on the PA theory, this would require that the companies monitor the farmers’ behav-
iour, thereby enabling the companies to sanction those farmers whose bad yield in reality was 
a result of neglect in the cotton field. If this arrangement was not enforced, it would from the 
PA theory be argued that since farmers are opportunists, they would neglect cotton deliber-
ately and focus on other crops (Nielsen 2005:104). When payment time came they would 
blame the weather for the low yielding, thereby profiting from the extra work acquired on 
other crops, will maintaining the payment from cotton. This would be an example of farmers 
doing moral hazard, which is a result of difficulties for companies in enforcing appropriate 
behaviour. As the PA theory argues; monitoring is often impossible or too costly, since many 
sources of risk cannot be foreseen of fully covered by the contract (Milgrom & Roberts 
1992:168). This makes the contract incomplete and less effective.  
 
In the case of cotton, were the companies’ surveillance involves rural farmers, this woul
o
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problem’. On the one hand, the company wants to encourage a particular kind of behaviour; 
n the other hand they wish to apply the least costly way of doing this (ibid:254).  
 
The disadvantage of this price arrangement is obviously not in favour of the farmers, since 
they are not paid after the labours spent in the cotton field, but by their outcome production. 
Since there are many variables that affect the production, this means that there is a trade-off 
between profitability and risk.  
 
Overall demand and supply equilibrium 
Besides risking becoming indebted, the cotton prices in Zambia are not fixed, but changes 
according to fluctuations in overall supply and demand (Larsen 2003:7). The changes in 
prices are partly a result of variables of the demand and preference at international level as 
we saw in chapter 4, and partly a result of how many farmers and companies at the dom
level that are involved in the industry. Hence price fluctuation is something which farm
and and the price in advance, be able to make more rational decisions on which crops, 
o
estic 
ers in 
addition have no control. One year, it can be beneficial for the farmers to be in the cotton 
industry compared to alternative crops, the next year the opposite can be the case. A result of 
this is, as one cotton farmer explains: “It is sometimes better just to focus on food crops, 
where labour requirements are less” (IW:Godfred). But calculating which years are the best 
to focus on cotton or not, is impossible for the farmers, as they do not have access to infor-
mation on the price fluctuation beforehand. Although farmers still have to take the unpredict-
ability of the weather into account, they would, if they had information on the overall 
dem
ands which allocation of the different crops, to cultivate. In the figure below (figure 6), the 
changes in farmers’ income are illustrated. During four years, the income differences have 
moved 100 percent, from 80 US$ in the 1993/94 season to 160 US$ in the 1997/98 season.  
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Figure 6 
 
Yearly income per farmers, cotton production
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 (Source: App:B) 
 
ge rate between the dollar and the Zambian currency 
etween the different years, has to be taken into account when reading the data. I have not 
 we assume that the income fluctuation in the figure is representative for the real price 
                                                
The level of inflation and exchan
b
been able to include these variables, which means that comparing income levels between 
different years does not show the complete picture110. Still it is useful to apply the figure, as 
it provides some indication of the individual farmer’s income development over the years, 
and because the farmers assumable likewise do not know the exact level of inflation, hence 
have difficulties in grasping the changes in income received. 
 
If
development for farmers cultivating cotton, the fluctuation has followed a similar curve as 
the overall yearly cotton production, shown in figure 5 (sec:5.3). Both figures are at the 
highest in the 1997/98 season, then decline to be the lowest in 1999/00, and then rise again in 
the 2001/02 season. This would indicate that the farmers receive the best price when the 
overall cotton production is highest, and receive the lowest price when it is in decline. If we 
assume these similarities the farmers’ profit from cotton is largest when the overall cotton 
 
110 When calculating the income the amounts have been maintained in US$ as it is the currency used in the 
ade due to lack of reliable exchange rates for the statistics used. Conversion into Zambian Kwacha can not be m
entire period.  
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production is highest, hence the profit from overall cotton production seems to trickle down 
to farmers to some extent. This implies that providing a business environment that secures a 
well-functioning cotton industry for the companies, is likewise beneficial for the farmers.  
 
While this is a major conclusion to base on an assumption, other scientists have pointed 
wards the same conclusion. The FSRP researchers David Tschirley and Ballard Zulu have 
 prices. Dunavant administration manager of Katete and 
inda112 argues that “The focus should move from looking at improving the price and instead 
lds remain well below those in West and Central Africa, 
nd average returns to farmers appear to be no higher than in Tanzania where input use and 
yields are lower“ (Kabwe & Tschirley 2007a:45) Currently, the cotton yield accounts for 
only 400 to 800 kg/Ha for ninety percent of the farmers, where the potential should be above 
                                                
to
compared the Zambian small scale farmers’ income with the income of farmers in other 
countries. They conclude that Zambia paid the highest price share to farmers after privatiza-
tion. The price later dropped during the first credit crisis to among the lowest, and rose again 
when the industry recovered to be among the highest once more (Tschirley & Zulu 
2003:3)111. Moreover, the price to farmers during the final period exceeded those in all the 
other African cotton countries in comparison (ibid:3). Thereby the FSRP fellows derive at the 
same conclusions, as my less solid observation study.  
 
6.3 Improvement in volume 
 
In relation to the unpredictability in prices, the companies have advised farmers to focus on 
yield volume instead of ‘good’
S
look at improving the return of the yield” (IW:Siwiwaliondo). A general improvement in the 
farm yields has been recovered since privatization, moving from 500 kg/Ha before privatiza-
tion to 750 kg/Ha in 2007/08 season (App:A).  
 
Whereas this improvement is likely a result of the enhanced input-credit schemes including 
insecticides that diminish failed crops, researchers from FSRP argue that there is still room 
for improvement. “Despite the country’s relatively good performance in input credit provi-
sion, yield growth has been slow, yie
a
 
111 I have not been able to get knowledge on the exact prices. 
e eastern province in which Dunavants is operating. 112 One of the districts in th
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1200 kg/Ha (IW:Kenan). The low productivity level obviously hampers farmers’ income as 
DT 2007:2, Thurlow & Wobst 2006:619f). According to the PA 
eory, it can be argued that since the low yield is a concern of both actors, their interests in 
ume might 
e the result of neglect in other crops. Hence the increase in cotton yield likely ought to be 
, Zambia is 
sing trained capacity faster than the companies are able to train them (IW:Muleba). Hence 
well as the companies (C
th
solving the low yield problem are identical, hence the potential in establishing an arrange-
ment that improves the yield is high (Milgrom & Roberts 1992:170). 
 
According to the managing director of Dunavant an important factor constraining yields are 
the farmers’ poor production practises, in terms of inadequate planting, weeding and harvest-
ing (IW:Seabrook). The larger companies are addressing the problem of the low farm yields 
by training the cotton farmers in timely and adequate cultivation practices. This has contrib-
uted to a larger cotton yield and an income improvement for those who have been involved in 
the training, without the level of inputs increased. One estimate assesses that farmers, who 
have received training, have increased their yield by 8,4 percent compared to farmers who 
has not received any training (CDT 2008:3, Balet & Porto 2005:20). While this would imply 
an 8,4 increased improvement in farmers cotton income, the increased cotton vol
b
subtracted from the lower yield in other crops, since the extra yield acquired in cotton is a 
result of neglect on other crops. 
 
The farmers’ training in cotton cultivation has likely spillovers to cultivation of other crops, 
since the knowledge acquired on how to cultivate cotton might be applied on other crops too. 
However, one problem connected to the training is that it is working against the odds of the 
widespread aids epidemic in Zambia, where 16,5 percent of the adults are affected by the 
disease (CIA113) and 50.000 dies per year of malaria (FNDP:170). In some areas
lo
in these areas, the number of adults is decreasing, leaving children with limited knowledge 
about how to farm (Hazell 2007:6). 
 
                                                 
113 Estimation from 2003.  
 89
 6.3.1 Lack of ownership 
 
In relation to the argument of the importance of increasing the yields, it is relevant to point 
 simply would require more labour, in 
rms of human and animals, if the whole land is to be cultivated” (IW:Dettmer).  
Since larger farmers have more labour coverage, they are able to do the accurate cultivations 
arrangements at the right time: “Households that own their own animals and ploughs can 
prepare their land as soon as the rains begin, permitting both timely planting (a prerequisite 
for good yields) and the cultivation of larger areas of land. […] The poorest farmers must 
often prioritise hiring out their labor for immediate cash income over the timely performing 
of cultural practices on their cotton plots” (Kabwe & Tschirley 2007c:2). This means that 
the poorest farmers might neglect their own cotton field resulting in less cotton volume at 
harvest time, and less income. This curtails their possibility of escaping poverty.  
 
The FSRP research associates are, among others, of the opinion that e lack of assets, 
including the farmers’ right to their own land ain constraint to yield provision, and 
the reason why the farm
Since farmers do not own the land, and the chief can take the land back whenever he wants, 
the traditional land tenure system provides little incentive for farmers to invest in improve-
ments enabling them to fully exploit the cotton market opportunities (Shepherd 2007:34). For 
example, as cotton payment is targeting the highest volume and best quality of cotton 
out that many researches have pinpointed the lack of ownership of assets as one of the key 
constraints in improving the yield (Barrett 2007:306, Foster & Norton 2001:6, Brambilla & 
Porto:8). The limited number of assets makes farmers less productive, resulting in lower 
incomes. “If the group of assets can increase, there is a sound change that farmers can move 
out of poverty” (IW:Kabwe). Some of the most important assets in the case of cotton yields 
are oxen and ploughing equipment. The chairman of NDFA Albert Chaale explains this by 
arguing that: “Depending on whether a household have oxen or not, they can grow up to 
three to four hectors, but the ones with none can only grow up to one hector” (IW:Chaala). 
This is further stressed by Richard Dettmer from Cargill: “As a result of the lack of assets, 
many farmers are only using one third of their land. It
te
 
th
 is the m
ers’ are maintained in a poverty trap (Kabwe & Tschirley 2007a). 
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harvest, the incitement for farmers to use lots of chemicals is strong. As a result, the level of 
akes farmers produce less 
olume and gives poorer cotton quality (Sachs 2005:6).  
 otherwise could 
rocess to them, are constrained by the lack of assets.  
nutrition in the soil decreases and soil depletes. This eventually m
v
 
Jeffrey Sachs concur the importance of assets by arguing that investment in livestock can 
raise a household’s productivity which can lead to capital accumulation (ibid:52). The 
importance of level of ownership of assets in terms of escaping poverty is troublesome, 
considering that there are no initiatives from either the state or the companies, in acquiring 
more assets to the farmers. This is even more critical considering that last year many cattle’s 
died due to a tsetse fly’s epidemic114. As one farmer explains “In the Chipata area we were 
especially hit hard by tsetse flies, that made our cattle’s sick and killed them. Now, only forty 
percent of us farmers have oxen and cows” (IW:Chris). From this perspective, the farmers’ 
capabilities of taking advantage of the opportunities that the cotton industry
p
 
 
 
 
At Cargill ginnery in Chipata. Cotton lint is being compressed. 
                                                 
hem with sickness which eventually courses them to die. 114 The flies bite the cattle and inflict t
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6.4 Establishing the ‘right’ business environment  
 
The companies’ market arrangements, laid forward in the above, including input-credit 
packages, cotton quality control, farmers’ training in yield provision, are often missing in 
Africa (Kabwe & Tschirley 2007d). Since the markets are imperfect or missing in rural 
Africa, the incentives for the private companies to provide these services to farmers are often 
small or non-existing115. Therefore, most companies choose not to invest in these areas, and 
s a result rural farmers are often isolated from profiting of being linked into the world 
Zambia’s cotton industry is, in this respect, a fortunate 
siness environment to provide the incentives for companies to invest. The argument behind 
ard by Marianne Larsen who stresses that since few companies until 
a
market. For this reason, developing the right business environment in Zambia for the cotton 
companies is crucial to create the incentives for companies to invest in establishing and 
maintaining the services to rural Zambian farmers. Only then can farmers overcome the ‘low 
equilibrium trap’ that are prevalent in rural areas (Dorward et al 2006:243). 
 
The ‘concentrated’ structure in 
bu
this, has been laid forw
2005 have been operating in Zambia the involved companies have had a greater chance of 
capturing the returns of their investments, where the coordination between the companies 
likewise was most easily achieved (Larsen 2003:26). As the number of cotton companies 
operating in Zambia since privatization essentially has been low, a balanced competition has 
taken place between the companies in the sense of securing the return of the companies’ 
investments. If this balance had not been prevalent, and instead aggressive competition had 
existed, attempts of ‘free riding’, where the companies seek their own short-term gains, 
would likely have occurred (Rodrik 2007:156, Dorward et al 2006:266). From this it can be 
derived that it has not been a coincidental, that the ability to coordinate between the compa-
nies e.g. in establishing high quality control throughout the cotton chain, have been highest in 
countries that have had a ‘concentrated’ structure (Tschirley & Zulu 2003, Poulton et al 
2004:13).  
 
                                                 
115 of reasons detailed in section 4.4. 
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Considering the lack of the Zambian State’s interference in the cotton industry, the compa-
nies’ incitement to take initiative to coordinate has been important in terms of developing the 
cotton industry. When the state’s institutional environment is weak, the involved partners of 
an industry have to build regulation by themselves in order to make the industry well-
functioning, including secure property rights (Nielsen 2005:106). In the case of the concen-
trated cotton industry this has meant that, in spite of the state’s lack of upholding companies’ 
property rights, the companies’ coordination, has made it possible for the companies to invest 
and innovate the industry.  
 
The companies’ incitement to cooperate and invest has meant that the cotton commodity in 
Zambia has witnessed a ‘process upgrading’ where the linkage between farmers and compa-
ies has been made more effective, which lower the productions cost per unit for cotton 
03:1). Further, the Zambian cotton industry has experienced a ‘product upgrad-
ing’, since the quality of cotton has been improved, increasing the value of Zambian cotton 
(Kaplinsky & Morris 2001:38).  
  
Leading companies  
The figure below (figure 7) shows the current market share of the companies operating in 
Zambia116. It clearly demonstrates that Dunavant and Cargill have the largest market share 
each, and that the two companies combined, with 61 percent, process a larger market share 
than all the other companies together. These two companies have until 2005 been leading the 
cotton industry, with a dominated combined market share of over eighty percent (Tschirley & 
Zulu 2003:5). Since the two companies are similar in terms of business practice and “Cargill 
and Dunavant have similar views on many aspects” (IW:Battershell), they have essentially 
found incitement to coordinate and control the terms in the Zambian cotton industry. Thereby 
it can be considered that they have taken over the regulating role in the cotton industry, from 
the Zambian state. The entrants of new companies in Zambia have essentially been following 
the business practice of these two companies, e.g. imposing similar quality control proce-
dures (Larsen 2003:16).  
 
                                                
n
(Larsen 20
 
116 Because new companies lately have entered the Zambian cotton market, it is difficult to estimate their 
market share yet, and as a result e.g. Yustina might have a slightly larger market share than shown in the figure. 
 93
In the terminology of the GVC theory, it can be argued that Dunavant and Cargill operate as 
e ‘lead agents’ in Zambia, controlling how the first segments of the cotton commodity th
chain should be managed throughout Zambia. Therefore these two companies can essentially 
take credit for the development of the Zambian cotton industry. The downside of this power 
concentration between the two companies is the possibility of power abuse towards other 
companies as well as farmers. In relation to this the earlier discussion on the lack of price 
differences between the companies can e.g. be interpreted as the lead agents setting a price 
the other companies have to follow. While, as I summed up earlier it could not be concluded 
whether this was the case, the farmers are critical towards this power concentration, and 
doubt the dominant companies actions as solely good intentions (IW:Emmanual & George). 
The consequences of the power concentration will be further brought up in chapter 7.  
 
Figure 7 
Company Market Share
Dunavant; 40%
Cargill; 21%
Mukuba +Yustina+Olam; 1%
CCC; 12%
Continental; 9%
Alliance; 6%
Great Lakes ; 4%
Mulungushi; 4%
Birchland; 3%
Dunavant Cargill CCC
Continental Alliance Great Lakes 
Mulungushi Birchland Mukuba +Yustina+Olam  
(Source: App:D) 
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6.4.2 Trickling down to farmers 
the ISI period, where 
mers could wait months before they were paid. Knowing when payment comes strength-
ers in Zambia has not been any different from countries 
proved (ibid:1)117. These statements indicate 
 
While acknowledging the improvements the companies have accomplished in strengthening 
the small scale farmers’ linkage to the world market, the aspect of whether these improve-
ments have trickled down to farmers at an extent that enables them to escape poverty, needs 
further consideration. Ballard Zulu and David Tschirley argue that the cotton industry has 
improved farmers’ productivity and quality, while companies have been paying the farmers a 
higher average price share than any other country (Tschirley & Zulu 2003:4). Also the 
farmers have benefited from privatisation by receiving prompter payments. In the contract, it 
is stated that the company pays within two weeks after they have purchased the farmers’ 
harvest (App:H§5.3). This stands in contrast to the conditions under 
far
ens the farmers’ position, since they can calculate it into their household’s consumption and 
investments.  
 
However in addition, the researchers of FSRP likewise point out that “…, while Zambia’s 
concentrated structure creates the potential for high returns to farmers […], little of this 
potential has yet been realized” (Kabwe & Tschirley 2007c:4). On the contrary, they state 
that the return to the cotton farm
where the yield and quality have not been im
that the gains acquired on the world cotton market have not trickled down to farmers at a 
satisfying extent. Why the companies profit attained on the world market has not trickled 
down to the farmers and the consequences hereof, will be elaborated in the next chapter.  
 
                                                 
117 However it is worth mentioning that not everybody follow this argument: 
prices in Zambia have been relatively good compared to other countries (Poulton 
Colin Poulton argues that the 
et al 2008:138). 
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6.5 Summary  
 
Zambia’s cotton business environment with a ‘concentrated’ structure has been beneficial to 
create a well-functioning cotton industry in rural Zambia. There were a number of obstacles; 
in particular the weak credit market, which needed to be dealt with, and since there was a 
mutual interest in coordinating between the cotton companies, these challenges were met in 
ite of the state’s lack of assistance. The business environment, characterized by a few 
ompanies, where two companies were leading the coordination was fortuitous, since the 
volved companies had a greater chance of capturing the returns from their investments. The 
mpanies established arrangements that upgraded the cotton quality. This resulted in an 
increase in prices for Zambian cotton on the world market.  
 
Moreover, the fortunate investment climate gave the cotton companies the possibility to 
increase their production, thereby giving a larger proportion of small scale farmers the 
opportunity to cultivate cotton and made it profitable for farmers to be in the cotton industry, 
compared to their alternatives. As a result of the companies providing the farmers with 
training, the farmer’s cotton volume increased. Thus, the ‘concentrated’ model has been an 
important strategy for Zambia to increase a large amount of farmers’ position in the cotton 
value chain on the world market.  
 
However, whether these improved conditions have been transformed into increasing farmer’s 
capability to escape poverty is not evident. The lack of price competition between the 
companies is a e revenue they 
receive for themselves.  Since the farmers bear the risk connected to producing cotton, they 
bear the cost if their harvest fails, even if the cause of harvest fail is beyond the farmers 
control e.g. pest epidemic in cotton. Since farmers are cash constrained they likely have no 
money to pay back for the input they have received on credit from the companies. As a result 
farmers risk becoming indebted. Another possibility for the farmers is to pay back the loan in 
assets, e.g. an ox. This would mean that they would produce less volume the year after, 
which would lower their income. For the farmers that have become indebted to the compa-
nies or have paid back in oxen, participating in the cotton industry does not work as a poverty 
reduction strategy but rather hinders them from escaping poverty.   
sp
c
in
co
 
disadvantage for farmers, since the companies can keep th
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 ired on the 
orld market has not trickled down to farmers at a satisfying extent. Hence a question 
The research conducted by the FSRP points in the direction that the gains acqu
w
remains to be answered: Has the cotton companies utilized the potential that exists in the 
cotton industry in Zambia in terms of reducing poverty among small scale farmers or if not, 
what are the variables that constrains it? In the following chapter, I will investigate the 
advantage and shortcomings for farmers that have entered the cotton industry, further.  
 
 
‘ 
 
 
 
Storage of cotton seed at Chipata Cotton Company, ready to be ginned. 
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7. The contract relation between companies and farmers 
 
In this chapter, I will investigate why the Zambian cotton strategy is currently in decline. To 
understand the shortcomings that have resulted in the second default crisis, identification of 
the dynamics of the institutional arrangement between the farmers and the cotton companies 
will be elaborated. This will be done with the assistance of the PA theory. The purpose of 
this chapter is to answer whether Zambia’s cotton industry has achieved its potential in 
poverty alleviation, or whether there is more potential to be reached. We will see that the 
relation between companies and farmers is in the company’s advantage, as the companies 
.g. lay the risks connected to producing cotton on farmers, but we will also see that the 
erate with another com-
any, they can fell free to do so the next year, as long as they have paid back their loan for 
the inputs.  
this relation, where both parts are profiting from the contract arrangement (Milgrom & 
Roberts 1992:141, Nielsen 2005:99). By entering into an agreement with the companies, the 
farmers get access to a crop to which they would normally not have access to, and, which 
e
farmers’ position has been strengthened under the current ‘competitive’ structure in the 
cotton industry.  
 
7.1 It takes two to trade 
 
From the PA theoretical approach, the relation between farmers and companies is manifested 
by the contract (Hatch 2006:261). The cotton companies use contractors to provide their 
ginnery with cotton, in return the companies provide the farmers with inputs that improve the 
quality and yield of their cotton production (Rates 2003:14). In the contract, it is stated that 
the farmers is obliged to sell their entire harvest to the contracted company (App:H§3). When 
the harvest is over, the company automatically subtract the input-credit loan from the end-
payment to the farmer, which is equivalent to around 25 percent (IW:Battershall, Malambo). 
The contract is based on one year, and if the farmers wish to coop
p
 
The PA theory argues that since the cotton industry is based on these contracts, signed 
voluntarily by the actors, it can be derived that there is a ‘reciprocal interest’ in sustaining 
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also has more value than the farmers’ alternative crops. Hence they increase their yield, as 
the companies provide the required inputs and a market for their cotton production. The 
companies, on the other hand, overcome land constraints, benefit from the farmers low cost 
of production and out-source a large share of the risks connected to producing cotton, by out-
contracting the raw cotton production (Poulton et al 2008:124). In the contract it is written 
that “Upon delivery of the Inputs, all risk of loss, damage or crop failure shall pass to the 
Producer …” (App:H§7), while the company “at all times retains full rights to the Seed 
otton produced by the Producer” (App:H§6). Hence, the institutional arrangement with a 
m entering into linkages with these companies, than they 
an obtain from alternatives. According to the PA theory, if the ‘reciprocal interest’ was not 
ctors would choose otherwise since they are rational actors (Milgrom 
 
C
contract is cheaper and less risky for the companies, than if it were done as an ‘in-house’ 
activity.  
 
An additional example of the ‘reciprocal interest’, is the impact on pest in the cotton fields, 
which can be financially devastating for the farmers as they bear the whole cost. However, 
since a failed harvest also represents a disadvantage for the companies118, it is in the compa-
nies’ interest to provide insecticides that diminish the risk of pests, improving the farmers’ 
chances of acquiring a fine harvest. The reasoning behind the agreement is that the compa-
nies are able to receive a profit for being linked to farmers, and the farmers are, in turn, 
receiving a higher net income fro
c
the case, the involved a
& Roberts 1992:129f). For this reason it can be concluded on the basis of the PA theory that 
since it is beneficial for both parts, there exist a ‘reciprocal interest’ in abiding the contract, 
where the long term goals are identical. This is essential for the cotton industry in order to 
work as efficiently as possible and sustain creating jobs in Zambia.  
 
7.1.1 Shortcomings of the ‘reciprocal interest’ 
However, the scope for farmers to replace cotton by other competitive crops is small. The 
alternative cash crop to cotton is, only for some of the richer small scale farmers, tobacco. 
                                                 
118 Their unit cost becomes less if they have a larger volume of cotton.  
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Tobacco is a competitive crop as it gives a similar income as cotton, but requires less labor119 
(IW:Banda). But, since the input-credit package is less developed in the tobacco industry, 
farmers have to finance the inputs themselves, if they wish to cultivate tobacco. As the 
farmers are cash constrained, most farmers are excluded from participating in the tobacco 
industry (IW:William). As a result, most farmers do not have an alternative cash crop to 
cotton. The only alternative is to solely cultivate food crops that are less input demanding, 
ut also less income generating.  
critical point of the contract arrangement is that it can be criticized for creating a 
ependency relation. The managing director of Yustina cotton company Jesse Kitta argues 
re likely to offer to provide them with input over 
                                                
b
 
From this it can be derived that although there exists a ‘reciprocal interest’ in sustaining the 
contract arrangement, when the alternatives for farmers are small or non-existing, the 
contract arrangement does not give the farmers the advantages this relation might otherwise 
have given them. In other words, when the cotton companies’ linkage to farmers is the best 
alternative for the farmers, the companies do not have the incitement to make it more 
attractive for the farmers to cultivate cotton than it is already. The example in the contract 
mentioned previously, on the allocation of rights and risks between the involved actors, 
clearly indicates this point. Since cotton essentially is the only cash crop small scale farmers 
can cultivate, they have no better alternatives. This is limiting the farmers bargaining 
positions towards the companies. 
 
Dependency relation 
Another 
d
that “The contract procedure is a tool for the ginneries to tie the farmers” (IW:Kitta120). 
Facts that point towards this argument are that it is written into the contract that the farmers 
have to pay back the loan, in cash or in assets, even if the harvest has failed (App:H§7). It is 
likely that the farmers are not able to pay back the company if their harvest has failed, due to 
cash constrains. Therefore, the companies a
 
119 The price on tobacco changes like the price of cotton, hence one year it can be beneficial to produce cotton 
instead of tobacco, the following year the opposite is the case. There is a trend that every third year, some of the 
farmers shift between tobacco and cotton, because of changes in price. When there are fewer cotton farmers, the 
ginneries compete of the price to make sure that they get the cotton they need. The farmers respond to the price, 
and the following year the former tobacco farmers shift over to cotton. As a result, more cotton is produced 
resulting in less competition of the price.  
120 Yustina does not provide input credit at the level that other companies do, and buy cotton from whoever 
wants to sell to them. 
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a longer period, where they can stay in the cotton business and pay back the company over a 
manager Richard Dettmer from Cargill explains it: “The 
mulates it in this way: “… a single failed crop season, [… ] can push a 
l of unending indebtedness and destitution” 
 
despite the problems” (Koenig 2008:186). 
longer period. As the country 
farmers are very poor, therefore it would not make any sense to bully them. Instead we sit 
down and find a realistic way of how the farmers can pay back their loan. Often it will be by 
making a contract for the next years, thereby we finance the farmers once more, where the 
farmers pay back their loan over two or three seasons” (IW:Dettmer).  
 
This procedure of companies re-claiming the loan is creating a strong dependency to the 
contracted company, which has consequences for the farmers’ economical vulnerability. 
Jeffrey Sachs for
household that has taken on debt into a spira
(Sachs 2005:230). Cash constrained farmers acquiring indebtedness thus might run into an 
ever-enhancing poverty trap. From this outlook, the farmers’ relation to the cotton companies 
does not lead to poverty alleviation, but rather enhances poverty. The chairman West Chitah 
of CDT emphasizes this point by explaining: “Being involved in the cotton cultivation is a
circle. You need to have enough assets to go into the next season. But if the previous season 
did not get you enough profit, you will have to allocate a smaller share of land to cotton 
cultivation, hence your production this year will suffer, giving you even less the next year” 
(IW:Chitah). Furthermore, considering the argument laid forward in chapter 6, regarding 
farmers not having full control over a failed harvest, acquiring indebtedness is even more 
unjust.  
 
Despite the shortcomings of the contract arrangement between farmers and companies, the 
cotton industry continues to be based on these arrangements, since the alternatives for both 
parts are worse. Dolores Koenig 121  formulates the situation in this way “Farmers are, 
overall, rational producers; they continue to cultivate cotton because they see benefits, 
                                                 
121 Professor at College of Arts and Science, American University, Washington DC. 
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7.2 Floor and final prices 
e company will pay per kilogram of cotton, but 
 
’, which is a result of asym-
etric information, explained in the PA theory, is highly manifested in this relation (Mil-
 & Robert 1992:129f). Since there exist ‘asymmetric information’ between companies 
 
In the contract it is not stated how much th
only what their floor price per kilogram will be at harvesting time (App:H§5.3). The floor 
price is calculated by each individual company on the basis of last year’s prices and the
anticipated world market prices and cost in the coming year’s season (IW:Dettmer, Bassets 
2008:55). The floor price-setting ensures that the farmers’ income from their harvest is not 
decreased in the event of drops in world market prices (Cotlook A122). Hence the floor price 
diminishes farmers market risk123 (Bassets 2008:56).  
 
The final price is unknown for the farmers until the market season begins. Hence a major 
constraint for farmers in signing these contracts is that they can not sell to the highest bidder 
at market season. This constraint makes it difficult for the farmers to choose rationally which 
company to sign the contract with. Hence ‘bounded rationality
m
grom
and farmers when the contract is being signed it precludes the farmers from information that 
would enable them to make to optimal decisions. Instead the farmers agree on signing a 
contract not knowing whether the company will be in the top or bottom when payment time 
comes. As a result, farmers living next to each other receive different payments for the same 
products, because they have signed contracts with different companies124. Hence, eventhough 
the farmers can liberally choose with which company to sign up, if they don’t know who will 
be in the top payment, this advantage is not worth a lot, and as a result “the farmers often 
choose to work for the first company that shows up offering a contract” (IW:Muleba). As a 
result, the farmers are likely to settle for something less than their work is worth. From this it 
can be derived that since ‘asymmetric information’ exists, where companies hide informa-
                                                 
122 There are a variety of pricing systems for world cotton. The Cotton A index, published be Cotton Outlook, is 
the most widely used as the best indicator of world price levels for cotton (Tschirley & Zulu 2003:2). The A 
price index is an ex post record of the level of offered prices the country receives on the international market. It 
is used by international trading companies, governments and international organisations e.g. ICAC as a 
measurement of the fluctuation of international raw cotton prices (Poulton et al 2004:9, Larsen 2003:6). 
123 However companies do not always sustain with the floor price in the event of major price changes on the 
oor prices. These cases will be 
gh the price differences have not been major over the years, this has changed during this season. For 
world market. Therefore farmer’s market risk is not always decreased by fl
mentioned later in this section and in the next chapter.  
124 Althou
further details, see section 7.3.1. 
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tion, the farmers do not choose rationally, hence the Zambian cotton market is imperfect 
ielsen 2005:99) 
 difficult to enforce farmers to obey the contract, when the 
ompanies themselves do not, when it is in their disadvantage.   
he price is high 
assets 2008:56). The companies are able to hid price improvements, because the farmers, 
                                                
(N
 
The procedure of not telling the final price until the market season begins is based on 
experience from Clack Cotton (IW:Battershell). Clack Cotton did not use floor prices, but 
came out with a fixed price per kilogram of cotton. Thereby giving the farmers more infor-
mation, enabling them to choose more rationally with whom it would be best to negotiate125. 
However, this procedure was short-lived, due to the unforeseen rapid appreciation of the 
Kwacha, Zambia’s currency in 2002126. As a consequence, Clack Cotton was not able to pay 
the price in Kwacha to the farmers that they had promised in the contract. This entailed that 
Clack Cotton was viewed by farmers as untrustworthy, and no farmers wished to negotiate 
with the company the following year127. In 2003 Clack Cotton left Zambia and Cargill took 
over its assets (IW:Battershell). This episode makes the farmers suspicious of the companies 
in general. In addition, it might be
c
 
In relation to the floor price setting, it is feasible that the cotton companies that are part of 
ITC, have some knowledge of the world cotton price setting, hence have an idea of where the 
final price will be at market season. But from the PA theory it can be argued that the compa-
nies might set the price lower than anticipated when the market season begins, without 
informing the farmers, due to opportunist behaviour (Milgrom & Roberts 1992:167). From 
this view, the companies reap the amount of the profit at the expense of farmers. This 
argument is concurred by Thomas Bassets who argues that the floor prices make the compa-
nies in a position to take a larger share of the cotton world price when t
(B
and their control institutions including the farmer associations, do not have the required 
knowledge on when and whether companies do this. In addition, if they had, they would 
probably not have the bargaining strength to do much about it. Argumentation for this 
statement will be detailed in the following section.  
 
 However in dollar terms, they may have paid back the right amount. 
125 Though full information would require that all the companies did the same. 
126 How the appreciation of the Kwacha affects the cotton industry and farmers will be exploited in the next 
chapter.  
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7.2.1 Lack of strong farmers’ associations 
 
This procedure, of the farmers’ lack of access to market information on prices and alterna-
tives, obviously hampers the farmers’ bargaining position and constrains them from escaping 
poverty. Small farmers need to organize themselves better to exploit the opportunities that 
larger markets offer (Hazell 2007:10). The Chariman of CDFA128, Vigil Malambo empha-
zes this by stating: “The farmers are making wrong decisions based on incurrent informa-
ining negotiations with the companies and have the complete 
verview of the contractual relations consequences. Further, individual farmers are obviously 
s. This would assumable have an 
verall positive impact on poverty alleviation among small scale farmers. 
 
                                                
si
tion. Due to lack of information, the farmers make an uninformed decision, that end up 
making losses for their families. They will be forced to sell their products to the contracted 
company eventhough they are getting a very low price” (IW:Malambo). If the farmers could 
choose who to sell to at market season, when the companies have published their buying 
price, they would have more information, and they could sell to the highest bidder. This 
would likely lead to companies having to compete more on price, which would strengthening 
the farmers’ bargaining position. 
 
The farmers’ weak bargaining situation is related to the fact that the contracts are individu-
ally based. Lacking capital, education and management skills, it is difficult for the farmers to 
successfully manage the barga
o
weaker than when they are organized, in terms of negotiating with a company. The chairman 
of NDFA Albert Chaala stresses this point by arguing “It is easy to push the farmers to a 
lower price individually. The companies are telling that the price is so and so on the world 
market, therefore they are getting so and so. No farmer have the capacity to check whether 
the companies are telling the truths nor do anything about it” (IW:Chaala).  
 
One apparent way to improve the farmers’ position in the linkage to cotton companies would 
be by using the farmers’ associations to negotiate prices on behalf of the farmers, and 
denying companies individual negotiations procedure
o
 
128 CDFA has 400 individual members, and 150 small-scale farmer groups as collective members. In average, 
each group consists of 25 attendees, so almost 4000 people benefit from the activities arranged by CDFA 
(MS.dk). 
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Still, in Zambia the farmers have historically been poorly represented by the government and 
the ZNFU129 have been weak in spite of representing over 33.000 small scale farmers (Taylor 
2007:82). This tradition seems to have been maintained, as the farmers’ associations are 
currently too weak to bring the required bargaining strength to “face” the cotton companies. 
As a result, when the farmers’ associations are brought forward at policy hearings, it seems 
to be more as a formality. 
 
Still trends in improving this matter have come to the fore. One initiative to reduce the cotton 
farmers’ vulnerability is the initiation of CAZ, which was formed by farmers in 2005. The 
association is affiliated to the ZNFU, and district farmers’ associations in all the cotton 
growing districts of Zambia are affiliated by CAZ (CDT 2008:6). Before every sowing 
season, the companies present CAZ with the price they are offering farmers, to acquire CAZ 
cceptance (IW:Nkole). However, it can be derived that since there are no price negotiations 
etween CAZ and the companies, the associations have no influence on the price setting. On 
e contrary CAZ insists that they will discuss, but not negotiate prices. (Kabwe & Tschirley 
2007a:32). This indicates that the procedure is just a formality. Richard Dettmer from Cargill 
stresses that “CAZ have no influence on the companies price setting” (IW:Dettmer), which 
indicates that this is the case.  
 
From this it can be derived that there are still a lot of challenges for CAZ in order to improve 
the farmer’s position in the relation to the companies. CAZ, as well as the district farmer 
associations, are not equipped to negotiate effectively with companies, since it is infeasible 
for them to asses whether the prices to the farmers are equitable or not. If the farmers’ 
associations were strengthened, they could negotiate better with the companies and push for 
an improved price to farmers and push for transparency in the companies’ price setting. This 
would demand knowledge of the farmers and companies costs of production, “which requires 
record keeping and gross margin analysis skills, and of prevailing market prices and how to 
                                              
a
b
th
convert these to farmgate prices” (Shepherd 2007:27). 
 
   
9 ZNFU represent 33.000 small scale and 510 large scale farmers. The mission of the ZNFU is to promote and 
rotect the interest of its members in order to achieve sustainable economical and social development 
(Haggblade & Fynn 2006:iii). 
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The reason why farmers are not better organized is likely related to the lack of traditions in 
farmers organizing in Zambia, and the fact that it is an extra expense. A membership to e.g. 
CDFA costs 10.000 kwacha per year per household, corresponding to 2 US$ (IW:Malambo). 
Since many farmers might not see the point in a membership, as long as the associations are 
weak, the lack of fiscal capability reinforces the weak position the association is in. Another 
argument of the farmers’ lack of membership might be that the advocacy the associations do 
provide, benefits all the farmers anyway; hence the problem of free-riding occurs. The 
farmers’ associations have e.g. established market information services on public boards for 
everyone to read, including information on the companies’ different prices. In spite of the 
lack of farmers support to associations, the Chairman of CDFA stresses that there is a 
tendency that “After every market season, after farmers received their payment, more and 
more farmers come and sign up for a membership” (IW:Malambo).  
 
 
 
 
 
Michael Banda, CAZ representative from the eastern province, shows one of the information boards 
provided for the farmers to get information on when important meetings are being held as well as 
information on prices for different crops.   
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Overall speaking, there seems to be in the Zambian government, as well as by the cotton 
farmer associations, a profound respect towards the ‘old’ cotton companies. Joseph Nkole, 
the national coordinator of CAZ, argues that: “It is the hard work of the companies that have 
been here for a long period [read: Dunavant and Cargill], that has made all these new 
companies come into the market” (IW:Nkole). This is a view, I also which also was shared 
by the two district associations, as well as by the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives 
(IW: Kamona, Chaala, Malambo). While recognizing the companies’ investments in an area, 
at a time where few companies were willing to invest, I see a danger in these ‘old’ companies 
profiting too much of this acknowledgement. If the Zambian state and the cotton association 
allow too much recognition, towards these companies, it might happen at the expense of their 
role in pushing for better prices and conditions for farmers. Furthermore, the argumentation 
of Dunavant and Cargill being in Zambia in the long-run can be discussed. Since the compa-
nies have been in Zambia, in the case of Dunavant about eight years, and in the case of 
Cargill roughly five years, it is debatable whether they merit the title of companies that have 
perated in Zambia for ‘a long period’ of time. A sustainable cotton industry requires long 
e final market price in June. 
he company announced that they would pay 1220 Kwacha per kg of A grade to the farmers. 
before announcing it (IW:Ben). Andrew Shepherd concurs their concerns by arguing: “One 
o
term commitment, which would require a longer time frame.   
 
7.2.2 Price setting 
  
Dunavant was the first company this year that came out with th
T
This was 220 kwacha more than their floor price (IW:Malambo). Moreover, the price has 
gone up from last year, where Dunavant paid 850 kwacha130. Right after Dunavant published 
their price, Cargill and others followed, announcing that they would buy 1230 kwacha per kg 
(IW:Malambo). This is ten kwacha per kg difference, equivalent to 0,002 $US.  
 
The proven fact of only 0,002 $ US separating the companies from each other, makes 
farmers, as well as farmer associations, argue that there exists a price cartel between the 
dominant companies, where the leading companies: Dunavant and Cargill, agree on a price 
                                                 
130 However, inflation has to be taken into account in order to know the real price increase.  
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problem with trader collaboration is that while working together to achieve economics of 
scale, identify markets and reduce risk can make a lot of sense for traders, it does open them 
p to allegations of cartel-like behavior” (Shepherd 2007:20). Hence, in relation to the 
the pre-financing prices that 
verybody starts from are the same for the companies, therefore the price is similar” 
(IW:Battershell). Hence the lack of price differences between the companies might be the 
d large the same. The companies many 
xpenses and necessity in staying competitive on the world market might simply keep the 
y who paid 1230 kwacha. This would mean that the 
rmers could increase their income by 7500 Kwacha, equivalent to 1,3 US$ in comparison 
of information, are captured in the statement of the director of CDT, West 
hitah: “The cotton industry is good business for the farmers, they just don’t know it yet” 
u
advantage of the companies cooperating laid forward in chapter 6, there might a tendency 
towards too much cooperation, if the aspect of price is included in the cooperation. However, 
this accusation does John Battershell from Cargill denies: “The end-prices are not fixed. 
Cargill as well as all the other companies, take into account their ginning cost, pre-financing 
cost, the currency exchange rate, world market price, cost of transportation, and then a 
margin to operate from. Many of these variables, especially 
e
result of the fact that the production costs are by an  
e
share companies can offer the farmers in check.   
 
Whether a price cartel exists or not is unknown to me but the lack of price differences is 
clearly a disadvantage to the farmers. If we presumed that the farmers knew the companies 
final price before signing a contract, they would more than likely chose the company with the 
highest price, in this year the compan
fa
with the company offering the lower price of 1220 Kwacha131.  
 
Clearly, the power relation and asymmetric information connected to hiding information, is 
in favour of the companies. This signifies that creating a cotton market for rural farmers is far 
from enough to guarantee the extraction of the potential the cotton industry processes in 
terms of enabling farmers to escape poverty. The farmers’ lack of information of the market, 
both in terms of current prices and in terms of future market developments, constrains them 
from exploiting the potential the cotton industry could present to them. The shortcomings of 
the farmers’ lack 
C
                                                 
131 Calculations are based on App A. Since I only have data reaching the 2007/08 season on average production 
for cotton farmers in kg/Ha, I have used those data to calculate the price differences for the year 2008/09.  
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(IW:Chitah). With lack of information the cotton industry is constraining the farmers from 
making a good bargaining.  
 
In relation to these severe consequences of the arrangement connected to the price setting I in 
the subsequent argue that moving from a ‘concentrated’ to a ‘competitive’ structure has 
roved to diminish the companies’ possibilities in keeping the revenue to themselves. The 
was not utilized (App:D). The low production compared to the ginning 
apacity is related to the increased number of companies operating in Zambia, creating a 
mpted to sell their cotton to Yustina, instead of their contracted companies. 
he reason why Yustina is capable of paying a better price than the others, is due to the 
company providing the farmers with none or less input packages than the majority of cotton 
 Seabrook). When a company, provides less input to farmers, 
ey are less affected by credit default, hence they can offer more attractive prices (Tschirley 
called side-selling. It is written in the contract that side-selling is not allowed (App:H§3). 
p
companies can still hide the correct price to farmers, but the companies have currently had to 
compete much more aggressively on price, and as a result the final price to the farmers has 
become closer to what assumable would be the accurate price.  
 
7.3 Price changes in favour of the farmers  
 
In Zambia, the companies are currently running at low production, and there is not enough 
cotton produced too feed all the ginneries. In the 2007/08 season, 48 percent of the compa-
nies’ ginning capacity 
c
‘scramble for cotton’ among the companies. This increased competition has lately changed 
the farmer’s final price for the better.  
 
In the eastern province where seven companies currently are located, Yustina offered more 
than the other companies prices of 1220 - 1230 Kwacha, and paid 1270 per kg when the 
2008/09 season started (IW:Malambo). This set in motion a chain of events, where some 
farmers were te
T
companies (IW: Battershell,
th
& Zulu 2004:4).  
 
The phenomenon of farmers selling to other companies than their contracted company, is 
However, under the Zambian law, companies promoting side-selling, referred to as pirate 
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buying, are currently not illegal. This in essences means that companies that are promoting 
side-selling can not be sanctioned, but the farmers that side-sell can. Dunavant, Cargill and 
other cotton stakeholders are trying to make pirate buying illegal in Zambia by lobbying for 
assing of the Cotton Act, which condemns pirate buying132. Thereby moving the sanctions 
ince the price competition to farmers has varied by location, the price competition experi-
iance is doing” 
W:Weston).  
                                                
p
from the farmers on to the companies instead. 
 
To prevent farmers from side-selling, the remaining companies had to increase their prices 
additionally if they wanted to get the cotton production that they had pre-financed returned. 
As a result e.g. Dunavant moved from 1220 Kwacha in June to 1250 Kwacha and ended up 
in August with a final price on 1310 Kwacha per kg and “ gave the farmers a price equiva-
lent to A grade prices, eventhough it was categorised as B grade” (IW:Kenan). This price 
competition has mainly been experienced in the eastern province, hence in the case of this 
province the price on cotton to farmers has varied a lot this year, depending on whether the 
farmer sold in the beginning or at the end of the market season. Obviously, the price competi-
tion in the eastern province has benefitted those farmers who sold their cotton at the end of 
the season the most.   
 
S
enced in the eastern province has not occurred in the other cotton provinces to the same 
extent. In the central province, where only three companies are operating, the General 
Manager Mwalanga Weston of Mulungushi cotton company explains that the price is 
relatively high compared to the year before, but it remains similar between the companies: 
“Mulungushi is buying at 1250 Kwacha per kg, just as Dunavant and All
(I
 
7.3.1 Farmers side-selling  
 
With limited information on the world market price fluctuations, the farmers find it difficult 
to understand the reasons for the price fluctuations on their cotton. The lack of transparency 
in how each company determines the prices and deduce input costs, has lead many farmers 
 
 on the companies that promotes it instead of the on the farmers are elaborated.   
132 Details on the Act conducted in chapter 8. Later in this chapter argumentation of the reasoning of laying the 
cost of side selling
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and farmer associations to mistrust the companies, and suspicions of exploitation have arisen 
(Poulton et al 2008:142). When you combine the lack of trust towards the company with the 
lack of risk in breaking the contract, side selling arouse.  
 
Side-selling is an example of ‘moral hazard’, where farmers hide information after the 
contract has been signed in order to circumvent the contract in their own interest, instead of 
lling to their contracted company. This example expresses a point of the PA theory: The 
ccessible information the companies are able to acquire may be manipulated by farmers. In 
e case of cotton, farmers claiming that part of their harvest has failed are feasible. In 
ality, some of them might have sold the rest of their harvest to another company willing to 
pay a higher price for the cotton. To check whether the farmers are telling the truth is 
impossible, or too costly, for the companies due to poor infrastructure making the surveil-
lance of the cotton farmers’ behaviour essentially unrealistic (IW:Song). Hence the possibil-
ity of sanctioning farmers for not abiding the contract is small. As a result, the farmers who 
do not obey the contract are able to stay in business. With lack of enforcement behind the 
contract133 there are no incentives to obey the contract and no consequences when breaking 
the contract. 
 
By side-selling the farmers gain from the improvement in the price that the ‘pirate buying’ 
company offer, and at the same time the farmers gain from the improved quality of cotton, 
due to the inputs which the contracted company have provided them with. This makes the 
incitement for the farmer to act opportunist and circumvent the contract high. They simply 
get a higher return of their harvest by side-selling without being sanctioned.  
 
In rel ers and 
ompanies in sustaining the contract-based relation and pre-financing, the increased side-
selling suggests that the interest between the actors are not always identical. Rather, on the 
short term basis conflicting interests exist. While farmers wish to get the most out of their 
work here and now, the companies wishes, on the contrary, to get the return of their invest-
ment in order to reinvest and improve their business further (IW:Seabrook). Hence, 
eventhough the farmers wish to stay in the contract arrangement in the long term, the benefits 
                                                
se
a
th
re
ation to the previous argumentation on a ‘reciprocal interest’ between the farm
c
 
133 Contracted companies have difficulties in controlling who are side-selling, hence it is difficult to prevent it 
from happening.  
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to circumvent the contract in the short term are currently too tempting and too non-risky. For 
ings and in shortage of cash opportunities, side-selling farmers with limited income-earn
therefore appear to be a rational decision. “It is difficult for the farmer to overcome this 
“jackpot” mentality and to understand the potential benefits of establishing a long-term 
arrangement with a reliable buyer, if that  buyer is paying what appear to be low prices” 
(Shepherd 2007:23). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yustinas ginnery in Chipata. Started to be built in July 2008, hopefully the roof will be  
finished before the rain season begins. In the background Yustinas acquired cotton is located.  
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7.4 Diminishing side-selling 
 
The contracted companies are currently experiencing that somewhere between twenty to 
thirty percent of the cotton they have pre-financed, are sold to another company 
Cargill expresses his frustration 
force the contract. How do you 
, given the small sums involved” (Shepherd 
his makes the companies question whether it is worth the trouble to monitor the 
rmers and sanction those who do moral hazard (Rodrik 2008:3). In relation to this, the 
 difficulties sanctioning those who practices ‘moral 
’ behaviour, the incitement for the farmers to seek their own interest becomes even 
is in the cotton industry. This has huge conse-
n industry, where the companies might move 
ut of Zambia, as in the case of Lonrho, leaving farmers worse off. It is therefore crucial for 
(IW:Battershall). The country manager Richard Dettmer of 
of the farmers’ behaviour: “It all comes down to how to en
prove that the farmers are side- selling, that his harvest has not been lost to bad yield. 
Assume that it is possible to prove it: how do you get your cotton back, when the farmer has 
nothing left and it is not possible to get anything else from them because they don’t owe 
anything” (IW:Dettmer).  
 
Even if the companies were able to check who are side-selling, the ability to enforce the 
contract in the courts of law is essentially impossible. “… court procedures are universally 
slow and even if a judgment is eventually obtained, there are usually problems in enforcing 
it, and inflation may have eroded the amount claimed. Furthermore, contract laws are of 
limited utility for businesses seeking to obtain repayment of loans from farmers who have 
practised extra-contractual marketing 134
2007:34). T
fa
argument of passing the Cotton Act where one of the articles states that pirate buying is 
illegal (App:I:part II.17, part V 32(2)), seems reasonable. Thereby sanctions are laid on the 
companies instead of the individual poor farmers who are side selling. 
 
However currently the Cotton Act has not yet been passed, hence the sanctions are solely on 
the farmers. When companies have
hazard
larger, which enhances the credit default cris
quences for the future development of the cotto
o
the companies to sanction the farmers; thereby ‘signalling’ to other farmers who are tempted 
to do ‘moral hazard’, that it is not worth it (Milgrom & Roberts 1992:155f,186). Richard 
                                                 
134 Read: side-selling 
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Dettmer points this out by stating “By taken one or two farmers to prison, it shows a strong 
example for other farmers. If we don’t, the farmers think that it is beneficial to steel from 
Cargill. If words get around that an untrustworthy farmer are able to stay in business, the 
incitement for the farmers to stay loyal to the signed company would be less” (IW:Dettmer)  
 
Capitalizing the loans defaults into the cost of inputs 
 their actions, instead of inflicting it on 
thers. (Stiglitz 2006:217). A way to circumvent enhanced side-selling is by rewarding the 
There is a tendency that the cost for companies of some farmers’ ‘moral hazard’ behaviour is 
being passed on to those farmers who have honoured the contract (Kabwe & Tschirley 
2007a:4). Companies have started to capitalize their loans defaults into the cost of inputs for 
the farmers who do repay their loans. This results in lower income for those cotton farmers 
who stay loyal to the contracted company (Poulton et al 2008:142, Balet & Porto 2005:5). In 
relation to this, since there are no benefits in staying loyal, and there is only a small risk of 
being caught in not obeying the contract, this curtails the ‘loyal’ farmer’s incitement to 
maintain loyal. The lack of incitement to stay loyal to the contracted company is critical for 
future development of the cotton industry. For that reason, it becomes crucial that those who 
do ‘moral hazard’ bear all the risks associated with
o
farmers who stay loyal.  
 
 
As we have seen, the incentive for farmers in side-selling is beneficial for farmers in the 
short term. However, in the long term this behaviour results in a widespread credit default 
crisis causing severe consequences for the cotton industry in Zambia. The lack of sustainabil-
ity in how the cotton industry currently is running has likewise a devastating effect on the 
cotton farmers’ livelihood, since it might lead to the end of cotton production in Zambia. I 
will look into this in the succeeding. 
 
7.5 Changes in the investment climate 
 
The lack of rules and regulations makes the competitions in the cotton industry unsustainable 
and intensive side selling and loan default. As Nigel Seabrook explains: “We do not mind 
competition, competition is good, but we do mind that companies are taking the cotton we 
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have invested in, which is rightfully ours” (IW:Seabrook). This current crisis illustrates the 
importance of institutions, particular contract enforcement and secure property rights, in 
creating a well-functioning market (Nielsen 2005:106). Since companies’ property rights are 
currently not guarantied, the cotton market becomes ineffective to secure the investments 
required to have a well-functioning cotton industry in Zambia.  
ared to the previous season (App:A). The 
onsequences for farmers, of companies holding back investment, are decreased training of 
ith competitive structure 
he downside of unrestrained competitive structure and lack of state interference has 
tnessed in other African countries. Stephen Kabwe and David Tschirley 
rgue in a cotton country comparison analysis, that the cotton industries in Uganda and 
countries. From this it can be derived, that eventhough the share of the profit paid in percent-
 
Faced with a credit crisis, the tendency is that companies loose their interest in investing in 
developing sustainable relations with farmers (Shepherd 2007:23, Larsen 2003:29). Since the 
contracted companies become unsure of whether they will receive the return of their invest-
ments, they start taking precautions to ensure that their money is not put at unnecessary risks 
(Shepherd 2007:35). An example of this is Dunavant and Cargill, who both reduced their 
support to the farmers by providing less expensive input packages in 2006/07. As a result, 
cotton cultivation fell by as much as half comp
c
farmers in yield provision and lack of interest in pre-finance. Companies simply do not want 
to waste time on farmers who are selling to others.  
 
Experiences from other cotton producing countries w
T
likewise been wi
a
Tanzania have had a similar competitive structure currently experienced in Zambia. When 
liberalized, the cotton industry in Tanzania and Uganda were characterized by full privatiza-
tion, with twenty to thirty cotton companies competing. This resulted in intense price 
competition between the companies, and significant improvement in the share of farmers’ 
income.  
 
However, a downfall of the heavy competition was the collapse of input supply and training, 
resulting in lower quality of cotton (Kabwe & Tschirley 2007b:2). In the end, when the 
quality of cotton worsened the cotton lint price on the world market went down for these two 
age to the farmers has stayed the same, when the world prices declined for Tanzania and 
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Uganda, the prices to farmers likewise went down (Kabwe & Tschirley 2007c:1). The 
experience from Uganda and Tanzania, illustrates that competition without rules and regula-
tions can undermine the pillars of Zambia’s cotton success story. Unless appropriate institu-
tions are developed, the situation in Zambia is likely to repeat the experiences of Uganda and 
Tanzania135. 
 
On the basis of the changed dynamics in Zambia’s cotton industry and the experiences from 
other countries with similar structures it can be derived that for small scale farmers to escape 
overty through the cotton industry two conditions needs to pre-exist.  First of all a business 
t?  
nstraints in the contract relation preventing farmers from unleashing the potential 
at cotton trade could otherwise offer them. Since cotton essentially is the best crop for 
all scale farmers to cultivate, in terms of receiving an income, the incentive for companies 
to make it more attractive is small. Further, the feasibility of failed harvests, while companies 
insist on getting their input loan to farmers back; enhance the farmers’ dependency relation to 
the companies. Instead of farmers participating in cotton to earn an income to get out of 
                                                
p
environment needs to be achieved that protects the investments the cotton companies conduct 
in the sector, thereby maintaining pre-finance. Second of all it is crucial that price competi-
tion between the companies is maintained in the interest of the farmers, thereby maintaining 
the pre-financing (Kabwe & Tschirley 2007a:1).  
 
A central question is whether this balance between coordination and competition is possible 
to create, and what the right institutional arrangement should be to create this balance. Is it 
possible to establish enforceable ‘rules of the game’ that can ensure good pricing perform-
ance and at the same time safeguard credit repaymen
 
7.6 Summary 
 
There exist a ‘reciprocal interest’ between the companies and the farmers in sustaining the 
contract based relation since both on the long term are benefiting from this arrangement. Still 
it has become clear throughout this chapter that their interest is not always identical, and that 
there are co
th
sm
 
135 The comparison between these countries has some limitations. There might be differences in the extent of 
how much that is trickled down to farmers in the different countries.  
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poverty, it becomes a way to pay back their loan in order to get out of dept. In addition, the 
e, and then later the final price, is a disadvan-
ge for the farmers. When you combine the farmer’s uncertainty regarding the final price, 
ehaviour 
ractised by the farmers has major consequences for the future development of the cotton 
. This 
include creating a business environment that protects the investments of the cotton compa-
ies in the sector and at the same time sustain price competitive, that enables farmers to take 
e world market. In the next 
hapter I will look into the possibility of creating such a business environment.  
arrangement of companies giving a floor pric
ta
with the uncertainty regarding quality and volume, it becomes difficult for the farmers to 
choose the optimal allocation of crop cultivation, which leads to losses. The farmer’s relation 
to the cotton companies are on an individual basis. Obviously the farmers are weak in this 
bargaining position. Therefore instead the farmers associations should be strengthened to 
negotiate with the companies on behalf of the farmers.  
 
The changes in the business climate moving from a concentrated to a ‘competitive’ structure, 
have worked out to be an advantage for the farmers in terms of enhancing the options on 
which company they are to cooperate with. This enhances the companies’ price competition 
and result in more choices and better prices for farmers. However, the opportunist b
p
industry. The credit crisis makes the companies less interested in investing in Zambia, this 
including less training of farmers yield provision and pre-financing of farmers. This means 
that if the tendency continues fewer farmers are able to cultivate cotton, and those who are 
pre-financed produce less yield to do less training.  
 
As we have seen in order for small scale farmers to escape poverty through cotton trade there 
are variables that need to exist in the Zambian cotton industry, if this is to be utilised
n
part of the surplus the Zambian cotton companies generate on th
c
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8. The role of the Zambian state 
 
Since the Zambian cotton industry to a large extent is private-based, with minimal state 
interference, the previous chapters have focused on the relation between the farmers and the 
private cotton companies. Nonetheless, by the issues outlined in the former chapters it is 
clear that the Zambian state needs to play are more active role in the cotton industry, for two 
reasons: 1) The Zambian cotton industry is currently under great stress, beyond what the 
companies can manage on their own, therefore action taken by the state is vital to sustain and 
develop the industry further, and 2) the trickle-down effect of the Zambian cotton industry’s 
growth success to the farmers, has not occurred to an satisfying extent. Thus actions taken by 
the Zambian state to improve the farmers’ position in cotton trade, is necessary if farmers 
additionally are to escape poverty through participating in cotton trade eventually.  
 
In this chapter I will clarify the actions taken by the Zambian state that has influenced the 
otton industry. This includes the priorities taken in the agricultural sector and the conse-c
quences of attracting foreign companies, leading, amongst other things, to the current 
‘competitive’ structure of the cotton industry. Secondly the revised Cotton Act will be 
discussed, in terms of its capability of securing the right balance between coordination and 
competition in the cotton industry. These two variables are, as I emphasised in chapter 7, 
necessary if the cotton industry is to reach its potential for farmers to escape poverty.  
 
8.1 Changes in the Zambian state’s policy priorities  
 
The development towards a ‘competitive’ structure in the cotton industry is closely related to 
changes in political priorities. In 2001, Levy Mwanawasa was elected president for Zambia. 
The new administration in power ushered a number of changes in Zambia’s policy, including 
recognizing the importance of smallholders in the agricultural sector (CDT 2007:1). One of 
the objectives was to increase the number of farmers producing cash crops, thereby making 
the farmers less dependent on food crops (IW:Malambo).  
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The Zambian government highlight in an official documents that they prioritize the sectors 
that stimulate growth and those improving the situations of the poor the most, including 
agriculture (AfDB 2008:618). As part of Zambia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the 
government proclaim to identify the agricultural sector as the leading sector to diversify 
Zambia’s economy, guarantee food security, economical growth and reduce poverty (TPR 
002:5ff, Haggblade & Fynn 2006:iv). This policy priority is likewise outlined in the Fifth 
hese priorities should be seen in the light of the small allocation of the government budget 
hese include that the approval of 
ew companies, might attract companies that only are doing business in Zambia on a short 
2
National Development Plan (FNDP) 2006-2011, which is Zambia’s five-year-strategy to 
fight poverty. The plan focuses on sustainable reduction of poverty through e.g. rural 
development and agriculture that should employ an enhanced number of people, which 
eventually should reduce poverty (FNDP:36). Further, the plan emphasise that the growth 
should be created in private sector (ibid, PID 2008:3). The strategy to accomplish poverty 
reduction amongst Zambians is through value increase in the processed work, especially 
agricultural commodities, and a general improvement in agro-commodity quality and a wider 
product assortment (FNDP:48,136). It is further stated in the FNDP that Zambia’s ability to 
compete internationally should be strengthened.  
 
T
for agriculture. The allocation for the agricultural sector in the Zambian government budget 
has risen from 3 percent in 2004 to 5,8 in 2005, to 8,8 percent in 2007, where it then dropped 
to 5,8 percent in 2008 (OECD:110, FNDP:24). Considering the importance of agriculture for 
Zambia’s economy and its citizens, the low financial allocation to the sector is troublesome, 
if Zambia is to fight poverty through the agricultural sector.   
 
Attracting foreign companies with short or long term commitments 
Along with the private companies’ improvement of Zambia’s cotton industry, the Zambian 
government’s policy in attracting foreign investments is responsible for the current ‘competi-
tive’ structure in the cotton industry. The policy of attracting new foreign investors, when 
there by and large doesn’t exist regulations, has spillovers. T
n
term basis. The Critical Globalist warns against allowing the entrance of companies who only 
seek to do business to gain a short term advantage. A company of this type “… seeks high 
returns in the short run and rushes into a country in a wave of optimism only to rush out 
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again at the first hint of trouble” (Stiglitz 2006:10). While the inflow of the companies 
capital might bring a short term gain, the decline that is likely to follow when a company is 
moving out, brings distortions into the economy on the long-run. Cargill, Dunavant and 
others are arguing that Yustina is such a company, only being in Zambia to gain as much 
profit as possible in a short term period (IW:Battershall).  
 
When new companies are not interested in a term commitment, expressed by e.g. pirate 
buying, the industry is easily eroded, which makes the ‘old’ companies move out of Zambia, 
as we saw under the first crisis with the case of Lintco (Sec:5.3). The director of Dunavant, 
Nigel Seabrook formulates his concern about this tendency in this way “the approving of 
ew investors into the Zambian cotton market takes place at the expense of the cotton 
herefore companies like Dunavant and Cargill that have invested in the cotton industry and 
rmers for a longer period of time, call for the Zambian State to take measurements that can 
ffer their companies protection against new companies. They are arguing that “competition 
is good, as long as everybody follow the rules. Right now instead of increasing the produc-
on and profit cake, we are slicing it up in smaller and smaller shares. The cake is cut 
etween us in a disproportionate way, so the ones that have invested in the industry is getting 
less than the others” (IW:Seabrook). In continuation of this, Nigel Seabrook has the follow-
ing solution: “The government should create an investment climate that focuses on the 
companies that are already here and that are here for the long term” (IW:Seabrook). It 
seems to be the point of view of Dunavant and Cargill that the new companies are taking 
advantage of the Zambian cotton industry, at their expense.  
 
The Zambian government is interested in attracting foreign investments, and is trying to 
create a sound investment climate for new investors (FNDP). The driving force behind 
attracting foreign companies is the b rate technological and 
n
companies that already are operating in Zambia” (IW:Seabrook). The FSRP researchers 
Ballard Zulu and David Tschirley concur this view by stressing that: “A major risk in 
allowing new, often small entrants into the cotton sector is that they may have little long-term 
investment in the sector and may, together, create major credit repayment problems that 
undermine the entire enterprise” (Tschirley & Zulu 2004:2).  
 
T
fa
o
ti
b  
elief that they eventually will gene
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learning spillovers for other domestic activities (Rodrik 2007:120). But in relation to this, the 
ritical Globalist warns against setting up the wrong priorities. They emphasize that the 
 
 
C
strive for increasing foreign investment might take place at the expense of other more 
important domestic development issues: “…, trade is useful only insofar as it serves broader 
developmental and social goals. Developing countries should not be obsessed with market 
access abroad, at the cost of overlooking more fundamental developmental challenges at 
home. Industrial countries should balance the interests of their exporters and multinational 
companies  with those of their workers and consumers” (ibid:227f) Therefore, when the 
Zambian state attracts foreign companies, the aim should be to transform its investments into 
solving development obstacles, rather than being an aim in itself.  
 
In the case of Zambia’s cotton industry this means that the aim of attracting cotton compa-
nies should be to increase price competition, between the companies, in order for a larger 
share of the final cotton price on world market to trickle down to farmers while at the same 
secure that this does not deteriorate the industry. It is therefore vital that the Zambian state 
does not stop the inflow of long term committed cotton companies, but regulates the industry 
so that the companies follow the same rules e.g. does not pirate buying.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Farmers showing a sack of cotton seed. 
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8.2 Changes in exchange rate  
 
As we have seen, the second credit default crisis happened as a result of widespread pirate 
buying. But also the rapid appreciation of the kwacha affected the extent of the crisis (Kabwe 
& Tschirley 2007b:6). Since independence in 1964, the kwacha has never been appreciated, 
but in 2002 it steadily started to be appreciated, and in 2005 it took further off (FNDP:25, 
IW:Seabrook). The rapid appreciation was due to a combination of the following issues: (1) 
e boom in the Zambian copper export as a result of the rise of copper prices on world 
aggblade & Fynn 2006:48). What 
plication this has for farmers participating in cotton will be discussed in the succeeding.  
th
market, (2) the depreciation of the dollar, (3) the international debt forgiveness136, and (4) the 
generally improved investments climate in Zambia. The increased interest in converting 
foreign currency into kwacha can be seen as a positive sign in the faith in Zambia’s econ-
omy. However, too many companies rushing to convert their currency into kwacha has 
negative spillovers for an export oriented industry such as cotton.  As a result, since 2005 the 
export sectors have been under great stress causing a serious crisis in all export sectors 
(Haggblade & Fynn 2006:v, FNDP:27f) 137 . This rise in the exchange rates, makes the 
Zambian export sectors less competitive and undermines the efforts done to diversify the 
economy and alleviate poverty (Stiglitz 2006:147f, H
im
 
8.2.1 The exchange rate affect on farmers 
 
The rapid appreciation of the kwacha creates difficulties for the cotton industry, since the 
exchange rate between the kwacha and the US dollar is a key variable in the competitiveness 
of Zambian cotton on the world market. Cotton is traded on the world markets in dollars, 
while cotton farmers are paid in kwacha. This means that when the dollar is strong, the cost 
of production of cotton is relatively low in dollar terms, but when the kwacha gains strength 
                                                 
136 In 2005, Zambia qualified for debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative, together with 
additional debt relief, agreed to at the 2005 G8 summit. Zambia’s international debt stocks were removed by the 
end of 2006 by as much as a fraction (Taylor 2007:84, AfDB 2008:623, FNDP:28). 
137 This situation is referred to as the Dutch disease, meaning an economy with a high inflow of foreign 
currency from the revenues of the country’s natural resources, in the case of Zambia this is mainly due to the 
high returns of cobber. The situation is referred to at the Dutch disease, since it was first observed in the 
Netherlands, where the inflow of dollars for the North Sea oil and gas led to a high exchange rate. Dutch 
exporters found themselves unable to sell their products abroad, and domestic companies had difficulties in 
competing with imports (Stiglitz 2006:148). 
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against the dollar, these costs become correspondingly higher in terms of dollars. Before the 
kwacha appreciation the exchange rate was at the companies’ benefit, but now “For every 
dollar we sell the less kwacha, and the less kwacha we have the less money we have to pay 
for staff and farmers” (IW:Seabrook). If the strong kwacha persists, companies indicate that 
they may have to shut down their operations in Zambia (IW:Dettmer, Seabrook). Hence the 
pid appreciation causes instability in the cotton industry, enhancing economic vulnerability 
aggblade & Fynn 2006:vi).  
 larger and commercially oriented farms, and 
ra
of the farmers involved.  
 
The companies have passed on the cost of the unfavourable exchange rate to the farmers, 
who receive less for their cotton (IW:Battershell). This has placed an even greater pressure 
on the income of the farmers. In 2005, Dunavant announced a pre-planting price of 1200 
Kwacha per kg, which was calculated on the basis on a 4200 Kwacha per US$ exchange rate. 
But with the decline in the exchange rate to 3200 Kwacha per US$, Dunavant reduced its 
price to the farmers to 850 kwacha per kg, to avoid operating at a deficit. The other compa-
nies followed the same price reductions to the farmers (Kabwe & Tschirley 2007a:32). As a 
result the farmers cultivating cotton in the 2005/06 season suffered a twenty to thirty percent 
fall in Kwacha revenues (H
 
This case of the companies offering below their announced floor price clearly illustrates the 
weakness of farmers’ dependency on companies trading in dollars on the world markets, 
makes them vulnerable towards unfavourable international exchange rates. Since farmers 
price decline in 2005, some farmers have abandoned cotton cultivation, and by the end of the 
market season 2008/09, the cotton crop was expected to be below 100.000 tons compared to 
the peak of 227.000 tons during the 2003/04 season138 (IW:Seabrook). Steven Haggblade and 
John Fynn estimate that it is the least productive and most remote small scale farmers who 
will be the first to leave the cotton industry (Haggblade & Fynn 2006:55). This estimate is in 
accordance with Peter Hazell’s overall observation on how the market works when it is in the 
hands of the private companies: “Left to market forces alone, the major beneficiaries of the 
new high value agriculture will mostly be the
                                                 
138 The low production and the increased number of companies operating in Zambia have recently meant that 
the companies had had to give farmers more favourable prices, to make the cotton industry once again attractive 
for farmers. This point on increased price competition is outlined in chapter 7 and has made the price to farmers 
increase in 2008. The reason why I have went a few years back in time in this chapter is to outline the role and 
importance of the Zambian state in the cotton industry.  
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farms that are well connected to roads and markets. Many small farms are likely to get left 
behind unless marketing arrangements can be developed that link them to the new market 
chains” (Hazell 2007:10). The presence of less revenue from cotton to the farmers in general 
and the exit of those that likely are the most poor from cotton cultivation is a significant 
tback for the small scale farmers’ possibility of escaping poverty through cotton trade.  
 
te  
 is clear that the exchange rate is worsening the Zambian cotton industry’s performance and 
 the following 
ppeal: “The exchange rate between the kwacha and dollar need to be stabilised by the 
s the rapid appreciation of the kwacha has on the Zambian export industry. The 
ain macro-economical management tools for the Zambian government to avoid excessive 
udget disciplines that sterilize foreign exchange earnings, 
se
Actions taken by the sta
It
the farmer’s possibility of escaping poverty, since they have to bear the brunt of the eco-
nomical loses139. Furthermore, it is clear that it can not be solved solely by the companies. 
The cotton companies are advocating for the Zambian state to take actions against this 
macroeconomic problem. They argue that the government should install regulations and have 
a sound fiscal policy that can keep the inflation rate and interest rate stable. The administra-
tion manager of Dunavant in Katete district Alibandila Siwiwaliondo have
a
government because only a stable exchange rate makes us able to calculate our margins 
right (IW:Siwiwaliondo).  
 
Since the problem originates from converting foreign exchange into domestic currency, a 
solution would be to reduce the amount converted, which would reduce the level of exchange 
rate appreciation (Stiglitz 2006:148). This could decrease the magnitude of the negative 
consequence
m
exchange rate volatility include b
strict controls on government spending in order to fight inflation, and public investments in 
e.g. agricultural technology and infrastructure 140 . To date, the Zambian government has 
adopted none of these measurements (Kabwe & Tschirley 2007a:41). “Instead of managing 
                                                 
139Again due to the time period the increased price competition recently witnessed, means that companies likely 
have to bear more of the economic looses themselves.  
140 The importance of improving infrastructure can not be stressed strong enough. “Poor physical infrastructure 
such as roads, electricity and water has been one of the major bottlenecks holding back private sector 
development and Zambia’s economic progress in general” (FNDP:39). The lack of reliable electricity is highly 
inefficient for the companies, since it lowers their productivity (World Bank 2005). When I visited Chipata 
Cotton Company most of the employed had went home in the middle of the day, due to a power cut. In the night 
the power supply is most reliable, therefore the employed were told to come and work in the night instead. 
(IW:Song).  
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the exchange rate, Zambia has allowed the Kwacha to float freely, …” (Haggblade & Fynn 
2006:58). Needles to say the Zambian states lack of actions of this issue is hindering the 
export industries competitiveness on world markets. This stands in contrast to the states own 
roclaimed goal of strengthening Zambia’s ability to complete internationally (FNDP) 
ffective ‘rules of the game’, to ensure the continuing 
provision of investment and input-credit to farmers, is required to create a well-functioning 
otton industry. Only then, can farmers escape poverty through cotton trade.  
gulations and policies 
p
 
8.3 The Cotton Act 
 
In the end of chapter 7 I derive two key elements that are required to create a well-
functioning cotton industry, of which farmers can escape poverty. First of all there is a need 
for sustaining competition between the companies to ensure favourable price to farmers. And 
second of all acquiring coordination of e
c
 
An initiative to balance the variables of competition and coordination is put forward in the 
revised Cotton Act 2005 (App:I). The Act focuses on improving the farmers’ credit repay-
ment and secure companies’ investment, including investments in improving the farmers’ 
volume and quality of cotton, which, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is under 
pressure in the current Zambian cotton industry. Elaboration on how the Cotton Act, if 
implemented, will contribute to the development of the cotton sector, will subsequently be 
elaborated.  
 
The power of the Cotton Board 
The essence of the Cotton Act 2005 is the establishment of a Cotton Board that should 
supervise regulations and be a balanced mix of private and public stakeholders (App:I:part 
II). The Board should consist of nine members, including representatives from MACO 
parliament members, CDT, CAZ, the Cotton Growers Association141, the controller of Seeds 
and one person from the Environment Council of Zambia (App:I:part II.5). It is stated in the 
Cotton Act that the Board should have the authority to 1) regulate the production, processing 
and marketing of cotton, 2) work as advisor for the government on re
                                                 
141 Associations for companies that support pre-financing and do not allow pirate-buying. Alliance, Cargill, 
Dunavant and Great Lakes are members. 
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related to the sector, and 3) monitor and report the level of policy implementation. On the 
of the revised Cotton Act makes it illegal for companies to purchase 
otton produced with inputs supplied on credit by other companies (App:I:Part V.32), it gives 
 
contrary, the Board does not have the authority to set prices nor directly to engage in market-
ing (App:I:part II.4 Kabwe & Tschirley 2007d:2).  
 
The Cotton Board issues licences and register companies dealing with cotton and approve the 
company’s trademark. “Any person who intends to produce, buy, sell, transport, store or gin 
cotton shall apply for registration in the prescribed form to the Board” (App:I:part III.20). If 
the Board estimates that a company does not have the sufficient requirements or willingness 
to respect the rules of conduct, it can deny it a licence (App:I:part II.20.6). It is further stated 
that if a company is found to be involved in pirate buying, its license can be cancelled, or it 
has to  pay a fine, and what it has brought illegally will be confiscated (App:I:part II.17, part 
V.32(2), Kabwe & Tschirley 2007b:6).  
 
8.3.2 The Act if implemented 
 
The Cotton Act sets out to regulate the cotton market and enforce sanctions that curtails 
pirate-buying (IW:Song). Thereby the Act provide a judicial system that protects companies’ 
property rights, which in turn underpins the companies’ incitement to further invest in the 
industry, and create a strong relation to farmers in terms of reliable input packaging, training, 
etc. From this perspective it can be derived that the Cotton Act, when implemented, promotes 
a sustainable cotton industry, with the required flows of investment to sustain or increase 
farmers’ cotton quality and yield.  
 
Since the enforcement 
c
the Zambian state and the involved companies the legitimacy to drag companies that are 
pirate-buying into court. This would mean that instead of punishing the farmers for side-
selling, which currently occurs, the sanctions will be transferred to the companies that are 
pirate-buying the farmers’ cotton. The companies that stick to their contracted farmers will 
have a greater incitement to drag the companies, rather than the farmers, in court due to the 
feasible larger amount of money that can hereby claim. 
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Lack of enforcement 
The revised Cotton Act 2005 was signed by the president in December 2005, but the Act has 
not been put into effect (IW:Kamona). To illustrate this by an example, Yustina has been 
promoting side-selling and have sold non-certified cotton seed in Zambia, which is illegal 
according to the Act (App:I:part III,20), but there has not yet been any prosecution taking 
place (IW:Kamona). The reason behind the lack of enforcement can partly be explained by 
the fact that some interest groups and politicians believe that if the Cotton Act 2005 was 
enforced, it would shift some of the power relations within the mandate of MACO over to the 
Cotton Board, hence give the Board too broad policing powers, and move the power away 
 political accountability. In addition, the Cotton Act 2005 was criticized for using a 
ons under which the Cotton Board could exercise its 
do not follow the Act (IW:Dunavant). Since the revised Cotton Act 2008 are 
milar to the Act 2005, and the recommended changes conducted, to my opinion could have 
forward once more” (IW:Kabwe) and “the new Cotton Act has all what is needed” 
e Zambian cotton industry (CDT 2008:7). Dunavant, Cargill and other cotton 
from
vague language in specifying the conditi
power (IW:Nkole, Kabwe & Tschirley 2007a:20). This created the possibility of power abuse 
by the Cotton Board.  
 
It was therefore recommended that amendments were made to specify under which condi-
tions the board had political power, if the Act should be passed. Hence the stakeholders 
agreed to revise the Act (Poulton et al 2008:145, Zulu & Tschirley 2004:6). In April 2008, a 
new ‘up-to-date’ Cotton Act was agreed upon by the cotton stakeholders. The essence is 
similar to the former Act142. The changes have been on specifying under which conditions 
the Cotton Board could exercise its power, and specify what sanctions should be used when 
companies 
si
been modified after the Act was passed, it to me shows the immensely slow process of 
implementing the Act. 
 
As mentioned in section 2.3.3, nearly every cotton stakeholder in Zambia puts their trust in 
the Act. “Once the Cotton Act is being implemented the Zambian cotton industry can move 
(IW:Kamona). It seems to be the point of view that this Act which will determine the faith 
and future of th
companies are pushing for submission by the government for the revised Cotton Act. Nigel 
                                                 
142 I have not included the Cotton Act 2008 in the appendix, since it is, by and large, the same as the former one. 
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Seabrook states that: “it is crucial that it be enforced before pre-planting starts in November 
2008. If the Cotton Act is further delayed, the cotton industry will be further threatened” 
(IW:Seabrook). However the Act is yet to be passed. Considering that the passage of the Act 
through the Parliament has been delayed on several occasions, recently due to the death of 
the President Mwanawase in August143, the chances of enforcing the Act before next pre-
planting season 2009 doesn’t seem feasible to me144 (IW:Seabrook). Moreover, the general 
delay in passing the Cotton Act might indicate the lack of fiscal support to enforce the Act 
after it is eventually passed.  
 
8.3.3 Shortcomings of the Cotton Act 
 
The enforcement of sanctioning companies that do not follow the Cotton Act is difficult. 
Companies will have to prove that they have purchased cotton from farmers who have not 
received inputs from others. But there are ways to circumvent this, as it is difficult to 
document that a particular sack of cotton comes from a particular household. Furthermore, it 
will probably be dragged out in the court. Hence a relevant question in connection to the 
Cotton Act is: how feasible is it to enforce the Cotton Act? Considering that there has never 
been a country succeeding in regulating the market with an institution like the Cotton Board, 
the likelihood of successful implementing the Cotton Act is not good (IW:Kabwe). All in all, 
if it is not possible to monitor who behaves rightfully and who does not, the Cotton Act is of 
little use.  
  
In relation to the problems with attracting foreign companies laid forward in 8.1.1, the Cotton 
ct tries to eliminate the entrants of companies that are in Zambia for the short-term gains, 
ol over who can and who can not operate in the country (App:I). However, 
 should be recognized that abuse likewise can be committed by long-term established 
A
by imposing contr
it
companies in Zambia who may, over time, come to favour short-term profits over long-term 
                                                 
143 The focus was on Mwanawasa’s long illness (almost two months in bed), the 21 days national mourning time 
after his death on August 18th 2008, and thereafter the 
th
election of a new president: Rupiah Banda on October 
 2008 (CIA). 
4 It could have been interesting to look further in why the Cotton Act has not yet been passed. It has not been 
30
14
possible to examine this more thoroughly in this report. Hence whether the concerns expressed on power abuse 
is real, or an excuse to delay the process of the Act further, is for me not known. To me, it seems crucial that the 
Cotton Act gets implemented if the cotton industry is to sustain in Zambia, hence I have difficulties in 
understanding why these long delays take place.  
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development. Furthermore, it is difficult to check and distinguish which new companies are 
in for the short-term. Therefore, setting high barriers to enter, could be seen as practising 
anti-competitive behaviour, where the old companies strive for profits by restricting competi-
tion from the entrance of new companies (Stiglitz 2006:94). To know whether a denial of a 
company seeking entrance to Zambia, is a believe that the company is only in for the short- 
term, or whether it is an attempt from the already established companies to keep competitive 
companies out of the market, is difficult to check, hence the chances of power abuse exist 
wards companies wanting to operate in Zambia.  
e 
 policy environment in which firms can continue to provide important services to farmers, 
ut this will not be sufficient, by itself, to turn cotton into an engine of rural poverty reduc-
tion” (Kabwe & Tschirley 2007c:4). In relation to this it is my believe that the Cotton Act, in 
spite of its shortcomings is an important step towards enabling the cotton industry to move 
beyond some of the key constrains that curtail the industry from developing thereby giving as 
many farmers as possible in rural Zambia the opportunity to cultivate cotton, and to get as 
much as possible to trickle down to farmers.  
 
8.4 Summary 
 
The Zambian state’s level of support to the farmers and scope of interference in how the 
cotton industry is run in general, influence the farmers’ constrains and capabilities to escape 
poverty through participating in cotton trade.  
 
In spite of the priorities of the Zambian state on the agricultural sector and farmers involved, 
the low budget allocations to agriculture, imply the lack of state interference in how the 
to
 
While many of the stakeholders put their trust in the implementation of the cotton Act, some 
critics of the Act exists. Albert Chaala from NDFA argues that: The regulations in the Cotton 
Act are in the favour of the companies. We are not seeing any improvements of the farmer’s 
situation. Therefore the government should enforce policies that focuses on the cotton 
farmers instead of the companies (IW:Chaala). Stephen Kabwe and David Tschirley concur 
this perception by arguing that: “Passage of the revised Cotton Act, and continued develop-
ment of the recent cooperation between ginners and farmers, are both needed to consolidat
a
b
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private companies are currently running the industry. The Zambian state does not regulate the 
otton industry, but play an active role in attracting companies to the cotton sector. This put 
 At the same time, the level of companies in Zambia will be 
aintained, thereby securing price competition, which again would improve the fact that the 
farmers. Thereby, offering the 
c
the sustainability of the industry under great pressure. Furthermore, the state is not taken any 
initiatives to diminish the current exchange rate that are hindering export industries, includ-
ing cotton, to stay competitive on world market. This is troublesome, considering that the 
companies’ costs of the changed exchange rate are laid on the farmers, and are decreasing 
their income. This is hampering the farmers’ capability of escaping poverty.  
 
Besides, if the Cotton Act is implemented, it will solve the problem in the cotton industry, in 
terms of guaranteeing companies property rights of cotton. This will improve the continua-
tion of companies accumulating and innovation in the cotton industry in Zambia. It will 
additionally enhance the spread of the cotton industry in Zambia giving rural farmers more 
alternatives places to cultivate.
m
price attained on the world market is trickled down to the 
farmers more value for their cotton cultivation and better possibilities of escaping poverty.  
 
 
 
 
Cargill Ginnery in Chipata.  
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9. Conclusion  
 
The objective of this thesis was to study the impact of the Zambian cotton industry on small 
ade can enable them to 
However, variables in the cotton industry’s organizational structure 
nd institutional arrangement prevent cotton farmers from reaching their full potential and 
arket would not be major and would not trickle-down to the farmers. Instead inter-
ediates would likely keep most of the price increase.  
he companies, if they wish to create jobs in cotton cultivation for its farmers. 
scale farmers in Zambia, and whether their participation in cotton tr
escape poverty. Due to the cotton industry’s ability to strengthen the linkage between rural 
farmers and the world cotton market, by enabling farmers to produce at a volume and at a 
quality required, the industry becomes an income generating activity that has the potential to 
reduce farmer’s poverty. 
a
escape poverty. This makes the benefits for small scale farmers participating in cotton trade 
at best modest. Based on the cotton industry’s opportunities and constrains for small scale 
farmers that has come to the fore in the previous chapters, I elaborate in the following how I 
have come to this conclusion.  
 
The global cotton markets impact on small scale farmers 
In view of industrialized countries cotton subsidies to their farmers, Zambia’s competitive-
ness in cotton trade is being hampered. Since Zambia is unable to export cotton at a scale and 
a price of which it has a comparative advantage, it essentially hinders small scale farmers 
from getting full value of their cotton cultivation. Still, if we assumed that cotton subsidies in 
the world were removed, there are reasons to believe that the increased price attained on the 
world m
m
 
Furthermore, due to the generally declining world cotton prices, Zambia’s farmers would in 
the long run have to produce more and more just to receive the status quo income. Of reasons 
outlined in chapter 4, I conclude that the Zambian farmers at their current position will not be 
able to produce significantly more, and as a result their income from cotton will eventually 
decline. In addition, since the international cotton companies have the possibility of moving 
out of Zambia if the business environment becomes too disadvantageous for them, the 
chances for small scale farmers from reaping the full benefits of cotton trade are constrained. 
This is a result of the fact that the Zambian State has to create a favourable business envi-
ronment for t
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This might happen at the expense of securing that the profit acquired on the world market is 
hen Zambia was liberalized, only large international cotton companies had the fiscal 
omic vulnerability, 
ce they can save up money, they need in periods when facing shocks, or to invest in e.g. 
es their 
trickled-down to farmers to a satisfying extent.  
 
The advantage of rural farmers’ strong linkage to world market 
On the other hand, the global cotton market provides advantages for rural farmers in Zambia. 
Globalization has diminished some of the barriers between rural and international markets, 
creating new opportunities for small scale farmers in terms of new crops to cultivate and 
large markets to sell to.  
 
W
capacity to invest in rural Zambia, which was fraught with risk and where a ‘low equilibrium 
trap’ existed, hindering the return of investments in the short term. Zambia’s land locked 
position and generally poor infrastructure, made the farmers essentially isolated from reaping 
the gains from increased trade on world market. Therefore, the companies’ investments in 
establishing a cotton industry in rural Zambia, including providing cotton input-credit 
packages to farmers, strengthened the farmers’ linkage to the world cotton market. The 
company’s provision of a closer linkage between the farmers and the world market lowered 
the cotton production cost. Moreover, the companies installed quality control and trained the 
farmers, thereby improving the farmers’ cotton quality and volume. This made Zambia’s 
cotton production more competitive on the world cotton market and gave them a higher 
price.   
 
The increased number of Zambian farmers cultivating cotton over the last two decades shows 
that cultivating cotton has become an attractive option for an enhanced number of rural 
farmers, moving a large proportion of formerly subsistence farmers to become cash-crop 
farmers. Creating income generating jobs for farmers reduces their econ
sin
livestock’s that can assist them in yield improvements. The increased yield increas
income which points in the direction of farmers being able to escape poverty by entering the 
cotton industry. Whether these improvements enable farmers at a level that can increase their 
income and alleviate poverty is ambiguous. This will be further elaborated at the end of this 
conclusion.   
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The Zambian cotton industry’s institutional arrangement  
Within the linkage between cotton companies and farmers an asymmetric power relation 
exists, in favour of the cotton companies. This includes the procedure of first notifying the 
farmers about the final price when the market season starts, which curtails the farmers’ 
possibility of working for the company that offers the best price. Furthermore, since the 
companies are not required to notify the price before market season, it enables them to hide 
the accurate price for the farmers. Thereby a potential increase in Zambian cotton on the 
orld market might not trickle-down to farmers, but only benefit the companies. This 
 due to variables beyond farmers’ control, 
ey risk becoming indebted. Since the farmers do not receive an income from their work 
onsequences of a competitive structure in Zambia’s cotton industry   
, moving 
w
obscurity, unable farmers to get full value of their cotton harvest.  
 
The risks connected to cotton production are, to a large extent, placed on the farmers. In 
addition general declining on world cotton prices and unfavourable exchange rates are passed 
on to farmers. If the farmer’s cotton production fails the risk and additional cost, is solely 
placed on the farmers. Since the companies require that their investments of inputs are paid 
back by the farmers, even if the harvest has failed
th
carried out in the cotton field, and since they in general are cash constrained, they are unable 
to pay back the companies. In these cases, instead of being an income generating activity for 
the farmers, the farmers enter into a vicious circle of indebtedness when linked to cotton 
companies. The farmers become depended on the companies’ willingness to invest in their 
inputs throughout the following years, which eventually enables them to pay back the loan by 
their income from cotton. Another solution for some of the richer small scale farmers is to 
pay back the company in assets e.g. livestock’s. Thereby, the farmers circumvent getting 
indebted, but the less livestock’s, e.g. an ox, the less cotton they produce, which lower their 
income additionally. In any of these two situations, less yield or indebtedness, the farmer’ 
economic vulnerability increases, which enhances their level of poverty. 
  
C
The changes in the Zambian cotton industry’s business environment since 2005
from a concentrated to a competitive structure, have worked in the advantage of small scale 
farmers. The farmers have acquired more options in terms of choosing which companies to 
negotiate with, and this has forced the companies to greater price competition. This has 
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particular been the case in the eastern province, where Yustina offered a higher market price 
than the other companies. This has lately resulted in larger income for farmers obtained from 
cotton cultivation, in particular for those residents in the eastern province and for those who 
sold at the end of the market season where the prices were peaking. Whereas this has worked 
to the advantage of the farmers, the aggressive competition between the companies has 
resulted in the cotton industry experiencing a crisis that hampers the future development of 
the cotton industry in Zambia.  
 
Since Zambia’s liberalization, it has essentially been the private cotton companies who had 
run and coordinated the Zambian industry. The challenges that existed in the cotton industry 
were to a large extent solved by the companies. This was possible as the cotton industry was 
oncentrated, and since few companies needed to coordinate, they had a greater chance of 
eir investments, to solve the obstacles in the industry. But after the 
f 
ompanies investment in pre-financing, as companies are pirate-buying the cotton, creates a 
e to the loss of their income generating job. 
 
tential in the cotton industry to reduce poverty in Zambia 
 
c
capturing the return of th
cotton industry has moved to a competitive structure, some of the companies do not have the 
same incentives to work together and coordinate.  
 
Due to the Zambian state’s hands-off approach towards the cotton industry, inadequate rules 
and regulations exist in Zambia’s cotton industry. This fact, combined with the less return o
c
credit default crisis. Given that the Zambian cotton industry is highly dependent on the 
companies’ investments, the need of enforcing rules and regulations that guarantee the 
companies’ property rights is crucial. With the lack of secure investments, the companies 
will not pre-finance or train the farmers. This makes eventually the Zambian cotton quality to 
decline, leaving the final price to farmers decline as well. Further, if the level of competition 
continues concurrently, with the lack of secured property rights, it becomes less profitable for 
companies to operate in Zambia. As a result they might relocate to another country, leaving 
farmers worse off than before, du
How to utilize the po
From the variables listed above, it is clear that price competition between companies is 
necessary to maintain, thereby making the profits acquired on the world market trickle down 
to farmers, allowing the farmers to earn the optimal from their cotton cultivation. It is
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likewise crucial that the Zambian state enforces regulations in the competition and secure 
companies’ property rights, thereby securing the companies incitement to invest in the 
quired pre-financing and training of farmers in yield and quality cotton production. Both 
 income from cotton is to be optimal, which eventually 
gainst the background of these conclusions, it can be concluded that the full potential for 
are constrained by their poverty, which hinders them from utilising the opportu-
ities the linkage to cotton companies, in a way that enables them to climb the development 
.1 Perspectives 
ers’ capability of escaping poverty through Zambia’s 
cotton industries draw out some interesting issues in relation to cotton. This includes upgrad-
re
conditions are crucial if the farmers’
enables them to escape poverty through the cotton industry. Enforcing the Cotton Act would 
solve the problems of upholding companies’ property rights, thereby securing that the 
companies maintain the investments required eventhough the price competition could 
continue. For the cotton industry to work as a poverty reduction strategy, another important 
strategy is to strengthen the farmers’ bargaining position in relation to the companies. The 
farmer association’s advocacy needs to be increased for farmers and politicians, for them to 
become aware of the terms farmers life with, when participating in cotton trade.  
 
Concluding remarks 
A
small scale farmers to utilize the cotton industry as a poverty reduction strategy has not yet 
been reached. For some of the farmers it might have enabled them to escape poverty, due to 
their advantage point in time of departure in terms of large amounts of household workers 
and livestock, but for the bulk of the Zambian cotton farmers they are still extremely poor.  
 
The farmers 
n
ladder. When the farmers are cultivating cotton under the conditions of poverty, it is ex-
tremely difficult for them to move out of the low equilibrium trap. Still, the farmers would be 
worse of if the companies were to leave Zambia. When combining the relatively high profits 
and high risk connected to cultivating cotton, with the farmer’s alternatives in food crops, the 
mix increases the farmer’s capability of withstanding exposure to shocks, hence reducing 
their economical vulnerability.  
9
 
The findings of this report on farm
ing of cotton into products with more value, thereby presumable improved income for 
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farmers involved and improvement for Zambian national development in general. I will here 
oes it affect their schooling, and 
hen does the work become too hard and for too long” (IW:Krogh-Poulsen).  
hile this argumentation is explicable, the ‘gray area’ means that children might be used as 
ur in the cotton field. The cotton companies are arguing that there is not much for 
them to do about child labour (IW:Dettmer). In relation to this, Godfrida Sumaili, the 
Program Director of Jesus Cares Ministries, working with child labour, is ar
ginneries do not bother with panies are saying that they are 
negotiating with the adults of the households, and they cannot do anything about parents 
wanting their childr arming aili)
 
 
 
                                                
briefly touch upon these elements. 
 
Child labour in cotton production 
To earn as much money as possible, small scale farmers seek to produce as much cotton as 
possible. Therefore children are often helping in their family’s cotton production. Whether 
child labour is allowed depends on the work performed by the children. The work is distin-
guished between easy, middle and hard work. The general minimum age is fifteen, which is 
normally the age where they have finished primary school (IW:Krogh-Poulsen). Children 
below fifteen are allowed to have four ours of work per day, as long as it does not interfere 
with participating in school or with the child’s need to resituate. “But obviously there exist a 
large grey area, which is very difficult to control. When d
w
 
The reason why the frame is set at four hour is the recognition of the fact that if families 
where not allowed to have their children helping them, they could not afford to have their 
children go to school145 or, in worst cases, they could not survive. “Lax child labor regula-
tions can often be justified by the argument that under conditions of widespread poverty it is 
not feasible or desirable to withdraw young workers form the labor force” (Rodrik 
2007:229).  
 
W
cheap labo
guing: The 
child labour issues. The com
en into f  (IW: Sum .  
 
14 , free chooling has existed since 2002, but students still have to pay for school uniforms 
and books (FNDP:32). 
5 In Zambia primary s
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Cotton in a health context  
ambia sells almost its entire cotton lint production on the world market, primarily to Asia 
sport costs is minimal, hence the unit cost less.  
 
Throughout the developing world, where farmers are exposed to cotton pesticides, reports 
document illnesses from pesticides, miscarriages and, in worst cases, deaths of cotton 
farmers (Dowd 2008:252). Farmers have little knowledge about the negative effects of 
pesticides including the chronic poisoning that occurs from inhalation (IW:Banda). This 
means that they do not protect themselves when exposed to pesticides, leading to direct skin 
contact when applying pesticides. Moreover, the companies do not provide the farmers with 
the protective outfit needed: gloves and boots. This puts the farmers at risk, and especially 
the children who are exposed to chemicals, when spraying the cotton with chemicals. 
Although it is illegal that children below eighteen get in contact with chemicals, parents 
without knowledge of the danger to which they expose their children, make them help with 
the chemicals alongside the rest of the family (IW:Sumaili) 
 
Cotton transformed into textile  
Z
(IW:Seabrook). The figure below (figure 9) is an illustration of how the textile commodity 
likely looks like. Eventhough it is not a necessity to have the raw materials domestically to 
develop a textile industry, and many variables influence the choice of location of textile 
industry, it is a paradox that Zambia, with a domestic large cotton production, has not been 
able to compete in the international textile sector. When the whole process is located domes-
tically, the tran
 
Figure 9 
Inputs:  
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 From a GVC theory upgrading perspective, the lack of a textile industry is troublesome. 
east Developed Countries should focus on a downgrading development strategy, 
ence focus on core advantages and improve these (Gibbon & Ponte 2005). In the case of the 
 the most globally spread industries, the possibilities to find 
e best location in which 
 start a business. Whereas a textile industry can be established everywhere and at low cost 
in Asia, cobber mining and cotton, which Zambia produces, can only take place in a few 
Since most of the value addition is connected to the textile nodes of the chain and not to the 
cotton itself, the shutdowns of the textile industry have considerable effect on national 
development. However, in relation to this, Peter Gibbon and Stefano Ponte argue that this 
classic upgrading model is not always beneficial for developing countries. The assumption 
behind this view is that ‘lead agents’ in the textile chain are retailers, who are much more 
‘driven’ in terms of regulating the marked and demand. Gibbon and Ponte further argue that 
caution should be taken, due to the fact that too much adjustment to buyers’ requirements can 
be too expensive for a Least Developed Country like Zambia. Instead of upgrading, they 
argue that L
h
cotton-textile commodity chain, this would be producing the best quality in cotton, with the 
greatest volume and leave the textile commodity to others.  
 
The focus on downgrading is related to another argument laid forward by the two research-
ers: Instead of the suppliers getting a premium for new quality adjustments that are being 
embedded in the end-product, they might have to meet higher entry barriers and entity costs, 
with no financial gain (ibid:118). For example do retailers demand better labour standards 
and lower unit cost, without allocating the finance to the supplier to accomplish these 
requirements. 
 
Since the textile industry is one of
suppliers for the buyers in the chain are more or less unlimited. As a result, the industry is 
mobile, feasible to set up everywhere which makes the argument of ‘race to the bottom’ 
prevalent. To stay competitive, including attracting investments and orders, improving skills 
and technology, the textile producers in developing countries need close linkages with 
retailers in developed countries. Considering that the textile industry is very mobile and 
feasible to set up everywhere, a land-locked country might not be th
to
geographically limited places.   
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 Second-Hand Clothing 
It is widely recognized that the textile industry can play an important role in relation to 
employment and economic development (Rodrik 2006:2). But even if the Zambian State 
wished to establish a textile industry, the large second-hand clothing industry in Zambia 
would make it difficult to create the incentive to start the industry. When there is a second-
hand clothing business competing with first-hand clothing, no big industry will have an 
interest in investing in that area. The production costs would be too high, due to Zambia’s 
land-locked position and to the fact that there would be no demand locally for first-hand 
xtiles since the consumers would prefer second-hand clothes that are cheaper (IW:Krough-
otton as genetically modified 
Since it is claimed that genetically modified cotton offers a range of production benefits, 
including higher yields, quality increases, labor savings, reduction in applying pesticide and 
healthier environment, I will briefly treat this subject in terms of its use in Zambia (Gouse et 
al 2008:103). From the list above indicating the benefits, it seems that upgrading cotton to 
genetically modified cotton is a beneficial strategy for small scale farmers to evict poverty. In 
line with what the green revolution witnessed in Asia in the 1980s.  
 
                                        
te
Poulsen).  
 
The administration director, Christopher Mtonga of Swarp Spinning Mills146 , as well as 
others, argue that the Zambian State should use safeguard measures on textile imports 
(IW:Mtonga, Koyi 2006:16). However, there are no governmental initiatives in the pipeline 
for this to happen (IW:Kamona). Birgitte Krogh-Poulsen147 offers this explanation: “The 
problem is that many are now occupied in the Salaula business, and restricting second-hand 
clothing would put many out of job. Since the second-hand clothing has become an industry 
in itself, you have to look far to find any politicians that are willing to fight for this case” 
(IW:Krough-Poulsen). Hence the prosperity of establishing a textile industry in Zambia once 
more seems unthinkable.  
 
C
         
sion of payment in January 2009. 146 This company went into suspen
147 The Chief Technical Advisor of the United Nations International Labour Organization.  
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But developing genetically modified cotton crop includes heavy investments in research and 
orris 2001:94). Currently, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, 
MO legislation (Gouse et al 
008:104). “…, only 5 % of GM cotton is grown by smallholders in South Africa … [and the] 
be 
laces” (Bingen 2008:231). Hence it does not seem to be expanding that 
 do not know 
d soil 
ts farmers’ health at less risk, as pesticides are not being used. Furthermore, there 
wd 
n in 1994 in Uganda and Tanzania and 
 
cotton in 
nic 
brook). The cost 
r 
5 
.  
development (Kaplinsky & M
Kenya and Egypt are the only African countries that have G
2
apparent successes of the technology amongst African smallholders in South Africa are 
premised on concentrated institutional, financial and technical support that is unlikely to 
eplicated in many pr
rapidly to include a large proportion of Zambian cotton industry. Moreover, we
the side effect of modifying the nature, which is a concern often heard in the EU.  
 
Organic cotton 
Organic cotton differs from conventional cotton, since it degrades the environment an
less and pu
is a price premium connected to organic cotton compared to conventional cotton (Do
2008:252f). Certified organic cotton cultivation bega
has since spread to Benin, Senegal, Mali and Burkina Faso (ibid:252). Since the price
premium increases farmers’ income, there are reasons to study whether cultivating 
Zambia is a possibility. Dunavant is currently examining the possibility of producing orga
cotton in Zambia, but are arguing that it is currently not profitable (IW:Sea
of acquiring certified organic cotton should be upheld with the currently low demand fo
organic cotton on the world market, where the organic cotton market represents solely 0,1
percent of total cotton exports from SSA (2005), although it is increasing (Dowd 2008:252)
 
 
Cotton field. The cotton seed is ready to be picked. 
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Appendix A: Yearly development in the cotton production in Zambia 
 1991-92 
1992-
93 
1993-
94 
1994-
95 
1995-
96 
1996-
97 
1997- 
98 
1998-
99 
1999- 
00 
2000- 
01 
2001- 
02 
2002-
03 2003-04 2004-05 
2005-
06 
2006-
07 
2007-
08 
 
Production of raw 0  7cotton in tons 26000 32000 37 00 42000 49000 84000 104.000 88.000 75000 80000 145000 160000 22 000 121000 170000 84000 101000 
Average 
production for 500 500 cotton farmers  in 
kg/ha 
500 60 00  7 70 0 75 0 500 500 0 6 600 600 700 00 0 75 750 750 0 75
 
Source: Data from 1991-1997 from the RATES repor m 19 ata  2007 outgro Data t and fro 97-2008 d from CDT and 2008 wer Fund 
  
Total hectares 
cutlivated  42000 68000 7400  7 0 00 84000 98000 140000 1 3000 150000 125000 114000 116000 118000 30 000 3000 0    
Number of cotton 3800farmers  0 40000 500  6. 00 0.0 0000 50000 50.000 85.000 8 000 95. 0 120.000 140.000 140.000 
             
? 25 00 250. 0    
 
Source: Data from 1991-1995 from the RATES report and from 1995 to 2005 data from CDT 2006 
  
Average 
production      71      71      71        71        71        71          71 71 
costs/Ha in US$ 
         71           71           71       
Average raw 
cotton sale                                                     
price/kg in US$    0.25      0.25      0.25      0.25      0.25     0.25         0.25 
                
     0.25 
      
         0.25 
     
          0.25 
        
       0.20       
 
Source: Data from 1991-2001 from the RATES report and from 2001-2002 data from CDT 2007 and 2008 outgrower Fund Data 
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A
 
 1991-9 94 1 96 9 99  01-02 Note 
ppendix B: Yearly cotton production, cost, 
2 199
sal
2-9
e a
3
nd 
19
in
93-
come  
1994-95 995-96 19 -97 1997-98 1 98-99 1 9-00 2000-01 20
Average production costs/Ha in US$ 7 7 71 71 1 1 71 1 71 71 71 71 71 71
Raw cotton sales price/kg in US$ 0,2 2 0 25 0,20 1 5 0,25 0, 5 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 ,25 0,  
Total hectares cutlivated  4200 0 14 125 00 116000 1 0 68000 740 0 84000 98000 0000 173000 150000 000 1140
Number of cotton farmers  3800 0 8 120. 0 140.000 1 0 40000 500 0 50000 50.000 5.000 86.000 95.000 000 140.0 0 
Production of raw cotton in tons 2600 0 8 75 0 145000 1 0 32000 370 0 42000 49000 4000 104.000 88.000 000 8000
Total Yearly Cost in US$ 2982000 4828000 52 00540 5964000 69 0 5800 9940000 12283000 10 06500 0 8875000 80 00940  8236000 2 
Total Yearly Sale in US$ 6500000 8000000 92 00500 10500000 12250000 21000000 26000000 22000000 18750000 200 00 2000 9000000 3 
Total Income in US$ 3518000 3172000 3996000 4536000 5292000 11060000 13 00717 0 11350000 9875000 119 00 2060 0764000 4 
Yearly income per farmer in US$ 93 80 80 91 106 131 160 120 83 86 149 5 
 
Note 1: The data in this statistic are take  A to conduct own calculations based on Ra nd CDTs statistics 
Note 2: Data derived from average production ts total hectares cultivated. 
Note 3: Data derived from cotton sales price and pr ion of cotton. 
Note 4: Data derived from total yearly sale and total yearly cost. 
Note 5 Data derived from total yearly income and number of cotton farmers. 
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Appendix C: List of Cotton Companies operating in Zambia 2008  
 
All
Year of inception: 2006 
Area
Local affiliates of mu
com
 
Birchand Cotton Zambia Limited  
Years of inception: 2006 
Area n: Easter
 
Cargill Cotton Ginnery Limited  
Year of inception: 2003 
Large transnational cotton company  
Area ation: Easter
Are also operating in Zimbabwe, Tanzania, 
South Africa and Malawi  
 
Chi   
Yea
Area
Chin
 
Continental
Yea
Area ion: Eastern and Southern
Indian based company  
 
Dunavant Zambia Limited  
Year of inception: 2001 
Large transnational cotton company  
Area of operation: Eastern, Central, Southe
Western and Copperbelt provinces 
Are also operating in Mozambique and Ugan
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year of inception: 2005 
Areas of operation: Southern  
ffili al 
Joint venture between Plexus Cotton Limited 
and Africa Resources Holdings Limited, with 
cotton gins in Uganda, Malawi, Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe 
 
Mukuba Ginneries Limited  
Year of inception 1998 
Areas of operation: Central 
 
Mulungushi Cotton & Cooking Oil Com-
pany  
ear of inceptio  
Areas of operation: Central  
hina.  
f inception 2004  
Areas of operation: Eastern 
 
ustina il Co
Areas of operation: Eastern 
Malawien   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iance Cotton Ginneries Limited  
 
Great Lakes Cotton Company  
s of operation: Central   
lti-national cotton 
panies 
s of operatio n 
s of oper n  
pata Cotton Company
r of inception: 2004 oint venture between Zambia and C
s of operation: Eastern 
ese based company  
 
Olam Zambia Limited  
Year o
 Ginnery  
r of inception: 1997 
s of operat   Y
Year of inception 2008  
s rn,  
da  
Local a
nies.  
ates of trans-nation cotton compa-
Y n: 1998
J
 Cotton & O mpany Limited 
 company
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 Appendix D: Companies ginning capacity, market share and ginning locations 
 
Ginning capacity and market share 2007/08 
Market share of  Ginning capacityCompany  Ginning capacity  
tons 
Estimated volum
 tons  
es 
estimated volumes   not utilised 
Dunavant 120.000 57000 40,9% 47% 
Cargill 55.000 29000 20,8% 48% 
CCC 20.000 17000 12,2% 15% 
Continental 18.000 12500 9,0% 31% 
Alliance 15.000 9000 6,5% 40% 
Great Lakes  15.000 5000 3,6% 67% 
Mulungushi 10.000 5000 3,6% 50% 
Birchland 8.000 4000 2,9% 50% 
Mukuba 1.000 1000 0,7% 0% 
Olam 16.000 Note1     
Yustina  10.000 Note1     
Total 288.000 139.500 100% 48% 
 
ing by Richard Dettmer during an interview the 5th of August 2009 
   
Source: Cargill, 8th of April 2008 giv
Note 1: There are no data for estimated volumes for these ginneries. This is because they are new companies and their 
estimated volumes are unknown. Because these two variables are unknown it is feasible that the market share and the 
share of ginning capacity is different than is shown in this statistic 
Capacity of Ginneries 2008 
Company Gin Location Provences Capacity tons/season 
Dunavant  Katete Eastern 22.000 
  Mumbwa Central 25.000 
  Gwembe Southern 19.000 
  Petauke Eastern 17.000 
 Kabwe Central 22.000 
  Lundazi Eastern 10.000 
    115.000 
Cargill  Chipata Eastern 55.000 
Chipata Cotton Ginnery Chipata Eastern 14.000 
  Petauke Eastern 14.000 
    28.000 
Continental  Kalomo Southern 8.000 
  Sinda Eastern 15.000 
    23.000 
Mulangushi Cotton Co Ginnery Kabwe Central 10.000 
Great Lakes Cotton Company  Sinazengwe Southern 20.000 
Alliance Cotton Kafue Lusaka 14.000 
Birchland Cotton Zambia Ltd Chama Eastern 12.000 
Others (Yustina, Olam and Mukaba)  Eastern and Central 8.000 
Total   285.000 
(Source: CDT 2008:5)    
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Appendix E: List of interviews 
 
Cargill Cotton Ginnery Limited 
Managing Director: John Battershell 24.06.08, Chipata 
Country Manager: Richard Dettmer: 05.08.08, Chipata 
ead of Agriculture Statistics Branch: Masiliso Sooka, 09.07.08, 16.07.08, Lusaka 
istrict Organisational Coordinator: Virgil Malambo, Chipata 23.06.08, 25.06.08, 4.08.08, 
anaging Director P.R Dawle 18.08.08. Lusaka  
hipata representative of CAZ: Michael Banda 23.06.08, Chipata  
.08, Lusaka 
otton Development Trust (CDT) 
 20.08.08, Magoye 
ambia Limited 
Development Worker for MS: Rose Adoul: 31.07.08, Lusaka  
 Project (FSRP) 
 
Central Statistical Office (CSO) 
H
 
Chipta District Farmer Association 
D
5.08.08 
 
Continental Cotton Ginnery 
M
 
Cotton Association of Zambia (CAZ) 
C
National coordinator: Joseph Nkole. 01.07
 
C
Director, West K. Chitah
 
Dunavant Z
Managing Director: Nigel Seabrook, 18.06.08, Lusaka 
Ginnery and Administration Manager of Katete and Petauke: Alibandila Siwiwaliondo 08.08.08  
Regional Agricultural Manger: Kenan Basaka 08.08.08, Katete 
 
Farmer Organisation Support Programme (FOSUP) 
Executive Director: Mike Muleba. 31.07.08, Lusaka 
 
Food Security Research
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Research Associate: Stephen Kabwe, 12.08.08, Lusaka 
 
penhagen University  
t professor, M  
str orking with Child Labour) 
Agricul nd Co-operatives (MACO) 
irector of A lture: Richard Mubukwanu Kamona 18.08.08, Lusaka 
 
 and Advocacy sor, Nathalie Cunin 16.06.08, Lusaka 
 Officer:  Vind-Andersen 16.06.08, 21.08.08, Lusaka 
 
king oil Company  
bwe 
yimba District Farmers Association 
 
warp Spinning Mills 
irector of Administration, Christopher Q Mtonga 13.08.08, Ndola 
nited National International Labour Organisation  
hief Technical Advisor: Birgitte Krogh-Poulsen, Lusaka 19.06.08 
ustina Cotton and Oil Company  
anaging Director Jesse M.K. Kitta 24.06.08, Chipata 
eneral Manager: Yokonia Manda 24.06.08, Chipata   
ambia National Farmers Union 10.08.08 
 
Institute of Geography. Co
Assistan arianne Nylandsted Larsen, Ph.D. Copenhagen 20.05.08
 
Jesus Cares Mini ies (W
Program Director Godfrida Sumaili 01.07.08, Lusaka 
 
Ministry of ture a
Deputy D gricu
Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke Zambia 
Lobby  Advi
Information  Lena
Mulungushi Cotton and Coo
General Manager: Mwalanga Weston 15.08.08, Ka
 
N
Coordinator Albert Chaala, 28.06.08 Nyimba
 
S
D
 
U
C
 
Y
M
G
 
Z
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Appendix F 
World Cotton Production 2005 
in million Metric Tons 
China  5,80 
USA 3,98 
India 2,93 
Parkistan 1,84 
Brazil 1,37 
Uzbekistan 0,99 
Others  5,29 
 
 
 
Souce Cotton: Review of the World Situation  
International Cotton Advisory Committe vol. 58 nr. 2 nov-dec 2004:2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
World Cotton Export 2005 
USA 3,10 
CFA Zone  1,10 
Usbekistan 0,70 
Australia  0,55 
Greece 0,26 
Brazil  0,50 
China 0,04 
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Appendix G 
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(Source: Colin Poulton et al 2004:82)
Appendix H: The Contract between Dunavant and farmers 
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Appendix I: The Cotton Act 2005  
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